Governmental Payments for Ecosystem Services Programs in China by Chen, Cheng
Governmental Payments for 
Ecosystem Services Programs in China
   The Institutional Settings and Market-based Approach
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 12.12.2019
Dissertation 
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades Doctor rerum agriculturarum (Dr. rer. agr.)
von M.Sc. Cheng Chen
eingereicht an der Lebenswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Präsidentin der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Prof. Dr.-Ing. Dr. Sabine Kunst
Dekan der Lebenswissenschaftlichen Fakultät
der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Prof. Dr. Bernhard Grimm
Gutachter/innen: 
1. Prof. Dr. Klaus Müller (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin)
2. Prof. Dr. Bettina Matzdorf (Leibniz Universität Hannover)
3. Dr. rer. agr. Thomas Aenis (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin)
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This work is dedicated to my loving daughter Zeling. Thanks to my wife Qian, my 
mother Yabing Wu and my father Ming Chen for all their great support! 
 Content 
    Preface & Acknowledgement………………………………………………………………………………V 
    Summary ................................................................................................................. VII  
Zusammenfassung .................................................................................................... IX  
Keywords……………………………………………………………………………………………………………XII 
Schlagwörter………………………………………………………………………………………………………XII 
List of Publications ................................................................................................ XIII  
List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................ XVI  
List of Figures ....................................................................................................... XVII  
List of Tables ....................................................................................................... XVIII  
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 1 
1.1 Research background ......................................................................................... 
1.2 Research objectives ........................................................................................... 
1.3 Research structure ............................................................................................. 
2 The PES Concept and Governmental PES ................................................................ 
2.1 The PES concept ................................................................................................. 
2.2 PES and governmental PES ................................................................................ 
2.3 Institutional context for PES in China ................................................................ 
2.4 Governmental PES in China ............................................................................... 
3 Framing Research on Governmental PES ................................................................ 
3.1 Theoretical framework ...................................................................................... 
3.2 Solidifying the research objectives .................................................................... 
4 Publications .............................................................................................................. 
1
4
5
7
7
7
9
XIII
X I
X II
X III
V
II
I
II
XII
12
16
16
16
20
 Paper 1: The Institutional challenges of Payment for Ecosystem Service Program 
in China: A review of the effectiveness and implementation of Sloping 
Land Conversion Program.......................................................................... 
Paper 2: How socioeconomic and institutional conditions at the household level 
shape the environmental effectiveness of governmental payments for 
ecosystem services program ..................................................................... 
Paper 3: The network of actors in a governmental PES program: Local 
governance models for China’s Sloping Land Conversion Program .......... 
Paper 4: Qualitative comparative institutional analysis of environmental 
governance: Implications from research on payments for ecosystem 
services ...................................................................................................... 
Paper 5: Strengths and weaknesses of the Net-Map tool for participatory social 
network analysis in resource management: Experience from case 
studies conducted on four continents ....................................................... 
5 Synthesis and Discussion ......................................................................................... 
5.1 Overall results .................................................................................................... 
5.2 How to improve the design of governmental PES ............................................. 
5.3 Methods for ecosystem service governance ..................................................... 
5.4 Overall limitations .............................................................................................. 
6 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 
7 Reference .................................................................................................................. 
8 Eigenständigkeitserklärung ...................................................................................... 
  
21
49
64
90
102
109
109
111
119
120
123
125
130
 Preface & Acknowledgements 
This dissertation is the culmination of my journey of Ph.D which is accompanied by 
motivating, hardship, encouragement, frustration and fulfilment. The journey laid a 
foundation for my future scientific career and builds my resilience to ensure the big 
dreams can be realized with joint efforts. I have so much to be grateful for the 
fruition, particularly for all of the wonderful who help me to get to this point. 
I would like to thank to my supervisors and colleagues. First of all, I am extremely 
grateful to my “Doktormutter”, Prof. Dr. Bettina Matzdorf, who offered me great 
freedom to realize my ideas, supported me with good advice and protected me with 
necessary criticism. Second, I would like to express my sincere thanks to Prof. Dr. 
Klaus Müller, who let me to carry out this work with scientific and financial support. 
Third, I thank my co-authors, Prof. Dr. Lin Zhen, Dr. Class Meyer, Dr. Barbara 
Schröter, Dr. Claudia Sattler and Dr. Hannes König for their supportive and 
constructive input. And finally, I am grateful to Prof. Dr. Klaus Eisenack, Dr. Tomas 
Aenis and Dr. Lasse Loft for an inspiring defense. 
I would also like to express my appreciation to my great working group members, 
particularly, Carolin Biedermann, Michaela Reutter, Marlen Krause, Christoph 
Schulze, Nahleen Lemke, Edward Ott, Rena Barghusen, Annett Rosenberger and Dr. 
Sarah Schomers. 
For those who facilitated my stay in China, I am obligated to express my grateful 
feelings. I would acknowledge the support from Dr. Chao Wang and Dr. Jie Hu as well 
as other team members from Institute of Geographic Sciences and Natural 
Resources Research (IGSNRR), Chinese Academy of Sciences, for their helps during 
my early stage of data collection. 
The generous funding for my doctoral studies came mainly from the China 
scholarship Council (CSC). I received additional funding from the Leibniz-Centre for 
Agricultural Landscape Research (ZALF) e.V. In parallel with finalising the 
dissertation, I was fortunately working with the AgoraNatura project and Peatwise 
projects. 
Finally, deep gratitude and special thanks to my family: my wife, Qian, for being side 
with me to take this huge challenge, especially for accompanying me here in 
V
 Germany with lots of love and encouraging me to become a better person; my sweet 
daughter, Zeling, who lights my life with happiness and empowers me with great 
motivation; my parents, who set me off on the road to pursue my dream. Thanks to 
all the family members that support me to be a son, father and researcher.  
Preface & AcknowledgementVI
 Summary 
My dissertation focuses on institutional aspects of governmental payments for 
ecosystem services (PES) in China. Market-based approaches for ecosystem service 
governance, particular the PES, have been considered new and innovative policy 
instruments over the past decades. Corresponding to this international trend, PES 
schemes in China are mostly described by the domestic term eco-compensation. 
However, the characteristics of eco-compensation are distinct from other national 
PES programs, as governance model, property rights and societal structures in China 
are different to the PES theory. Eco-compensation faces many institutional challenges 
in creating economic incentives for behavioral change. However, PES that combines 
elements of both a voluntary market and hierarchy-based system in dealing with 
incomplete institutional settings has not yet been sufficiently addressed. In 
particular, there is a knowledge gap regarding fitting the design of PES and 
institutional settings in China together. 
The mechanisms of PES in China differ in important ways from mechanisms familiar 
from the western experience. This dissertation aims to reduce the divergence 
between the common framing of PES and the reality of its practice by presenting the 
institutional analysis of China’s governmental PES program. As a major component of 
eco-compensation, the Sloping Land Conversion Program (SLCP) is considered one of 
the world’s largest PES programmes. By taking SLCP as an empirical case, the first 
objective of this dissertation is to understand how to improve the institutional design 
of governmental PES. The second lies in a broad international context, aiming at 
methodologically contributing to the analysis of ecosystem services governance. This 
dissertation follows a cumulative structure, integrating the framework text and five 
papers. 
Chapter 1 is an introduction, outlining the research gaps and objectives of 
governmental PES. Chapter 2 provides a theoretical foundation to the institutional 
economic schools, their respective theories and the relevance of nature resource 
governance in China. Based on this, Chapter 3 confirms the research design by 
deconstructing the research objectives into different research questions. Chapter 4 is 
the results section, which comprises five papers. The first paper provides the 
VII
 conceptual basis for all subsequent studies presented in this dissertation, as it is an 
overview of the effectiveness and institutional challenges of China’s Sloping Land 
Conversion Program (SLCP). Both the second and third papers are empirical works. 
The second paper explores how socioeconomic and institutional conditions 
encourage rural households to reach the primary environmental goals of SLCP. The 
third paper shows how local dynamics derived and shaped the SLCP’s 
implementation. The fourth paper illustrates and discusses the method used in paper 
2, comparing it with another case study in Germany. Finally, the fifth paper present 
the strengths and weaknesses of the method used in paper 3 based on the 
experiences of four different countries. Together, these papers deliver important 
contributions to both objectives. Chapter 5 is the synthesis and discussion, and 
Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation. 
The key finding of this dissertation is that the effectiveness of governmental PES is a 
result of interacting driving forces, whereas institutional settings and local dynamics 
play key roles in shaping program implementation. The SLCP could achieve its 
potential in creating significant economies of scale and environmental effectiveness 
under certain institutional conditions. However, against incomplete institutional 
settings, the current implementation of SLCP has deviated substantially from the 
market approach promoted by policy makers. While the incomplete institutional 
settings did not prevent SLCP’s wide acceptance and fast development in its first 
phases, there is no by-pass to reach the long term success in terms of environmental 
effectiveness in the absence of key PES elements. The program’s predominantly top-
down approach and lack of genuinely voluntary characteristics, conditionality and 
property rights are jointly understood to be critical factors that explain possible 
failures in the long-term. 
Another contribution which this dissertation makes is in methodological approaches 
of ecosystem service governance. This dissertation has shown that mixed approaches 
combining qualitative and quantitative methods, such as Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (QCA) and social network analysis (SNA), could have great potential for 
institutional analysis and participatory research for PES. The two methods were given 
particular emphasis in the detailed description of application, as well as in the 
inherent merits and limitations. 
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 Zusammenfassung  
Meine Dissertation  beschäftigt sich mit den institutionellen Aspekten staatlicher 
Zahlungen für Ökosystemleistungen (Payments for Ecosystem Services „PES“) in 
China. Marktbasierte Ansätze zur Steuerung von Ökosystemleistungen, insbesondere 
von PES, wurden in den letzten Jahrzehnten als neue und innovative 
Politikinstrumente angesehen. Entsprechend diesem internationalen Trend sind PES 
auch in China populär, werden jedoch meist mit dem inländischen Begriff der  
Ökokompensation beschrieben. Einen wirtschaftlichen Anreiz für 
Verhaltensänderungen zu schaffen, wenn das Ökokompensations-Programm nur ein 
Ausgleich für gesetzliche Einschränkungen ist, kann eine Herausforderung darstellen. 
Die Merkmale der Ökokompensation unterscheiden sich von anderen nationalen 
PES-Programmen, da sich das Governance-Modell, die Eigentumsrechte und die 
gesellschaftlichen Strukturen in China stark von anderen Staaten unterscheiden. Die 
Ökokompensation steht vor vielen institutionellen Herausforderungen, wenn es 
darum geht, ökonomische Anreize für Verhaltensänderungen zu schaffen. Zahlungen 
für Ökosystemleistungen, die Elemente sowohl eines freiwilligen, marktbasierten als 
auch eines hierarchischen Systems kombinieren, um mit den besonderen 
institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen umzugehen, wurden bisher noch nicht 
ausreichend untersucht. Eine Wissenslücke besteht insbesondere hinsichtlich der 
Anpassung des Designs von PES an die  institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen in 
China.  
Die Mechanismen von Zahlungen für Ökosystemleistungen in China unterscheiden 
sich in wichtigen Punkten von den aus der westlichen Erfahrung bekannten 
Mechanismen. Die vorliegende Dissertation zielt darauf ab, die Diskrepanz zwischen 
der allgemein gültigen Rahmung von Zahlungen von Ökosystemleistungen und der 
Realität ihrer Praxis zu verringern, indem sie eine institutionelle Analyse des 
chinesischen staatlichen PES-Programms vornimmt. Das Sloping Land Conversion 
Program (SLCP) gilt als eines der weltweit größten PES-Programme und ist ein 
wichtiger Bestandteil der Ökokompensation. Das erste Ziel dieser Dissertation ist es, 
anhand des SLCP als empirische Fallstudie zu verstehen, wie das institutionelle 
Design des staatlichen PES in China verbessert werden kann. Das zweite Ziel ist in 
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 einem breiteren internationalen Kontext zu sehen und zielt darauf ab, einen 
methodischen Beitrag zur Analyse der Governance von Ökosystemleistungen zu 
leisten. Die Dissertation folgt einer kumulativen Struktur, die aus einem Rahmentext 
besteht, in den fünf, von Experten begutachtete, Artikel aus internationalen 
Fachzeitschriften integriert sind. 
Kapitel 1 ist eine Einführung, in der die Forschungslücken und die Forschungsziele im 
Hinblick auf staatliche PES beschrieben werden. Kapitel 2 liefert die theoretische 
Grundlage  der institutionellen Ökonomie und zeigt die Bedeutung der Governance 
von Naturressourcen in China auf. Darauf aufbauend konkretisiert Kapitel 3 das 
Forschungsdesign, indem es die Forschungsziele in verschiedene Forschungsfragen 
untergliedert. Kapitel 4 beinhaltet den Ergebnisteil, der fünf Zeitschriftenartikel 
umfasst. Der erste Artikel liefert die konzeptionelle Grundlage für alle nachfolgenden 
Untersuchungen, die in dieser Dissertation vorgestellt werden, und gibt einen 
Überblick über die Wirksamkeit und die institutionellen Herausforderungen des 
chinesischen SLCP. Sowohl der zweite als auch der dritte Artikel sind empirische 
Untersuchungen. Der zweite Artikel untersucht, wie die sozioökonomischen und 
institutionellen Bedingungen Anreize für Haushalte in ländlichen Gebieten schaffen, 
um die primären Umweltziele des SLCP zu erreichen. Der dritte Artikel zeigt, wie 
lokale Dynamiken die Umsetzung des SLCP beeinflusst und geprägt haben. Der vierte 
Artikel veranschaulicht und diskutiert die im zweiten Artikel angewandte Methode 
im Vergleich zu einer weiteren Fallstudie in Deutschland. Der fünfte Artikel 
schließlich stellt die Stärken und Schwächen der im dritten Artikel angewandten 
Methode den Erfahrungen ähnlicher Studien in vier weiteren Ländern gegenüber. 
Zusammen liefern diese Artikel wichtige Beiträge für die beiden Ziele der 
Dissertation. Kapitel 5 beinhaltet die Synthese und Diskussion der Ergebnisse und 
Kapitel 6 schließt die Dissertation ab. 
Das wichtigste Ergebnis dieser Dissertation ist, dass die Wirksamkeit des staatlichen 
PES in China das Ergebnis der Interaktion der treibenden sozialen Kräfte ist, während 
institutionelle Rahmenbedingungen und lokale Dynamiken eine Schlüsselrolle bei 
der Ausgestaltung der Programmumsetzung spielen. Das SLCP hätte unter 
bestimmten institutionellen Bedingungen ein großes Potenzial für die Schaffung 
signifikanter Skaleneffekte und für die Verbesserung der Umwelteffektivität. 
ZusammenfassungX
 Allerdings weicht die derzeitige Umsetzung des SLCP wegen der besonderen 
institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen erheblich von dem von der Politik geförderten 
Marktansatz ab. Zwar haben die institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen die breite 
Akzeptanz und schnelle Entwicklung des SLCP in der Anfangsphase nicht behindert, 
doch gibt es keine Möglichkeit, einen langfristigen Erfolg im Hinblick auf die 
Umwelteffektivität zu erreichen, wenn die wichtigsten PES-Elemente fehlen. Der 
überwiegend von oben nach unten gerichtete Ansatz des Programms und das Fehlen 
von  echter Freiwilligkeit, Konditionalität und Eigentumsrechten werden zusammen 
als kritische Faktoren verstanden, die mögliche Misserfolge langfristig erklären. 
Ein weiterer Beitrag der Dissertation sind die methodischen Ansätze, die zum 
besseren Verständnis der Governance von Ökosystemleistungen beitragen. Diese 
Dissertation zeigt, dass Ansätze, die qualitative und quantitative Methoden 
kombinieren, wie z.B. Qualitative Vergleichende Analyse (Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis „QCA“) und Soziale Netzwerkanalyse (SNA), ein großes Potenzial für die 
institutionelle Analyse und partizipative Forschung von PES haben. Bei beiden 
Methoden wurde besonderes Augenmerk auf die detaillierte Beschreibung ihrer 
Anwendung sowie die damit verbundenen Vor- und Nachteile gelegt. 
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1 Introduction 
Ecosystems provide various benefits to human well-being. Humans use and modify 
natural ecosystems through agriculture, forestry, recreation, urbanization, and 
industry. For centuries, human impact has caused a number of dramatic changes to a 
variety of ecosystems. As ecosystem goods are often common or public goods, 
governmental governance structures may strongly influence their provision. Over the 
past few decades, market-based approaches have been considered to be new and 
innovative policy instruments, when compared to traditional regulation-based 
approaches. 
1.1 Research background 
Although the notion of ecosystem services (ES) has a long history, it was 
conceptualized in scientific literature less than a century ago (Daily 1997). Initially 
coined in the field of ecology, the concept of ES had evolved through various 
discussions in scientific communities. The expansion of the ecosystem service 
approach beyond specialized academic circles took place in the 1990s, when 
research on how to identify (Daily 1997), classify (de Groot et al. 2002) and value 
(Costanza et al. 1997) the ES were released. The concept of ES gained broader 
attention in 2005, when the United Nations published its Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment (MEA). In 2010, a report from Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity 
(TEEB) took up the task of promoting the ES concept to media, the general public and 
policy makers. Nowadays, ES is no longer just a concept but a framework for 
connecting scientists, decision-makers, other stakeholders and the general public 
(Schröter et al. 2014). As the network of ES, Ecosystem Service Partnership (ESP) 
claims that ES should enhance the science, policies and practices of ecosystems for 
conservation and sustainable development. 
ES definitions have evolved over time and several classifications can be found today. 
For example, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment in 2005 placed ES in four 
categories: (i) supporting services: nutrient cycling, soil formation, primary 
production; (ii) provisioning services: food, fresh water, wood and fiber; (iii) 
regulating services: climate and flood regulation, water purification; (iv) cultural 
services: aesthetic, recreational, spiritual. While markets exist and function well for 
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some ES, many ES with characteristics of public or common pool resources with 
incomplete property rights are still outside the current market system (Sattler and 
Matzdorf 2013). Therefore, some see the potential for using the ES concept to 
enhance the governance of ES provision (Fisher et al. 2009). 
At present, ES are increasingly reaching economic decisions through the widespread 
promotion of incentive-based instruments such as Payments for Ecosystem Services 
(PES). PES has been applied as a mechanism for translating external, non-market 
values of ES into positive financial incentives by paying land users or land owners for 
the provision of ES (Engel et al. 2008). The PES has not only transcended the 
academic arena but also governmental policy, as well as the non-profit and private 
sectors (Gómez-Baggethun et al. 2010). 
The definition of PES is not standardized, as different conservation approaches are 
bundled and co-exist under this concept. In theory, PES is dominated by the Coasean 
and the Pigouvian theorems. Corresponding to the market-based and user-financed 
PES in practice, the former defines PES as a voluntary transaction negotiated among 
private contractors, and sees the key role of market mechanisms for environmental 
conservation (Wunder et al. 2008). Theoretically, the Coase Theorem is rooted in the 
idea that private economic actors can reach an optimal allocation of resources 
without government intervention, but only when property rights are well-defined 
and transaction costs are low. As one of the most widely-cited authors of PES, 
Wunder (Wunder 2005, 2015) explicitly defined PES as consisting of voluntary, 
contractual, conditional and direct payments between ES buyers and ES sellers, in 
return for adopting practices that secure a well-defined ES.  
The Pigouvian theorem includes broader schemes by characterizing the 
intermediation of the government between those who benefit and those who 
preserve ES (Pigou 1920, Vatn 2010). The main difference between Coasean and 
Pigouvian PES schemes is whether the direct beneficiary pays the ES providers or the 
government acts on their behave. Over the last two decades, Pigouvian PES 
programs have become common all around the world, as a large number of 
governmental conservation schemes have adopted PES elements across both 
developing and developed countries (Wunder et al. 2008, Schomers and Matzdorf 
2013). However, deviating from Wunder’s ‘genuine PES’, many Pigouvian programs 
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are considered ‘PES-like’. 
Policymakers in China are increasingly interested in innovative approaches to 
addressing the country’s multiplying conservation challenges. Corresponding to the 
international trend of PES, “eco-compensation” is the most important concept in 
China for reforming conservation programs (Shang et al. 2018). It is defined as a 
mechanism to maintain or improve ecosystems by using economic incentives to 
change land users' actions. Some of the eco-compensation programs were 
recognized as PES-like schemes, as direct payment is often made by governments 
and the market mechanism is not yet fully in place (Bennett 2009). 
PES is commonly imbedded in broad institutional settings, with a variety of social-
ecological systems that do not resemble simple market-based buyer and seller 
relations. The characteristics of eco-compensation are distinct from other national 
PES programs, as clarity of property, responsibility fulfillment, executive efficiency, 
effectiveness, sustainability and equality in China are different to PES theory (Shang 
et al. 2018). China is undergoing a transition toward a market economy and parallel 
decentralization within a set of economic, political, and cultural institutions that 
remain embedded in a top-down, command configuration. Despite the official 
announcement of market mechanisms, the implementation of eco-compensation 
relies mainly on government structures, from the national down to the village level. 
The institutional settings for ‘genuine PES’ in China are, theoretically, far from ideal. 
However, China is not the only case of this. Ambiguity of property rights, multiply 
objectives and state centralized planning systems have been observed in other 
countries as well (Suhardiman et al. 2013), which may inevitably influence the 
suitability of the PES. However, most mainstream PES literature does little to explain 
situations in which there are no well-defined property rights. A new expansion of PES 
that combines elements of both a voluntary market-based and hierarchy-based 
system in dealing with incomplete settings has not yet been sufficiently addressed. In 
particular, there is a knowledge gap with regards to understand PES in China and its 
institutional settings as a new policy paradigm. 
As the flagship of the eco-compensation programs, the Sloping Land Conversion 
Program (SLCP) is considered one of the largest PES programs in the world. Due to its 
broad geographic cover, high level of participation and tremendous investment, the 
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SLCP has drawn substantial attention from the scientific community in China and 
over the world. There are more than 200 publications on SLPC in the Web of Science 
and the Scopus database (1999-2018). While most of this research has assessed the 
program’s success in combating soil erosion and poverty alleviation, far less attention 
has been devoted to describing its institutional aspects. Embracing innovative PES 
elements, however, the design and implementation of SLCP are embedded in 
incomplete institutional settings in China. The question remains open as to whether 
the SLCP is an institutional innovation or just “business as usual” (Bennett 2008). In 
particular, the dependence of the effectiveness of governmental PES on the 
institutional arrangement and local actors has been little explored. My dissertation 
aims to close this research gap and reduce divergence between the common framing 
of governmental PES and the reality of its practice by presenting an institutional 
analysis of China’s well-known PES program. 
1.2 Research objectives 
In this dissertation, I aim to investigate and improve understanding of a 
governmental PES in China, from an institutional economics point of view. I want to 
conduct a comprehensive and empirically-grounded analysis of the institutional 
arrangement of a large-scale PES program in China. I expect to contribute to the 
scientific debate of PES by having insights from China. It is also important to provide 
timely information to Chinese policy makers, in order to improve the program in the 
future. 
Additionally, in view of the methods employed by existing studies, gaps were 
identified for participatory and dynamic methodological approaches (Sattler et al. 
2018). Since my work employs a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
methods, including literature review, ecological measurement, village surveys, 
interviews and social network analysis (SNA), I intend that my experiences of these 
interdisciplinary approaches contribute to methodological development. Therefore, I 
present two methods that seem particularly promising in view of analyzing 
ecosystem services governance.  
Correspondingly, I intend to focus on two general research objectives: 
 
1Introduction 5
 
Research Objective A: How can the institutional design of governmental PES be 
improved? 
Research Objective B: What method can be used for ecosystem service governance 
analysis?  
1.3 Research structure 
The two general research objectives have been addressed by four individual peer-
reviewed papers and one working paper. Three papers (cited here as papers 1, 2 and 
3) depict the theoretical and empirical issues of governmental PES in China. Another 
two publications provide a methodological innovation in governmental PES (cited as 
papers 4 and 5) in an international context. Each paper focuses on a particular topic, 
which mainly contributes to one of the two objectives. Jointly, these papers provide 
important contributions to each objective. Within this dissertation’s framework, the 
contributions of the individual paper for the general research objectives are depicted 
in detail. Therefore, I will deconstruct the overall objectives into more specific 
research questions, which will then be answered by the five papers (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1: Paper contribution to research objectives 
 
In Section 2, I will present the overall picture by explaining the PES concept and 
governmental PES. In Section 3, I will solidify the individual research questions based 
on institutional economics ideas. In Section 5, I will present my answers to the 
questions raised. Finally, section 6 concludes the dissertation. 
  
How can the institutional design of governmental PES be 
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2 The PES Concept and Governmental PES 
2.1 The PES concept  
The PES concept is closely linked to the Coasen theorem, in which the beneficiary 
directly pays the ES provider on a purely voluntary basis, as an outcome of a private 
negotiation (Coase 1960). In the Coasean sense, Wunder (Wunder 2005, 2015) 
provides the most widely-cited PES definition, in which PES schemes are 
characterized as voluntary transactions where a well-defined ecosystem service is 
“bought” by at least one ecosystem service buyer from at least one ecosystem 
service provider, if and only if the ecosystem service provider(s) secure(s) the 
delivery of the service. However, in practice, obstacles to efficient private negotiation 
such as high transaction costs, power imbalances, or poorly defined property rights 
can prevent a Coasean solution (Engel et al. 2008).  
Opposed to the purely market-based Coasean principle, the PES concept was 
widened to incorporate the Pigovian approach later on, which promoted 
environmental taxation and subsidization for the correction of negative externalities 
(Sattler and Matzdorf 2013). In practices, most PES schemes do not strictly comply 
with Wunder's definition (Muradian et al. 2010), as they are mostly hybrid 
governance structures, which also include institutions of hierarchy and community 
engagement (Vatn 2010, Schomers and Matzdorf 2013) 
In summary, PES can be seen as an umbrella term for market-based, hierarchy-based 
and hybrid structures of ecosystem service management. On the one hand, PES has 
the potential to contribute to broader solutions for the sustainable use of natural 
resources. On the other hand, their applicability depends on a good fit to already 
existing institutional structures and governance (Vatn 2010, Muradian and Rival 
2012). For instance, the design of a PES should be in line with the extension of 
property rights establishment. 
2.2 PES and governmental PES 
Vatn (Vatn 2010) has defined governance as the establishment and change of 
institutional structures for the organization of natural resource usage. He identifies 
three main types of governance structures - hierarchies, markets, and community 
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management - and emphasizes that most types operate together. Following Vatn’s 
step, Matzdorf et al. (Matzdorf et al. 2013) developed a typology of PES governance 
which assesses the diverse types of PES governance structures, focusing on the 
government’s key role as a legal driver of ES demand and/or as an ES buyer (Figure 
2). This framework classifies PES schemes into four different governance models: 
user-and non-government financed payments, government-financed payments, 
compliant payments and compensation payments according to whether the state 
takes on one of these roles, both of these roles, or none, and thus yielding. Which 
type of PES governance might work better should be determined by the existing 
institutional settings in a given space and time.  
 
Figure 2: PES governance model (adapted from Matzdorf et al., 2013) 
 
For my thesis, I have applied a broad definition of PES, and have assumed that 
governmental PES schemes include government-financed payments and 
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out of legislations, such as agri-environmental measures (AEM) in Europe (Matzdorf 
and Meyer 2014), conservation programs in the US (Baylis et al. 2008), Payments for 
Environmental Services (PSA) in Costa Rica (Pagiola 2008), and Payments for 
Hydrological Environmental Services (PSAH) in Mexico (Kosoy et al. 2008). Another 
type of governmental PES is compensation payments for legal restrictions, where the 
state regulates institutions and compensates the fulfillment of regulations. 
The majority of PES schemes comply with the Pigouvian conceptualization (Schomers 
and Matzdorf 2013) because governmental PES has great potential for achieving 
large-scale environmental effectiveness and poverty reduction when there is strong 
and sufficient state capacity (Engel et al. 2008). However, the pitfalls of governmental 
PES in terms of targeting, stakeholder participation, conditionality, and additionality 
have drawn some attention (Wunder et al. 2008). Indeed, the EU’s agri-
environmental policy (Baylis et al. 2008), Costa Rica’s PAS (Pagiola 2008), Mexico’s 
PSAH and Vietnam’s Decision 380 (Suhardiman et al. 2013) have all been criticized 
for lacking in targeting and additionality. Besides this, bureaucratic implementation 
may endanger the stakeholders’ voluntary incentives when their willingness is not 
fully respected (He and Lang 2015). Much literature on PES highlights challenges in 
the developing world, where property rights can often be incomplete (Bennett et al. 
2011). The implementation of governmental PES in Vietnam (Kolinjivadi and 
Sunderland 2012), Cambodia (Clements et al. 2010) and Indonesia (Fauzi and Anna 
2013) have been challenged for their lack of well-defined property rights. Moreover, 
the poorest households may be ignored or even excluded by centralized governance 
(Corbera et al. 2009). 
2.3 Institutional context for PES in China 
The provision of ES never takes place in an institutional vacuum, but has to build on 
the interplay of institutions, policy instruments and the property rights of the 
interconnected social and ecological systems. Legal institutions provide the basis for 
PES schemes and shape diverse features of PES schemes (Muradian and Rival 2012). 
In particular, the laws, legislations and relevant policies influence the design and 
operation of PES schemes (Vatn 2010). 
No specific legislation exists for PES approaches or the similar Chinese term, eco-
The PES Concept and Governmental PES
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compensation in China (Gaodi et al. 2015). Relevant laws and regulations are split 
across various policies formulated by different governmental departments and the 
State Council. 
The government is the predominant stakeholder in China, as funding resources for 
ecological compensations have not expanded to non-government sectors in China. 
With the exception of transfer payments from central government, other channels, 
such as input by local government, enterprise and public institution, preferential 
credit and loan and social donations, are also absent (Gaodi et al. 2015). Some 
Chinese scholars have argued that government participation is necessary for eco-
compensation in China, due to the income gap and beneficiaries’ low willingness to 
pay (Shang et al. 2018).  
Property rights in China have collective characteristics, as natural resources belong to 
the nation or are collectively owned by communities. In 1993, China started to 
allocate forestland use rights from village collectives back to households, either 
individually or in small groups, leading to a relatively clearly-defined and better-
aligned property rights system. Property rights are closely related to land use rights 
(land contracting rights) and the right to commercialized services generated from 
land resources (land management rights) (Zhen and Zhang 2011). Households were 
given contracting rights and management rights for up to 70 years. In 2016, a 
remarkable reform divided traditional land rights into three separate rights: 
collective land ownership (土地集体所有权), land contracting rights for rural 
households (农户承包权 ), and land management rights (土地经营权 ) 
(Instrumentalities of the State Council 2016) (Figure 3). Before the reform, land 
contracting rights and land management rights were used in combination, so that 
households were not allowed to “sell” their land. After the reform, households will 
now be able to “transfer” land management rights while holding land contracting 
rights. However, this separation may cause some difficulty in defining exactly who is 
obliged to look after conservation (Uchida, Xu et al. 2005).  
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In China, land rights are separated into three different rights. Most forest is owned by 
collectives. But most collectively-owned forests are allocated to households as land 
contracting rights and land management rights 
Figure 3: The separation of rights in rural land ownership system 
Large-scale governmental PES programs have frequently been criticized for low levels 
of cost-effectiveness and environmental effectiveness. Low levels of cost-
effectiveness are often the result of high transaction costs. Many studies have argued 
that intermediaries within governmental PES governance structures can play 
important roles in facilitating transactions between governmental buyers and private 
sellers (Schomers, Sattler et al. 2015). Therefore, involvement from intermediaries is 
considered helpful in reducing public and private transaction costs. Ideally, there are 
three intermediaries that might interact with a PES transaction: non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), private consultancies and governmental entities (Schomers et 
al. 2015). However, China does not have a very long history of participating with 
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environmental NGOs and other social organizations for environmental interests. 
Western environmental movements are not the main driving force for ecological 
policy in China (Guttman et al. 2018). In particular, the environmental ‘civil society’ 
sector is dominated by government-related institutes and associations, such as the 
Beijing Environmental Protection Organization and China Environment Fund (Mol and 
Carter 2006). These government-related “NGOs” are far from independent to the 
government and have only played a relatively marginal role in in local rural areas. 
Therefore, intermediaries from civil society (western-style environmental NGOs, 
community groups and private consultancies) are not in place for ecological 
improvement in China.  
The rapid urbanization process in China has also affected ecological conservation 
programs. Economic growth has changed the livelihood of rural households and 
drove migration from rural to urban areas. As a result, fewer people live in rural areas 
and fewer people will engage in farm-related activities. New institutional 
arrangements are needed to ensure land-based ES provision in the absence of the 
households which have migrated (Pan et al. 2017). Besides this, the change in labor 
markets can alter opportunity cost for land usage and influence inventives for 
household participation.  
In summary, in lacking of non-governmental funding resources, clear property rights 
competitive market and intermediaries from civil society, the institutional context in 
China is incomplete for an ideal market-based PES. However, governance of ES needs 
to deal with broad ES, tens of millions of households as participant and poverty 
issues. 
2.4 Governmental PES in China 
In response to the enormous environmental challenges of land degradation, soil 
erosion, desertification, biodiversity loss and water pollution, China’s central 
government has launched a series of eco-compensation programmes to restore 
degraded ES, covering watershed ecosystem services, carbon, timber, landscape 
amenities, biodiversity conservation and anti-desertification services. The major 
programmes include Sloping Land Conversion Program (SLCP), the Natural Forest 
Protection Program (NFPP) and the Desertification Combating Program around 
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Beijing and Tianjing (DCBT) (Yin et al. 2010, Zhen and Zhang 2011). As a flagship 
toward an incentive approach, SCLP represents a hybrid governance type that 
includes both voluntary and hierarchical (top-down) elements (Bennett 2008). SLCP 
is considered a milestone in China’s ecological policy and a growing body of literature 
views the SLCP as one of the world’s largest PES programs (Yin et al. 2014). The 
official SLCP plan indicates that a wide array of ES are being targeted, including soil 
conservation, watershed protection, forest rehabilitation and landscape restoration 
(State Forest Administration 2003). Following the SLCP, numbers of PES-like programs 
have been implemented, covering forests, grassland, watersheds, wetlands, arable 
land and even deserts. Regardless of the different targeting of ES, the major PES 
schemes in China have inherited the logic of SLCP, which encourages governments on 
behalf of beneficiaries (Pan et al. 2017). Most of them are on large spatial and long 
temporal scales (Zhen and Zhang 2011). 
Officially, the SLCP has an explicit emphasis on voluntary participation and local 
autonomy, which allows enrolled households to be free to take a contract or not 
(State Forest Administration 2007). Embracing innovative PES elements, the SLCP 
contains the key characteristics of payments for ecosystem services (PES) (Wunder 
2015), as the central government payment to voluntary participants for land 
conversion. The implementation depends on household and village community 
willingness to accept the terms. The SLCP also contains components from the 
traditional command-and-control approach, such as top-down structure, inflexible 
contract design and campaign-style mobilization (Kolinjivadi and Sunderland 2012). 
The government sets the rules for participation and the implementation relies on 
hierarchically (top-down) structured governmental agencies at central, prefecture, 
county, and township levels (Bennett 2008). However, where to place SLCP and Eco-
compensation in the governance model developed (Matzdorf et al. 2013) is still 
unknown. 
In terms of policy design, as the department in charge of the SLCP in the central 
government, the State Forest Administration (SFA, following a wider national 
institution reform in 2018, the name was changed to State Forestry and Grassland 
Administratio) created the overall plan and budget for the entire country, assigning 
reforestation tasks and payment to provincial governments by signing liability 
The PES Concept and Governmental PES14
 
agreements in which the liability is extended to counties, townships and, finally, 
participating households (The State Council 2002) (Figure 4). The plan for the 
following year evolved in the opposite fashion, from bottom to top, through an 
application system. Village and township governments submitted their proposed 
afforestation plans to each higher layer of government. In the end, the central 
government reviewed their plans and their achievements from the previous year and 
then partially or completely approved their plans (The State Council 2002). 
Ultimately, quotas were again allocated top-down through the administrative ladder. 
The government has the dual role of “buyer” and intermediary, which may 
encourage principal-agent conflicts and rent-seeking behavior. 
  
Figure 4: Administrative ladder and working flow of SLCP 
 
Although complete ownership rights for natural resources and land belong to the 
collective or the state, SCLP is provided for contracting and management rights 
during the period of the SLCP contract only, rather than permanent ownership rights 
to the land (The State Council 2002). According to this policy of ‘whoever plants 
maintains and benefits,’ households are allowed to manage and benefit from the 
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products and services on their enrolled land (The State Council 2002). 
In terms of policy implementation, SLCP permits households the right to determine 
some dimensions of their participation. At the same time, some command-and-
control elements appear to be necessary to target the enrolled areas, determine the 
participants, distribute payments, provide technical support and monitor the 
program’s success (The State Council 2002). 
  
Framing Research on Governmental PES16
 
3 Framing Research on Governmental PES 
3.1 Theoretical framework 
I will view governmental PES frameworks through the lens of institutional analysis. 
Institutions are understood as the formal and informal rules that guide human 
interactions, from facilitating coordination to conflict resolution (Vatn 2010). PES 
have been conceptualized as new instruments designed to enhance or change 
behavior in relation to ecosystem management, through the provision of economic 
incentives (Corbera et al. 2009). The framework presented below builds on a 
conceptual approach previously developed by Corbera and Brown (Corbera et al. 
2009), and can appear as a conceptual map for guiding institutional research on 
governmental PES. 
3.2 Solidifying the research objectives 
3.2.1 Institutional design 
Institutional performance identifies whether an institution contributes to achieving a 
specific goal (Mitchell 2008). In other words, institutional performance analyses the 
contribution of PES to ES provision. Young (Young 2002) sees institutional design as 
something which is particularly constrained by limitations in the human ability to 
foresee institutional performance in complex systems. Most institutional 
arrangements are designed to meet a goal, “the solution of more or less well-defined 
problems” (Young 2002). Due to the diversity present in socio-ecological systems, a 
set of institutional designs works better under the given circumstances than one 
single institutional design (Ostrom 2008). Therefore, I have refined objectives A into 
three questions: 
A 1: How are institutional settings correlated with the performance of a 
governmental PES? 
A 2: How do institutional and socio-economic conditions influence local ES 
providers in reaching the provisions of ES under a governmental PES? 
A 3: How can local actors influence the implementation of governmental PES? 
Evaluating institutional performance requires the definition of criteria against which 
the institution in question can be evaluated (Corbera et al. 2009). My study on 
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governmental PES is rooted in the Chinese content, particularly the SLCP program. To 
identify the criteria of effectiveness and institutional, I have refined objective A 1 into 
two questions. 
A 1.1: What are the institutional challenges of SLCP? 
A 1.2: What is the relationship between effectiveness and institutional settings? 
Because households have great importance in the implementation of SLCP (Liang, Li 
et al. 2012, Li, Bennett et al. 2017), understanding the linkage of institutional 
conditions and the program-induced provision of ecosystem services at a household 
level is critical for ensuring the success of governmental PES. While most existing 
studies considered conditions individually and independently, Meyer et al. (Meyer et 
al. 2015) first showed that the combination of certain design rules conditioned the 
success of a governmental payment scheme in Germany. In order to understand the 
combination effect of conditions on PES program design, I have refined objective A2 
into two questions: 
A 2.1: What are the necessary and sufficient institutional and socioeconomic 
conditions for a successful SLCP implementation at the household level? 
A 2.2: What are the necessary and sufficient institutional and socioeconomic 
conditions for a failed SLCP implementation at the household level? 
While the Chinese central government has formal authority over the design of eco-
compensation, the implementation has largely relied on local actors. However, the 
program required a few modifications to become adapted to the somewhat varied 
ecological and economic conditions across the country, leaving a significant gap 
between the centrally designed policy and local situations for implementation. As 
farmers were offered payments for financial incentive, local agencies were over-
dependent on bureaucratic incentives, such as promotion and administrative 
punishment. Local agents’ demands for financial compensation and their ability for 
adaptation seemed to have been underestimated (Yu 2016). These deviations 
undermine the innovative elements of local engagement and willingness for PES, 
meaning there is risk of reversal to the governmental PES, turning it back into a 
compensation program. I have refined objective A3 to: 
A 3.1: Which roles do the local agencies and households play in shifting a 
compensation program to a governmental PES? 
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3.2.2 Methods for ecosystem service governance analysis 
Following a definition from Rival and Muradian (Rival and Muradian 2013), 
ecosystem service governance is ‘the institutionalization of mechanisms for collective 
decision-making and collective action with respect to natural resources 
management’. It has gained increasing popularity with the mainstreaming of the ES 
concept (Sattler et al. 2018). Corbera et al. (Corbera et al. 2009) view this question as 
one which concerns whether PES influences or is influenced by other institutions and 
which types of synergies or conflicts exist. 
As one of the key challenges of ecosystem services governance, the analysis of 
institutional interplay is especially useful when learning about the interactions 
between different institutions and actors, and how institutional settings are 
correlated with the effectiveness of a PES scheme. In particular, institutional 
interplay concerns how a set of institutions affect one another, something which cuts 
across institutional design and performance (Young 2002). The principal assumption 
of this concept is that an interaction between two or more institutions can influence 
their respective outcomes. However, most analyses of institutional interplay were 
based on qualitative approaches, such as bibliographical review, stakeholder 
interviews and expert interviews. Methods which underpin a deeper understanding 
of ecosystem service governance in the context of interconnected social ecological-
systems are just beginning to be explored and assessed (Sattler et al. 2018). In order 
to formulate a methodological contribution to the analysis of ecosystem services 
governance, I have refined objective B into two questions. 
I propose using the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to exam the institutional 
arrangement among several possibilities and the Social Network Analysis to explore 
the governance structure. For the first method, I drew on one governmental PES in 
China and one governmental PES in Germany to determine the possible range of 
application. With regards to the second method, the research tool was applied in 
four different countries and continents. I have documented the strengths and 
weaknesses of the proposed method against an international background, proposing 
ideas for improvements and further research. 
I have refined objective B into B1 and B2: 
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B 1: How should the QCA be applied to support Comparative Institutional Analysis, 
and to determine the preferred institutional arrangements among several 
possibilities? 
B 2: What are the strengths and weaknesses of using the Net-Map tool for 
participatory social network analysis in ecosystem service governance? 
In summary, the contributions of each paper to the research objectives are outlined 
in figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: The contributions to research objectives 
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The Institutional challenges of Payment for Ecosystem Service Program in China: A 
review of the effectiveness and implementation of Sloping Land Conversion Program 
 
Paper 2: 
How socioeconomic and institutional conditions at the household level shape the 
environmental effectiveness of governmental payments for ecosystem services 
program 
 
Paper 3: 
The network of actors in a governmental PES program: Local governance models for 
China’s Sloping Land Conversion Program 
 
Paper 4: 
Qualitative comparative institutional analysis of environmental governance: 
Implications from research on payments for ecosystem services 
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Strengths and weaknesses of the Net-Map tool for participatory social network 
analysis in resource management: Experience from case studies conducted on four 
continents 
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Abstract: This study is an overview of the effectiveness and institutional challenges of 
China’s Sloping Land Conversion Program (SLCP). The SLCP is the Chinese government’s 
largest Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) program and one of the largest PES  
programs in the world. From an institutional perspective, the SLCP is particularly interesting 
because it represents a hybrid governance type that includes both voluntary and hierarchical 
(top-down) elements rather than traditional command-and-control approach. Our analysis is 
based on a literature review that encompasses 164 international scientific articles. To identify 
institutional challenges, we linked the results regarding the effectiveness of the program to 
its institutional aspects. Our SLCP case study highlights the dependence of the effectiveness 
of a governmental PES program on the specific regulatory institutional setting and the 
particular actors involved. Our results show that some institutional challenges undermine the 
anticipated advantages of PES (local participation) and eventually reshape the program 
outcomes through implementation process, particularly in cases of hybrid governance 
structures in which institutional requirements are as important as the design of the specific 
financial incentives. The collaboration between relevant government actors at different 
hierarchical levels, and specifically the motivations and interests of the government actors 
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responsible for the implementation on the ground, play crucial roles. The SLCP can be an 
important milestone in environmental policy in China and the world, if more innovative 
elements of a theoretically ideal PES—such as local flexibility and self-interest (or at least 
the acceptance of the service providers supplying the relevant ecosystem services) can be 
strengthened. The environmental goals can be achieved in combination with greater  
self-interest of the applicable government actors on all hierarchical levels. 
Keywords: grain for green program; land set-aside program; effectiveness of implementation; 
hybrid governance; PES; sustainability 
 
1. Introduction 
Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) are an increasingly popular way to manage ecosystems [1]. 
In addition to using market forces for the efficient allocation of user rights to natural resources, the 
“…PES philosophy argues for the internalization of environmental externalities through the creation of 
markets and quasi-markets” [2]. This notion is linked to the Coase Theorem [3], which holds that the 
problem of external effects can be overcome under certain conditions through private negotiations 
between affected parties. However, Coase negotiations do not represent the ideal market situation for 
the environment [4]. In accordance with this understanding, within PES schemes, people do not buy and 
sell ecosystem services (ES), as some authors argue [5], but instead buy and sell bundles of use rights 
over ES [6]. 
In both practice and research [7], the concept of PES has been broadened to include government 
payments, which function as a PES-like mechanism [8]. This broad concept of PES is consistent with 
the Pigouvian approach [7], through which government either pays itself or makes others pay on  
behalf of beneficiaries [6,9]. The term PES is used as a broad umbrella [10] term for any type of 
conservation instruments that employ positive financial incentives. The governance model beyond the 
pure market-based PES system is often a hybrid type in the sense of Vatn [11]. The state represents an 
important actor not only as a financier but also as a legal driver [9]. Consequently, the effectiveness and 
efficiency of PES schemes depend on the interplay of all the institutions and actors involved. The actors 
are frequently connected by more than purely economic relationships [11].  
The advantage of PES schemes over conventional command-and-control measures is based on the 
argument that social negotiations and voluntary approaches perform better in terms of cost-efficiency and 
local acceptance, in particular. This fact must be considered when PES systems are discussed as an 
innovative conservation approach that supports proactive action, replication, and stakeholder participation, 
that spurs competition, and that produces new sources of funding and positive side-effects [12].  
Thus, on the one hand, if command-and-control institutions dominate all of PES governance, these 
advantages can be limited. On the other hand, there are good arguments that hybrid institutions,  
including command-and-control approaches, are frequently the most appropriate to consider in complex  
social-ecological systems [13].  
The analysis of this type of hybrid governance PES approach seems most useful in learning about the 
interaction of different institutions and actors and how the institutional setting is correlated with the 
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effectiveness of a PES scheme. China has one of the world’s largest hybrid governmental PES programs. 
With its rapid economic growth over the past three decades, China’s environmental degradation has also 
accelerated [14]. These problems have included land degradation, soil erosion, desertification, 
biodiversity loss, water pollution and water shortages [15]. In response to these enormous environmental 
challenges, China’s central government launched a series of programs aimed at ecological restoration 
and ecosystem conservation with payment from the government in the late 1990s, and these programs 
are most commonly categorized under the domestic term eco-compensation [16]. This institutional 
arrangement was perceived as protecting and sustainably using ecosystem services to adjust the 
distribution of costs and benefits between different actors and stakeholders, primarily through economic 
measures [17]. Although the terms “eco-compensation” and “PES” are often used interchangeably [18], 
eco-compensation is a broader term that encompasses PES-like policies that involve direct payment by 
the government to individuals and community-level suppliers under market mechanisms [19], in addition 
to a range of other policy and program types. According to this classification, there are 24 major  
PES-like programs in China (see Supplementary Material 1). The targets of them range from watershed 
protection and soil erosion control to carbon emissions control and eco-agriculture [18]. As a typical 
government-financed ecological restoration program, the “Sloping Land Conversion Program” 
(SLCP)—also known as the “Conversion of Cropland to Forests Program” or “Grain-for-Green”—is 
considered one of the largest PES programs in the world [20], and its broad geographic cover [21], wide 
participation [22], tremendous investment [23] and institutional innovation [24] have drawn significant 
attention from the scientific community. This program was launched in 1999 with the goal of increasing 
forest cover and preventing soil erosion by converting sloping farmland into forests or grassland [25]. 
Consistent with PES’s stated principals of volunteerism and local participation [26], the SLCP uses a 
public payment scheme that directly engages millions of rural households as core agents of project 
implementation [26]. Although there are different classifications, the SLCP is considered a PES program 
by a number of researchers [19,24,27].  
One of the main challenges linked to PES development is the appropriate consideration of a variety 
of social-ecological systems, and its applicability often depends on complex institutional settings [11]. 
A number of studies individually assess the SLCP from mainly environmental [28], socioeconomic [29] 
and institutional perspectives [30], and utilize many different elements and indicators. Few studies have 
investigated the various situations and multiple dimensions of the SLCP, with the exception of a series 
of papers published by Yin et al. [31–35]. By reviewing the program in terms of its implementation 
efficacy, socioeconomic effects and environmental impact, Yin et al. [31] developed an integrated 
assessment and called for more attention to program execution and interdisciplinary research. In another 
article, Yin et al. [34] assessed the program’s outcomes by exploring the governance of the SLCP, 
claiming that certain contexts under the label of “implementation” appear to be challenges to the 
program. Asking further questions about how to design an effective PES program, Yin et al. [35] 
examined the SLCP under the diagnostic framework of a social-ecological system with analyses from 
ecological, socioeconomic and institutional perspectives. However, Yin et al. [33] considered the SLCP 
one of the ecological restoration programs (ERP) in China and always took ERP, rather than the SLCP, 
as the research target. Particularly, whether the SLCP has been implemented effectively; how 
governance and policy implementation affect program outcomes; and how its performance can be 
improved are still not clear [30]. As suggested by He et al. [36], to understand the driving forces of the 
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effect of the SLCP, efforts to contextualize the social-ecological interaction in the broader system of 
institutional economy are needed. 
In this review, we focus on how the effectiveness of the SLCP is influenced by many design and 
execution contexts that fall primarily under the institutional umbrella. The primary goal of this article is 
to provide a literature survey on the SLCP with multiple dimensions and, in the end, to link the deviation 
between effectiveness criteria and program outcomes with their institutional contexts. To do so, we first 
gather the literature with a keyword-based web search and follow the classification from Yin et al. [32]. 
We sort the literature according to different indicators from environmental, socioeconomic and 
institutional perspectives. After an overview of research topics covered in the previous SLCP literature, 
our next step is to build criteria from the literature for program effectiveness. The actual “effectiveness” 
of an environmentally targeted conservation policy is complex and difficult to assess. There are  
different frameworks to measure effectiveness, such as the capital asset framework (CAF) [37] or the 
social-ecological system [38], and they are frequently built on a longer-term basis [34]. Here, we adapt 
the method from Yin et al. [39] and analyze the effectiveness from two determining positions: effective 
implementation and program impacts. Elements relating to implementation, such as converted areas, the 
survival rate and restored vegetation, can be categorized as effective implementation. Accordingly, the 
socioeconomic impact (e.g., change in income, labor transfer) and environmental impact (e.g., erosion 
control, water conservation) can be categorized as program impact. In our article, effectiveness is 
ultimately gauged based on effective implementation, socioeconomic impact and environmental impact. 
Nevertheless, the effectiveness criteria cannot always match program outcomes. Therefore, our third 
step is to summarize the previous findings on the deviation between effectiveness criteria and program 
outcomes. Fourth, we identify institutional challenges. Finally, to answer the question of how to improve 
the performance of the SLCP from an institutional perspective, we discuss the dependence of the 
identified deviation on these institutional challenges. The results of this study can help support the 
development and improvement of government-financed PES in China and throughout the world. Our 
analytical structure is shown in Figure 1. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the SLCP and how it is 
implemented. Section 3 presents an overview of the SLCP literature, focusing on current research 
priorities. Section 4 identifies the effectiveness criteria used in the literature, analyzes the deviation 
between the criteria and outcomes and summarizes the relevant institutional challenges. Section 5 
discusses the dependence of the program’s effectiveness criteria in an institutional setting under a hybrid 
governance regime. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
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Figure 1. Analytical framework. 
2. The SLCP 
The severe drought of the Yellow River region in 1997 and the widespread flood of the Yangtze River 
in 1998 spurred the Chinese government to take action in response to the growing degradation of the 
country’s forest ecosystem [24,40]. Under these circumstances, the SLCP aims to increase the country’s 
forest and grassland cover and to reduce soil erosion, flooding, desertification and other ecological 
disasters [23] by retiring steeply sloping land (greater than 25 degrees) from agricultural use and 
returning it to forest and grassland [41]. After a pilot phase from 1999 to 2001 in three provinces, the 
SLCP was extended to 25 provinces. The program involved over 32 million rural households, and  
257.22 billion RMB had been spent by 2010 [42]. The official goal of the SLCP was to convert 
approximately 14.67 million hectares of cropland to forest (4.4 million of which is on land with a slope 
greater than 25°), afforest 17.33 million hectares of wasteland and increase the forest cover in the 
enrolled area by 4.5% by 2010 [43]. Upon full implementation in 2002, the converted land jumped from 
0.39 million hectares to 2.04 million, more than a fivefold increase [42]. As shown in Figure 2, after 
reaching its peak in 2003, new program enrollments began to decrease rapidly and almost completely 
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stopped in 2007 because the central government stopped assigning liability to lower-level government 
in 2006. The tasks of the program thus became to consolidate the achievement on former cropland and 
to continue afforestation on wasteland and barren mountains [43]. By 2012, 8.0 million hectares of 
cropland had been retired and converted under the SLCP, which was less than 60% of its original target; 
the program had also established forests elsewhere on another 16.29 million hectares. Obviously, the 
original target for cropland retirement has not been achieved. 
 
Figure 2. The Sloping Land Conversion Program implementation (unit: 1000 hectares). 
Source: China Forestry Statistic Yearbook 2012 [42]. 
The two objectives of the SLCP are to restore the nation’s forests and grasslands to prevent soil 
erosion and to alleviate poverty in some of China’s poorest regions [41]. The main instrument of the 
SLCP is direct compensation of households in cash, grain, or seedlings for trees by the central government. 
Compensation varies based on two geographical differences. Compensation in the Yangtze River Basin 
is higher than in the Yellow River Basin, which is in accordance with the opportunity costs of local 
cropland plots [31]. The period of compensation differs based on the type of conversion taking place. 
Households can choose either an “economic forest” (i.e., forests that produce timber, fruits, nuts, medical 
goods, and other commodities), an “ecological forest” (i.e., forests that provide primarily ecological 
functions and services) or grasslands, for periods of five years, eight years or two years, respectively [31]. 
However, in reality, most of the retired cropland has been planted with trees of mixed species and 
enrolled for eight years [23]. In 2004, the State Council issued standards for converting grain to cash at 
the rate of 1.4 RMB/kg because of dwindling public grain reserves [34]. In 2007, most contracts were 
supposed to end. To sustain the livelihood of participants, the State Council decided to extend the 
program for another round (2–8 years); however, the subsidy has been halved [44]. 
In the official annual reports, the most common indicators used to evaluate the outcomes are the 
enrolled area, the tree survival rate and the program acceptance rate after inspection [43]. The program 
is conditional in terms of land retirement but less so in terms of management of trees and grass 
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established on the enrolled land, let alone the ultimate services that the restored ecosystems provide, 
such as erosion control and runoff regulation [33]. It is a typical “input-based PES program” in that 
payments are frequently made on a per-hectare basis. The SLCP’s conditionality is high for retired areas 
and lower for successful forest plantations, which departs from the classic pattern [27]. 
The original institutional framework was simple: The central government provides compensation to 
voluntary participants for land conversion, which is presumed to improve the provision of ecosystem 
services in the future. This innovative feature is why the SLCP differs from most other nature 
conservation programs in China. It first combines a large-scale government program with direct 
engagement by voluntary households and village communities using financial incentives [24]. Thus, on 
the one hand, the government sets the rules for participation and other types of institutions, including 
the amount of the payment. On the other hand, implementation theoretically depends on household and 
village community willingness to accept the terms. This key rationale reflects the defining principle of 
PES, i.e., a voluntary transaction in which a land use that is likely to secure the ecosystem service is 
“bought” by at least one service buyer that engages with many providers [8]. By contrast, many studies 
have observed that because the government is the only service buyer, this type of hybrid program is 
typically less voluntary for the provider compared with purely market-based programs [27].  
The program’s design is innovative, but because implementation relies on government agencies, the 
SLCP remains hierarchically (top-down) structured. This type of PES can thus be characterized as hybrid 
governance [6]. In the implementation process, as the department in charge of the SLCP in the central 
government, the State Forest Administration (SFA) created the overall tasks for the entire country and 
assigned reforestation tasks to provincial governments by signing liability agreements [41]. The 
targeting of areas to retire has generally been performed via a top-down approach, beginning with 
retirement quotas that are distributed by the central government to the provinces and continuing on to 
counties, townships and, finally, participating households [45]. The onus of actual implementation has 
thus fallen on townships and village governments [33]. The local agencies allocate quotas, target the 
enrolled areas, determine the participants, distribute payments, provide technical support and monitor 
the program’s achievements [41]. The plan for the following year evolved in the opposite fashion, from 
bottom to top, through an application system. Village and township governments submitted their proposed 
afforestation plans to each higher layer of government. In the end, the central government reviewed their 
plans and their achievements from the previous year and then partially or completely approved their 
plans [41]. Ultimately, quotas were again allocated top-down through the administrative ladder. 
3. Overall Literature Analyses 
3.1. Dataset Establishment 
The literature search for this study was conducted in July 2014 and updated until December 2014. 
All names of the program (“Sloping Land Conversion Program”, “Grain for Green Program China”, 
“Conversion Cropland to Forest and Grassland Program” and “Payment for ecosystem service China”) 
were used as keywords to search the Web of Science and the Scopus database (1999–present). No other 
search terms were considered because the dataset was designed to present the overall picture of the SLCP 
study. After careful selection, two-thirds of the reference materials unrelated to the topic of this study 
were excluded. Additionally, for discussion purposes, we included highly relevant literature that could 
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not be found with the above strategy by pursuing the references in the literature that we had found. 
Ultimately, we obtained 164 journal papers covering all the study subjects (see Supplementary Material 2). 
The following analysis and results are based on this dataset. We acknowledge that many more studies 
have been published in domestic Chinese journals. However, because these studies were not written in 
English and most are not peer-reviewed [31], we did not include them in our dataset. It is notable that 
our literature search was based on defined keywords and therefore some relevant articles might have 
been overlooked. However, to minimize this possible bias, we carefully searched for relevant references 
in the available literature. 
3.2. Literature Sorting 
First, the 164 articles were sorted according to their main research topics. It should be noted that 
many papers address more than one topic; thus, each paper can have a maximum of three topics, although 
only the most important topic is considered the representative topic. Therefore, we defined the 
representative topic as the single topic criterion and other less important topics as multiple topic criteria. 
The papers were then classified into different subject categories according to their single and multiple 
topics. As an environmental policy, the goal of the SLCP covers many aspects, and the single and 
multiple criteria can be used as the indicator for comprehensive evaluation. By making this comparison, 
we can better understand the interdisciplinary research of the SLCP and identify the relationships among 
the different subjects.  
After carefully reading, we selected 26 topics (detail in Figure 3) with environmental, economic, 
social and institutional aspects to classify our dataset. There are 13 topics related to the environment 
aspect, five topics related to economics aspects, five topics related to social aspects and three topics 
related to institutional aspects. Integrated studies and comparison studies are hard to classify, so we list 
them as other. Again, we acknowledge that there may be potential bias or overlapping of this 
classification, although we carefully select them to represent the available literature. 
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3.3. Research Area 
To understand the literature on the SLCP, we established environmental, social, economic, and 
institutional subject areas based on their single main topics. As a consequence, we obtained a result such 
as that shown in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4. The subject areas of selected studies (n = 164). 
Remarkably, half of all the published articles in international journals regarding the SLCP refer to 
environmental aspects. Economic aspects, social aspects, and institutional aspects are the focuses of 
22%, 12% and 11% of the articles, respectively. Thus, the institutional aspect has drawn the least concern 
from the scientific community. When we examine the details, 17 articles refer to institutional studies, 
including 12 articles about implementation and five about institutional settings. Among these, five were 
contributed by a team [46] that included Michael Bennett, Zhigang Xu and Jintao Xu (as colleagues and 
co-authors), and their main interests were policy formulation and top-down approach implementation. 
Another team at Michigan State University led by Runsheng Yin [23] published four articles concerning 
implementation strategy, whereas other articles explored the governance of policy implementation [30], 
notions of justice [47], trust and property security [48], and local variations in implementation [49].  
3.4. Single and Multiple Topics 
In this section, we seek to compare the results of different paper classification methods to identify 
how the different aspects relate to one another (Figure 3). In the single topic criteria, changes in income 
(18 articles) and implementation (12 articles) drew considerable attention. Although environmental 
studies constituted 50% of all the research, those articles’ topics are broad and scattered. There are 14 
topics related to environmental aspects, but only five related to economic aspects, five related to social 
aspects, and two related to institutional aspects. It is clear that most papers on environmental studies 
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focus on only one environmental topic, such as Land Use and Land Cover Change (LUCC), soil science, 
carbon sequestration or hydrology. 
Including multiple topics as the criteria, the number of papers on the institutional setting increased 
rapidly from five to 21 and became the second most popular topic. Targeting and implementation also 
increased to eight and four papers, respectively. This growth made the institutional category grow from 
17 papers to 45 papers. The growth came primarily from the contributions of the other three aspects. In 
the economic and social categories, the number of papers increased by 48.6% and 73.7%, respectively. 
However, the growth in the environmental category was only 16.3%. This result shows that, although 
most studies focus on environmental studies, institutional aspects connect wider research topics when 
we look at the big picture. This finding may demonstrate that the SLCP’s institutional and socioeconomic 
aspects have many direct and indirect links with its outcomes and that these relationships are not 
independent. In fact, many economists and ecologists have found that the socioeconomic and 
environmental effects may have certain links to implementation strategies. For example, Gauvin et al. [50] 
suggested that the dual goals of the program design are a barrier to improving cost-effectiveness. 
Moreover, the ecologist Cao [51] asserted that unsuitable afforestation design seems likely to worsen 
local water shortages. 
4. Results 
4.1. What Criteria for the Program’s Effectiveness are Described in the Literature? 
4.1.1. Effective Implementation  
4.1.1.1. Effectiveness of Targeting  
According to official document [52], the principle of targeting is that “sloping land suffering from 
serious soil erosion and that is low-yield should be afforested as much as possible under the plan 
approved by State Council; while government cannot force households to retire land with good production 
conditions and high yield that is causing no soil erosion”. In other words, the targeting criteria are sloping 
and low-yield land. This official strategy is recognized by many researchers as a means through which 
the program achieves its goal of preventing soil erosion at the lowest possible cost [25,50,53]. For 
example, Uchida et al. [25] showed that targeting land on the basis of individual plot sizes, slopes and 
yield histories might maximize the environmental benefit and minimize payments. In the same vein, 
Gauvin et al. [50] further asserted that with the exception of land associated with high environmental 
benefits and lower opportunity costs, land managed by poorer households should have been considered. 
Additionally, Wang et al. [54] suggests that local heterogeneity must also be taken into account because 
local and regional biophysical and socioeconomic characteristics vary greatly based on the land’s 
productivity and susceptibility to erosion.  
4.1.1.2. Stakeholder Engagement 
As an approach that is distinct from and innovative compared with conventional programs, the SLCP 
claims to be decentralized and voluntary [24]. It directly engages rural households with respect for local 
volunteerism and autonomy, abiding by the core principle of PES, which is defined by Wunder [8] as a 
Publications : Paper 132
Sustainability 2015, 7 5575 
 
 
voluntary transaction. As noted in The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity report [55], “wide 
participation in decisions relating to PES design and implementation can help ensure transparency and 
acceptance and to avoid the covert privatization of common resources”. Without adequate consultation 
and “bottom-up” initiatives, local people tend not to plant or properly maintain trees and grass [56], and 
as a result, survival and growth rates can be negatively affected [34,56]. 
4.1.1.3. Compliance 
The aspect of “conditionality” is considered critical for PES because it ensures that participants 
actually comply with their contracts [8]. Regarding SLCP, the term of conditionality was replaced by 
program compliance to define the trees/grasses planted on the enrolled land in terms of their quality, 
types and survival rates [24]. Compliance includes two essential parts: monitoring and sanctions. 
Effective and lasting monitoring, particularly internal monitoring and enforcement, should be a major 
component of implementing any PES program [32]. During the pilot phase, the most important 
compliance condition is the tree survival rate, which was 85% for the Yangtze River Basin regions and 
70% for the Yellow River Basin regions [24]. Later, this standard was revised to a nationwide standard 
of 75% for full-scale implementation [24]. 
4.1.2. Environmental Impact 
The main environmental impact of SLCP is found in forest ecosystems. Some environmental effects 
are immediately observable, such as the amount of land converted and afforested and the changes in 
vegetative cover [57]. By contrast, effects on flood control, carbon sequestration, and climate change, 
for example, are to a large extent inferred from changes in immediately observable factors [21], which 
makes it difficult to directly attribute program effects. 
First, vegetation cover was accorded great significance in consolidating the reforestation 
achievements and effectively controlling soil erosion. Various studies, such as those by Zhou et al. [58], 
have used vegetation cover to evaluate the success of the SLCP. Indeed, Zhou et al. [59] found that the 
reduction of soil erosion in the Loess Plateau was partly attributable to the increase in forest coverage 
induced by the SLCP. Second, the program is considered to improve the physical properties of the soil 
structure and reduce nutrient loss to maintain soil fertility, in addition to decreasing river sediments [60]. 
The effects of the changes in surface runoff and sediment yields have been widely studied [61]. Third, 
the SLCP provides a good opportunity to restore biodiversity regions that have been destroyed or 
dramatically affected by human activity [62]. Fourth, large-scale afforestation under the SLCP will  
result in an extensive new forest and hence enhance the carbon sequestration capacity of China’s 
terrestrial ecosystems [63]. 
4.1.3. Socioeconomic Impact 
4.1.3.1. Income Improvement 
A PES program can offer a means to increase the incomes of the rural poor and reduce risk by 
diversifying income sources, primarily through monetary payments [29]. Because most households in 
the target areas are poor and many are located on steeply sloped land, the program must be able to provide 
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livelihoods to ensure the participation of households affected by the program [64]. Uchida et al. [25] assert 
that payments to households for entering their plots into the SLCP largely exceed the plots’ opportunity 
costs; as a result, the average participating household should be better off by participating. 
In addition to direct compensation, the new planting of commercial forests (such as fruit orchards) 
will continue to increase participants’ income, and the government-invested newly built infrastructure 
will either provide income (e.g., fish ponds, livestock-raising facilities) or reduce households’ costs  
(e.g., methane generators) even after government subsidies end [64]. 
4.1.3.2. Labor Relocation 
The rapid loss of cropland has provided an abundance of labor for other businesses, and households 
can choose to allocate their labor off the farm market [59]. For example, the average cropland area of 
participating households in Wuqi in Shannxi Province dropped to approximately 30% of the original 
area during the 2004–2010 period [65]. These changes suggest a significant decline in on-farm labor 
use, and households might thus have much to gain from reallocating the surplus labor to off-farm 
employment. To solve liquidity constraints, it is easier for participating households to switch to non-farming 
activities than it is for non-participants [66]. Furthermore, this transition from on-farm to off-farm labor 
allocation and the diversification of revenue sources are keys to ensuring that the converted land is not 
returned to cropland [67]. 
4.1.3.3. Poverty Alleviation 
The land owners who provide these environmental services are predominantly poor; consequently, a 
well-designed program can contribute to alleviating poverty [29]. The SFA explicitly states that poverty 
alleviation and restructuring agricultural production into a more environmentally and economically 
sustainable set of activities are goals of the SLCP [26]. Moreover, compensation under the SLCP is 
higher than opportunity costs, and one explanation for setting this compensation level is to benefit poor 
households [25]. However, the opportunity costs of retiring cropland and the operational costs of 
restoration vary with farming practices and natural conditions [35]. Therefore, it is worthwhile to have 
competitive participation selection based on the opportunity costs of local conditions [35]. 
4.1.3.4. Sustainability of Forest 
Some studies [25,51,68] suggest that the long-term effects and sustainability of the program are 
decided primarily by the households’ behavior once payments cease. For example, Uchida [25] 
examined the issue of the sustainability of the SLCP through its potential to generate sufficient income 
that will continue after the formal program ends. In another example, Xu et al. [56] contended that the 
ultimate success of the SLCP depends on its ability to restructure the production practices of rural 
households so that they can increase the opportunity cost of their non-farm labor (e.g., livestock 
production and off-farm employment). To ensure the sustainability of forests, a sustainable livelihood 
should be guaranteed to the people losing their cropland. 
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4.2. Deviation between Effectiveness Criteria and Program Outcome 
The official evaluation report [43] of the SLCP presents the remarkable accomplishments of the 
program at the national level. Our analysis shows the differences between the national perspective and 
regional/local implementation. 
4.2.1. Effective Implementation  
One interesting finding is that the SLCP’s spatial targeting has not always been achieved. Studies by 
Uchida et al. [25] and Xu et al. [46], for example, have found that in some cases, productive,  
low-sloped parcels have been included in the program, whereas in other cases, less productive  
high-sloped parcels have not. Uchida et al. [25] indicate that cost-effectiveness may have been 
compromised in practice due to overly rapid expansion and conflicts with local government priorities. 
Based on studies in northeast China, Wang and Maclaren [69] concluded that the targeting process was 
generally inefficient because productivity and environmental heterogeneity were ignored. There were 
many critics of the inefficient top-down implementation approach [24,35] associated with quota  
systems [46,70], and most blamed the local government, which preferred the easier-to-implement 
method of simplifying the plots-based selection [45,71]. 
Many studies [24,70] criticize the level of stakeholder engagement. For example, a survey conducted 
in Shaanxi, Gansu and Sichuan provinces in 2003 showed that approximately 53% of households could 
choose whether to participate [24]. One survey in Hubei and Shanxi in 2011 showed that 86% of 
households participated in the program because they were required to do so by the government [72]. The 
most recent survey in 2014 in Yunnan found that only approximately 45% of households were consulted 
about their willingness to participate in the program [30]. In practice, this consultation is commonly 
carried out at a village meeting that merely served to distribute required participation information instead 
of being an actual consultation [30]. Worse, due to the rushed initiation, even local planners do not have 
the knowledge to fully engage, resulting in even more confusion for participating households [32].  
Many findings confirm that for some areas, implementation of the program proceeded in traditional  
top-down fashion [24,32,45], without engaging households regarding their interest and willingness in 
participation [24,32], although the policy highlights the importance of local volunteerism [34,56]. 
Another critical point is that compliance has, to some extent, not been achieved. Compliance is monitored 
via a series of inspections conducted by various levels of government [24,71]. Because most enrolled 
land is in remote areas or in villages, village officials must check the land regularly. Furthermore, formal 
annual evaluations are conducted by township and county governments, and random but rare inspections 
are conducted by higher-level government entities or officials from the SFA [73]. According to the SFA, 
97.4% of the enrolled land was monitored over the 1999–2005 period, and 93% of it was deemed to pass 
the acceptance inspection [74]. However, many research results contradict these official reports;  
Bennett [24] found that the survival rate was 75%, and Cao et al. [51] found that tree survival rates in 
the afforestation plots averaged only 55.7% in the first year after planting and 49% in the seventh  
year in northern Shaanxi Province. Similarly, the sanction mechanisms for non-compliance do not  
appear credible [24]. 
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4.2.2. Environmental Impact 
In addition to several studies [75,76] that highlight the positive environmental effects of the SLCP, 
other studies, such as Cao et al. [77] and König et al. [78], also note some challenges with regarding to 
afforestation. First, a crucial aspect noted in this regard is that afforestation with unsuitable species may 
damage local water balances, even exhausting limited ground water, and may result in dead or dying 
trees. The potential regional effect of afforestation on watershed hydrology and water-resource 
management has not been thoroughly investigated [79]. On the one hand, forest areas in China are 
considered to play an important role in water cycling and water conservation, particularly with respect 
to flood reduction [80]. However, after crop land is converted to grassland, it is assumed that the water 
budget will be substantially disturbed because of the significant changes in vegetation components and 
in the vegetation cover period [81]. On the other hand, serious water shortages become progressively 
more limiting for further vegetation establishment, particularly in semi-arid steppes, which could 
ultimately lead to increasing desertification, as is the case in areas of Northern China [51,77], such as 
the Loess Plateau. Second, monoculture plantations and exotic species can also reduce biodiversity when 
they replace natural ecosystems [82]. In fact, during planting, there was widespread destruction of natural 
vegetation, such as the removal of natural herbaceous vegetation (i.e., grasses, forbs, herbs) to promote 
tree growth [51]. The monoculture plantations are also at high risk for insect and disease problems [83]. 
In this regard, Cao et al. [84] summarized the situation nicely, stating that the “huge investment to 
increase forest cover seems likely to exacerbate environmental degradation in environmentally fragile 
areas because it has ignored climate, pedological, hydrological, and landscape factors that would make 
a site unsuitable for afforestation”. 
However, forest cover change cannot always be credited to afforestation programs [85]; state forest 
policies may have been the main driver in the past, but private afforestation activities increasingly 
dominate the expansion of tree cover [85]. He et al. [36] provide further evidence that the contribution 
of the SLCP to forest cover is conditional on the institutional setting. 
4.2.3. Socioeconomic Impact 
The effects of the SLCP on participants’ livelihoods are diverse, as reflected by key indicators such 
as income change and labor transfer. In different regions of China, the outcomes strongly depend on the 
local contexts and conditions. In most study cases [65,86], the majority of households noted that the 
program actually increased their net incomes. Other studies, such as those by Song et al. [72] and  
Wang et al. [54], show that in some regions, households considered themselves to be worse off after 
participating in the SLCP. A longitudinal household study [23] doubted the efficiency of economic 
compensation because households received incomes that were either substantially higher or lower than 
their former crop incomes. In particular, it was noted that in the early implementation phase, 
compensation exceeds opportunity cost, and the program has received support from a large proportion 
of participants [25]. As time has passed, the prices of commodities have risen every year; however, the 
compensation standard is halved, making it a much smaller part of families’ incomes. Consequently, it 
is reasonable for some households to have lost interest in the program and that some even want to return 
to farming. For example, in a survey conducted in 2005 in the Shaanxi Province, a large proportion 
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(37.2%) of participating households stated that they would return to cultivating forested areas and 
grassland once the project’s subsidies end in 2018 [22]. In the province of Ningxia, only approximately 
8% of households said that they would not re-convert their land to cropland following termination of  
the compensation [87]. 
In addition to compensation, income inequality [88] and the changes in income sources [47] induced 
by the SLCP have effects on income changes. By studying the Gini coefficient, Li et al. [88] found that 
income inequality is lower among participants than among non-participants. Xu et al. [89] also questioned 
the quality of development. Additionally, using the difference-in-differences model, Uchida et al. [25] 
found that the program has not induced significant changes in income sources except for the program 
payments. Using the same model, Yao et al. [90] showed that the income source does not significantly 
change apart from off-farm work, and the effect on crop production is not as negative as was once thought. 
The argument of labor transfer has been studied intensively but remains unclear. Li et al. [88] found 
that the SLCP has not improved labor transfer to off-farm activities in the survey site because most 
participants still engage in traditional farming. By contrast, Yao et al. [90] showed that the program has 
accelerated the transfer of farming labor and has greatly stimulated income growth from off-farm 
opportunities. A 2003 study conducted by Uchida et al. [29] found no strong evidence that participants 
had changed their labor to off-farm work. Surprisingly, two years later, tracking the same group of 
households with the same method, researchers claimed that the program had significantly relaxed the 
liquidity constraints for participating households [66]. Other evidence also showed that participants 
began to shift the labor freed by the program to off-farm activities [67] and increasing numbers of 
households occupy with off-farm work in city areas because of higher income [23]. However, in the 
context of China’s rapid expansion of urban employment, this labor transfer would doubtless occur even 
without the SLCP [91]. Another survey [91] is critical about explaining labor transfer by alleviating 
constraints but supports the idea that the transfer might involve a simple farm-to-nonfarm labor 
substitution. In summary, non-farm participation and labor supply may not be as sensitive to the program 
as the policy designers had thought, and the effects of labor transfer changed over the different study 
periods and differed from one site to another [92]. 
4.3. What Types of Institutional Challenges are Described? 
With the program suffering from an imperfect institutional setting, some features are noted as 
challenges to its effectiveness in the literature. As the first article appearing in an international journal 
with regard to the institutional analysis of SLCP, Bennett et al. [24] examined the program design and 
implementation by assessing targeting, conditionality and participation autonomy. The top-down 
approach and budget distribution were frequently focused upon as problems [24,46]. In addition,  
Yin et al. [31] asked for more concerns on integrated program management, and He Jun [30] called for 
more attention to local dynamics in policy formulation. However, most of the literature has individually 
documented the effects of implementation and the institutional setting; much less of it has directly linked 
different institutional aspects to corresponding outcomes. Therefore, we summarize the following 
aspects of our literature sorting process under the umbrella of institutional challenges: (a) the quota 
system; (b) administrative budgeting; (c) a multi-goal approach; (d) a tree-planting strategy; (e) program 
adaptability; and (f) an institutional complementary policy. 
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4.3.1. The Quota System 
As noted by Bennett [24], the two main innovative elements of the SLCP are volunteerism and the 
direct engagement of participants. However, the de facto hierarchical (top-down) approach in the 
institutional setting destroyed the original design. According to the Regulations of the SLCP [41], the 
SLCP is implemented under a target responsibility system. The officials in the relevant departments of 
local governments at or above the county level will sign responsibility agreements with the higher levels 
of government that define the responsibilities. At the local level, the chief executives take responsibility 
for the outcomes, and forest bureaus take responsibility for actual implementation [41]. The performance 
of these tasks affects these officials’ promotions, and there are even punishments for unsatisfactory 
performance or failures. Under this pressure to meet or exceed quotas, local government officials rushed 
households to retire much more land than was planned by the central government [31]. In principle, 
households should have been granted full autonomy in their choice of whether to participate. The 
government actually ignored the engagement of local people in implementing the program. A village 
leader survey [93] reported that in interviews with 40 village leaders, only three village leaders stated 
that participation in the SLCP was entirely voluntary. In most cases, participation was based on a 
combination of self-selection by households and final selection by the local government [93]. A 2014 
study showed that farmers’ participation in the SLCP was not voluntary [72]. 
To facilitate inspection and monitoring by higher-level government officials, some regions gave 
priority to sites near roads for conversion [24]. This practice resulted in a system that conspired not only 
to avoid targeting by the project but also to report its success [94]. As a result, some affected households 
were forced to subscribe to the scheme by village leaders to meet specific conversion targets [70]. Under 
the quota system, implementation originated from government agreements instead of being based on 
local conditions, land use practices, or household needs [70]. As result, some poor and environmentally 
critical areas received fewer quotas than they desired [71]. 
4.3.2. Administrative Budgeting 
Some key administrative challenges of the SLCP include targeting, different agencies’ coordination, 
compensation delivery, local proactive participation and after-program inspection [21,34,35,71]. 
However, these tasks are burdensome when local governments must pay the administrative costs from 
their own budgets [24,46]. Local governments have found other ways to benefit from the system by 
increasing land conversion quotas, exceeding quotas and bargaining for more subsidies [46]. 
Concurrently, they have sought to minimize administrative costs by including parcels that are contiguous 
regardless of steep slopes [95]. Consequently, a significant portion of non-sloping land was enrolled, 
whereas some steeply sloping land remained in cultivation [25].  
Another crucial challenge is the program’s poor monitoring [32,94]. For example, local budget crises 
have resulted in minimal monitoring and enforcement of the SLCP [70]. Additionally, given the 
remoteness of the forestation sites, which discourages monitoring and auditing, and the lack of funding 
and staffing for the projects, it makes sense for local officials simply to report successes and receive 
credit for them, particularly when they do not have the means to monitor the reforestation sites [94]. 
Shortfalls in delivered subsidies also occurred due to poor administrative budgeting [33]. Significant 
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shortfalls in compensation received occurred in 2003, ranging from 24%–77% in a 2003 survey [24]. In 
a study by Xu et al. [96], approximately 50% of 1,026 households had received incomplete compensation. 
4.3.3. Compromise of a Multi-Goal Approach 
The dual goals of ecological conservation and alleviation of poverty place local government in a 
dilemma [24], weakening its ability to ensure program compliance. Withholding subsidies based on low 
survival rates can significantly dampen enthusiasm for the program and potentially harm households’ 
welfare [24]. Additionally, the SLCP has acquired meaning that far exceeds the program itself. It was 
initially conceived as part of the “Open the West” campaign [49], which aimed to help China’s western 
provinces catch up economically with the eastern provinces and transfer more rural labor to cities [21,97], 
which gave the SLCP a means for urbanization. 
4.3.4. Tree-Planting Strategy 
Opinions differ regarding the SLCP’s afforestation strategy, which falls under the responsibility of 
the SFA [56]. For example, Cao [77] is critical of the SFA’s over-enthusiasm for planting trees on 
sloping land, which has largely ignored local conditions. A study by Wang et al. [98] demonstrated that 
most of the dry land areas in the west have an annual rainfall of less than 400 mm and thus are suitable 
for growing only grass and drought-tolerant shrubs. Afforestation in vulnerable arid and semi-arid 
regions, such as those in northern Shaanxi Province, might increase the severity of water shortages, 
decrease vegetation cover in afforestation plots, and adversely affect biodiversity [51]. Different 
environments support different vegetation communities, and forests are not suitable for all areas [77]. 
Moreover, participating households advocate for the planting of trees over grass because of the longer 
compensation duration [23]. 
4.3.5. Program Adaptability 
Studies [30,53] have indicated that flexible payments and a competitive selection process could be 
more efficient. Therefore, compensation should differ according to the benefits of certain plot types. The 
government offers two compensation schemes for the Yellow River Basin and the Yangtze River Basin. 
No formal pre-program analysis of participants’ opportunity costs was conducted [24]. Instead, consideration 
of opportunity costs was based only on estimates of average regional yields. However, given the 
tremendous heterogeneity characterizing the two areas, it seems that both compensation schemes would 
fail to match either environmental benefits or income loss [25]. Regarding the SLCP, Wang et al. [54] 
concluded that the local and regional biophysical and socioeconomic characteristics do not appear to 
have been sufficiently considered in site selection. 
Why does the socioeconomic effect of the program vary in different cases? One reasonable 
explanation is that the SLCP has different effects on different groups of people. Many researchers [24,25] 
criticize the program’s adaptability because one single policy cannot fit all situations. There are many 
ways to classify people according to their different responses to the SLCP. Based on the resources they 
have for cropping, livestock husbandry or off-farm employment, Komarek et al. [99] classified different 
households into four categories. The study indicated that subsistence-oriented households were most 
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likely to participate in the SLCP, whereas migration- and cropping-oriented households had less 
incentive to participate. Unlike the mainstream opinion of labor transfer [66], Cao et al. [22] found that 
many households prioritized agricultural development and that fewer wanted support in finding jobs in 
urban areas rather than assistance with tree and forage planting. These studies demonstrate that different 
people need different solutions and not a “one-size-fits-all” plan [22]. 
4.3.6. Institutional Complementary Policy 
According to Yin et al. [31,40], the success of the SLCP program depends not only on its own 
stipulations but also on other related policies because the SLCP is devoted to fostering long-term 
sustainable rural livelihoods through measures such as tenure rights registration. However, the current 
land tenure system is characterized by insecure land rights due to the separation of land property rights 
and use rights [100]. Land property plays an important role when subsidies cease, and land rental rights 
can enhance the sustainability of the program by enabling households to pursue off-farm activities [31]. 
An analysis [101] also showed that households have a strong aversion for land redistribution and favor 
the development of more secure land rights (both property rights and rental rights). 
Ideally, a market-based approach such as bidding and contracting can help to optimally match  
payer benefits with participation costs [102]. Programs such as the SLCP can adopt bidding processes 
to improve the effectiveness of targeting. Additionally, it enables the government to involve  
intermediaries [40]—including both for-profit and non-profit organizations—and these intermediaries 
might bridge the gap between the policy initiative at the top and local participants at the bottom [40]. 
However, it should be recognized that perfect targeting typically cannot be achieved in practice because 
of increasing transaction costs [31]. Therefore, although differentiated compensation cannot be based on 
the need of each local plot, it can be made according to plot types [31]. 
The implementation of the SLCP should be more closely integrated into a portfolio of policies 
addressing the rural economy. Access to rural credit [24], local livestock management [31], off-farm 
employment opportunities [66], and the removal of the legal barriers to rural-urban migration policy 
(“hukou” residency permit system) [100] might facilitate the effectiveness of the SLCP socioeconomically. 
Additionally, complementing the SLCP by other conservation programs would improve all the  
programs’ effectiveness [21]. 
5. Discussion 
To successfully reach its goals, the SLCP was claimed to be a decentralized and voluntary PES 
program; however, many institutional barriers have prevented it from being as innovative as it should 
be. Based on our analysis, we found the importance of institutional aspects, and how they affect the 
performance of the SLCP in this particular hybrid-governance type. There are multiple institutional 
driving forces that challenge the effectiveness of the SLCP: (1) the top-down governance regime with 
quota pressure has shaped the voluntary-based program into a campaign-style mobilization, and this 
regime has driven the program to quickly achieve tremendous land conversion, but at the cost of 
comprising local condition; (2) poor budgets have overburdened local governments, leading to poor 
targeting and loose monitoring, and the program can hardly succeed as its effectiveness wanes; (3) the 
trade-offs caused by conflicting goals—and particularly the dual goals of land conservation and poverty 
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alleviation —have put local governments in a dilemma in which punishing poor performance tends to 
worsen the living conditions of poor households; (4) over-emphasized tree planting has increased the 
severity of water shortages, decreased vegetation cover, and adversely affected biodiversity; (5) lacking 
differentiation, the payment scheme did not take local heterogeneity and economic conditions into 
account in site selection; and (6) land tenure rights, technical support for tree planting and assistance in 
the labor market did not receive enough attention to ensure the SLCP’s long-term impact. We outline 
the main relationships in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. An illustration of the dependence of program effectiveness on implementation. 
The arrows indicate the influence on, and the causality of, institutional challenges regarding the 
deviation between the criteria for program effectiveness and its outcomes. For example, the arrows of 
the quota system point to imperfect targeting, lack of voluntariness, and monoculture afforestation. 
Strong incentives to meet the quotas made local governments anxious to complete the task and in the 
end undermined the principle of voluntariness. There is substantial evidence in the literature that shows 
that the autonomy of the individual household has not been maintained and that participation is decided 
by the local government [24]. 
We acknowledge that the criteria for effectiveness in this figure are not independent of one another. 
For example, targeting is an element of effective implementation; however, it also causes vegetation 
cover and livelihood changes. Because we only discuss the deviation between institutional settings and 
the effectiveness criteria in this paper, we simply place them in different dimensions. Additionally, we 
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admit the relationships discussed above are by no means an exhaustive description of the complex set of 
interrelationships between the effectiveness of implementation, environmental effects, socioeconomic 
effects and institutional challenges. In this figure, we do not intend to precisely reflect these dependencies, 
but we instead visually summarize the challenges and how they influence the program’s implementation 
and its effects. Further empirical analysis is needed to testify and support the remarks of this review. 
6. Conclusions 
In this study, we analyzed the key institutional challenges faced by the Chinese PES, the SLCP. Based 
on a broad literature survey (n = 164), we identified the following four institutional aspects in our 
analysis: (1) program effectiveness (implementation and effects); (2) the difference between program 
objectives and achievements; (3) institutional challenges; and (4) the dependence of the identified lack 
of effectiveness on these challenges. 
The targeting of the SLCP introduced challenges regarding household participation. In some cases, 
stakeholder participation appeared less vulnerable, partly as a result of administrative (and pragmatic) 
implementation issues, the large size of the program and the (relatively short) implementation time 
allotted. For many households, the program offered new income sources. On the one hand, it was noted 
that participating households could benefit from the shifting from on-farm to off-farm activities for better 
economic opportunities. On the other hand, with growing economic development, compensatory 
payments appeared to be less attractive, and some participating households actually expressed their 
intention to reconvert their land after the program ends; although evidence showed more and more 
farmers have off-farm jobs, indicating less need for arable land [23]. The key environmental challenges 
identified included the selection of appropriate tree species and locations (e.g., tree mortality/survival, 
water problems, and household issues with maintenance). Nevertheless, these consequences might be 
linked to certain institutional challenges that made the implementation deviate from the criteria for 
effectiveness. Studies have shown a large PES program such as the SLCP is a complex and dynamic 
process in which many relevant actors interact and evolve [32]. From our study, we argue that the 
program’s effectiveness is a result of interacting driving forces, whereas institutional factors such as 
quota system, program management and relating policies play a key role in shaping the outcome. 
This study shows that the concept of PES might be successfully employed in China. In this case, the 
PES concept provides the basis for considering imperfect institutional settings featuring different 
environmental and socioeconomic conditions simultaneously. If key relationships are well understood 
and addressed, the effectiveness of the SLCP can thus be improved. A key finding of this study highlights 
the dependence of program effectiveness criteria on institutional settings under a hybrid governance 
regime (a mixture of top-down and voluntary approaches). Using a systematic approach, we conclude 
that large-scale government-driven PES programs could benefit from adopting the widely accepted 
principles underlying a typical PES as reflected in policy design, implementation, monitoring and adjustment. 
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ABSTRACT
As the world’s largest payments for ecosystem services (PES) program, China’s Sloping Land
Conversion Program (SLCP) is designed to combat soil erosion and land degradation by convert-
ing cropland on steep slopes into forests. Operating through an incentive-based approach, the
SLCP involved 32 million rural households as core agents. This paper aims to fill a research gap
regarding how socioeconomic and institutional conditions influence rural households to reach
the primary environmental goals. Using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA), we
conclude that at the household level, the different pathways to environmental success or failure
have been shaped by socioeconomic and institutional conditions in a combinatorymanner rather
than single conditions alone. Specifically, the combination of household involvement and
effective monitoring plays a fundamental role in capacity-building between government and
households. We found that financial incentives have a trade-off effect, as they could not only
create a positive interaction but also trigger failure in situations with different conditions. Finally,
the potential and limits of QCA were discussed, and we call for a more serious reflection on the
added value of QCA as an alternative or complementary method to conventional approaches in
environmental governance research.
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1. Introduction
Payments for ecosystem services (PES) has been
a popular approach to address environmental degrada-
tion in recent years. The principle of PES is to use an
economic incentive tomotivate voluntary local actors to
protect and restore valuable ecosystem services (Engel
et al. 2008). As PES is not a panacea, how to make PES
the right tool has attracted considerable attention.
Notably, by summarizing 70 PES programs worldwide,
Wunder et al. (2018) argue that four theoretical pre-
conditions and three desirable design features should
enable PES to achieve success. However, based on
a review of PES design features, Engel (2016) claimed
that the evidence on the effectiveness of PES is still
scarce and rather mixed.
The Chinese Sloping Land Conversion Program
(SLCP), initiated in 1999, is considered one of the largest
governmental PES programs in the world due to its broad
geographic cover, wide participation and tremendous
investment (Zhen and Zhang 2011). This program
aimed to reduce soil erosion and support rural economic
development by reforesting approximately 14.67 million
hectares of cropland countrywide (State Forest
Administration 2003). With an explicit emphasis on
voluntary participation and local autonomy in the policy’s
design, the SLCP directly engaged over 32 million house-
holds as core agents of program implementation (State
Forest Administration 2007). Although embracing inno-
vative PES elements, similarly to other governmental
schemes, the SLCP contains components from the tradi-
tional command-and-control approach, such as top-
down structure, inflexible contract design and campaign-
style mobilization (Kolinjivadi and Sunderland 2012).
Thus, an open question remains concerning whether the
SLCP is an institutional innovation or just ‘business as
usual’ (Bennett 2008).
The success of economic incentive instruments
depends on the capacity to target the self-interest of the
final agents – the households (Liang et al. 2012; Li et al.
2017). Various socioeconomic and institutional condi-
tions, including household attitude, trust, household
involvement, household livelihood, property rights clar-
ification, off-farm labor allocation, and regular monitor-
ing, were considered important factors to create the
incentive and shape the behavior (Uchida et al. 2005;
Bennett 2008; Cao et al., 2009a). Their influence on rural
households’ willingness to participate in SLCP was inten-
sively studied (Démurger and Pelletier 2015; Li et al. 2017;
Liu et al. 2019). Many studies had linked those factors
with program implementation, poverty alleviation, cost-
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effectiveness and long-term sustainability (Uchida et al.
2009; Gauvin et al. 2010; König, Podhora et al. 2015).
Many studies had extensively investigated the various
impacts of the SLCP on the participating households,
such as their household income (Lin and Yao 2014),
livelihood diversification (Liu and Lan 2015), agricultural
production activities (Yao and Li 2010; Liu and
Henningsen 2016), labor transfer (Yao et al. 2010) and
productivity (Liu and Lan 2018). The studies shed light on
the factors that affect the program implementation and
rural household livelihood. While many longitudinal
household databases had provided comprehensive analy-
sis of the livelihood impact of the SLCP, the dependency
of the primary environmental goal on socioeconomic and
institutional conditions at the household level has rarely
been explored. In particular, what determinants influ-
enced the final environmental effectiveness and efficiency
at the household level has until now been unclear.
The environmental effectiveness of SLCP is
mixed. Environmental effectiveness at the household
level refers to the quantity and quality of forest in
SLCP-enrolled plots (The State Council 2002).
Officially, the most important indicators used to
evaluate the outcomes are tree survival rate and
canopy coverage1. While the governmental national
evaluation result shows 93% acceptance after inspec-
tion (State Forest Administration 2007), many filed
studies cast doubt upon the accuracy and reliability
of that assessment (Bennett 2008; Trac et al. 2013;
He and Sikor 2015). In contrast, several studies
found great forest cover improvement in extensive
SLCP-enrolled regions by using remote sensing
(Zhou et al. 2009; Zhang et al. 2017). Nevertheless,
SLCP could not take all the credit, as private com-
mercial afforestation increasingly dominates the
expansion of tree cover (Frayer et al. 2014).
Additionally, the aggregated regional result may
neglect significant differences by individual house-
hold and locale (Bennett et al. 2014). Therefore,
scientific field observation of the official indicator
is important to justify the SLCP-induced environ-
mental outcome at the individual household level.
However, due to the difficulty in collecting the filed
data in the remote mountainous area, the criticisms
of the environmental effectiveness of SLCP primar-
ily relied on secondary data, such as household self-
reported information and governmental inspection
results (Bennett 2008; Bennett et al. 2014; He and
Sikor 2015). Only a handful of filed observations are
available, but they are not up to date (Cao 2008; Cao
et al. 2009b). To offer direct and detailed evidence,
further local case studies and field-based data collec-
tion have been called for (Trac et al. 2007).
While there have been several studies devoted to
addressing the link between socioeconomic and
institutional conditions with the environmental
effects of the SLCP (Bennett 2008; Yin and Zhao
2012; He et al. 2014; Zhang et al. 2017), they have
not explicitly clarified the interactions between socio-
economic and institutional conditions and environ-
mental outcomes at the same household level. To fill
this research gap, the objective of our paper is to
analyze the relation between relevant socioeconomic
and institutional conditions and environmental effec-
tiveness at the household level. We target the follow-
ing research questions:
● What are the necessary and sufficient2 socioeco-
nomic and institutional conditions at the house-
hold level for environmental effectiveness?3
● What are the necessary and sufficient socioeco-
nomic and institutional conditions at the house-
hold level for environmental effectiveness and
environmental noneffectiveness4?
2. Analytic framework
Our research is structured using a combination of meth-
ods. After selecting the case study, we selected and defined
the conditions based on the literature and local interviews.
Then, we collected data by a second household interview
and field observation. After calibration of the data, we
employed a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis
(fsQCA) to determine the different pathways to success
and failure in terms of environmental effectiveness among
varied condition arrangements. Figure 1 gives an overview
of how we proceeded with our analysis.
Socioeconomic and 
institutional conditions
Field observation of tree 
canopy coverage
Environmental effects
CalibrationFuzzy-QCA 
Pathway to success
The selection of study cases and conditions
Household interview
Pathway to failure
Figure 1. Analytical framework.
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3. Selection of case study area and conditions
3.1. Selection of study cases
As a typical target region of the SLCP, Jingyuan County
from the Guyuan Region in the Ningxia Hui
Autonomous Region (Figure 2) was selected as the
study region. Located at the southern tip of the Loess
Plateau, JingyuanCounty is in a remote, environmentally
fragile mountainous frontier region. The county is
defined as a national key ecological function zone and is
one of the most undeveloped areas in China. Shengli
village and Miaowan village were purposely selected
because both villages implemented two rounds of the
SLCP, with significant tree plantations and extensive
involvement of the local households since 2000. To
answer our research question, individual households in
both villages were selected as our study cases, and their
environmental effectiveness for SLCP-enrolled land was
defined as the outcome.
Another reason for us to select these two villages is the
similarity of their environmental settings. In general,
environmental conditions (e.g. soil, precipitation, and
temperature) are important determinants of environ-
mental outcomes. Of course, for an individual plot, the
micro-environmental conditions are different, especially
considering the variation under climate change.
However, the land areas in the two villages are categor-
ized into three classes according to biophysical conditions
(e.g. slope, soil, access to water and plot size) and traffic
conditions (e.g. distance to home). To make the overall
quality of land allocated to each household nearly equal,
one household normally has 3–6 plots that include all
three classes.Due to the targeting strategy, SLCP-enrolled
plots are mostly in the worst class, with the worst bio-
physical and traffic conditions. By selecting the SLCP-
enrolled plots in the two villages, we consider that our
sample has beennaturally controlled for the environmen-
tal aspect. This assumption was also confirmed by the
local forest experts. Our first field trip in 2014 observed
that one frequently sees two neighboring plots with simi-
lar environmental conditions but completely different
results due to differentmanagement strategies.We there-
fore believe that for our study cases, environmental con-
ditions may play only a limited role in determining
different environmental outcomes across different
households.
3.2. Selection of relevant conditions
Consistent with the PES theory and international
experience, the environmental success of SLCP
depends on a variety of conditions. As only a limited
number of conditions can be considered for valid
inferences by QCA, we assumed that some key condi-
tions are most relevant for the program’s environmen-
tal effectiveness. To avoid subjectivity, we selected the
most relevant ones through three steps. Step 1 listed the
potential conditions through a broad search based on
studies. The literature study began with socioeconomic,
institutional and environmental aspects that are gener-
ally assumed to be important within the SLCP litera-
ture. The review, conducted by the first author (Chen
et al. 2015) in 2015, includes 164 international scientific
articles; additional studies were updated in 2017. As
Figure 2. Location map of Jingyuan County in Guyuan region, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region.
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a result, 20 relevant conditions were found. Step 2
shortened the list by merging similar conditions into
more-general conditions based on local household
interviews. Finally, Step 3 selected the most relevant
conditions according to a local expert workshop.
Detailed information about this process can be found
in A1, the condition selection protocol, in the supple-
mentary material. The final selected socioeconomic
and institutional conditions are summarized in Table 1.
3.2.1. Household involvement
The SLCP claimed to be decentralized, and voluntary
households were to be free to choose their site to retire
and choose tree species to plant (The State Council
2002). However, during implementation, household
participation was not entirely voluntary and was
observed in a passive manner (Li et al. 2017). When
a region was targeted by the governmental general plan,
individual households can hardly have a say in the
enrollment decision (Démurger and Pelletier 2015).
Therefore, we viewed the participation by using the
broader term, ‘involvement.’ By our definition, house-
hold involvement included being part of the general
planning, site selection and tree species selection and
of the satisfaction of the decision results.
3.2.2. Financial incentives
For SLCP households, behavioral changes are highly
conditional on the governmental payment. Economists
viewed the financial incentive based on the opportunity
costs (Uchida et al. 2005). However, it is important to
consider household resources when analyzing real beha-
vioral changes. Furthermore, the payment amount varied
according to the enrolled land size and environmental
outcome. Therefore, we define the financial incentive
based on the household’s comparison between the cost
required by the SLCP (farmland loss, replanting respon-
sibility and obligation to be monitored) and payment
received.
3.2.3. Off-farm labor allocation
A household’s position within agriculture and off-farm
labor markets has a complicated impact on the program
implementation (Uchida et al. 2009). The effect of off-
farm labor allocation has been studied intensively but
remains unclear. Many scholars have argued that the
shifting from on-farm activities to off-farm employment
can offer the household better economic opportunities
(Yao et al. 2010; He et al. 2014). Therefore, this transition
was considered key to ensuring the converted land is not
returned to cropland (Groomet al. 2010).However, other
evidence shows that off-farm households do worse at
keeping their planted trees alive (Bennett et al. 2011).
The percentage of land-related income (farming, garden-
ing and livestock breeding) that accounts for total income
is chosen as the measure for off-farm labor allocation.
3.2.4. Property rights
Demsetz (1967) noted that different patterns of property
rights could lead to different patterns of behavior, and Tu
et al. (2011) found that property rights are generally
considered to influence SLCP household behavior
regarding resource use and environmental management.
Moreover, secure property rights played an important
role when payments were terminated by encouraging
households to pursue off-farm employment (Grosjean
and Kontoleon 2009; Yin and Zhao 2012). However,
there are increasing concerns about the uncertainty over
the lack of property rights in rural China due to the
separation of land property rights and use rights5
(Uchida et al. 2005). Since we are interested in the incen-
tive for households to provide environmental effects, the
measure of property rights focuses on household percep-
tion about trees and land rather than the legal property
status.
3.2.5. Effective monitoring
Effective and lasting monitoring, particularly internal
monitoring and enforcement, has been understood as
a major component of SLCP implementation (Yin
et al. 2013). While monitoring was widely accepted
as the core of PES design, how to implement mon-
itoring cost-effectively remains unclear (Ezzine-de-
Blas et al. 2016). As we consider the monitoring
from the perspective of households, household aware-
ness of the checking standard and the appearance of
monitoring officials are used as measures.
4. Data and methods
4.1. Data collection – socioeconomic and
institutional conditions
Data collection was done during our second field trip in
2015. Thirty households in Shengli village and 29
households in Miaowan village were onsite sampled,
totaling approximately 10% of the households in both
villages. The survey targeted the household head as the
Table 1. Definition of the five conditions.
Condition Code Category Definition
Household Involvement ‘invo’ Institutional Household is involved in decision making in program implementation
Off-farm labor allocation ‘off’ Socioeconomic A majority of income comes from off-farm employment
Financial incentive ‘fina’ Socioeconomic Household feels the payment is attractive compared to the required input
Property rights ‘prop’ Institutional Household recognizes property rights for trees and land
Effective monitoring ‘moni’ Institutional Household is aware of the checking standard and has been effectively monitored
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person viewed as knowing the most about his/her
household. Apart from basic household characteristics,
the interview focused on the five conditions and their
measures. In addition, interviews with the village head
and local forest officials helped to verify the results from
the households.
The subjective impacts from the interviews, such as
strategic answers, influence of the interviewer and mis-
interpretation were seriously considered and carefully
addressed. The interviews were conducted face-to-face
by a team led by the first author. Since 2014, this teamhas
worked in Jingyuan County, particularly in the two study
villages. The team included three PhD students from
a research group at the Institute of Geographic Sciences
and Natural Resources Research (IGSNRR), Chinese
Academy of Sciences. All team members were trained
on relevant conditions and correspondingmeasures. The
existing mutual trust and well-prepared knowledge
enabled the interviews to be conducted with minimum
communication difficulty.
4.2. Data collection – measurement of
environmental effects
Tree survival rate was used as themost explicit indicator
for evaluation for pragmatic reasons (Bennett 2008).
However, it is often criticized by household and local
forest officials because survival rate counts the quantity
of the trees rather than the quality of the forest. To
equally consider the quantitative and qualitative perfor-
mance, we therefore evaluated environmental effective-
ness at the household level by using the Braun-Blanquet
method to scale the tree canopy coverage. The Braun-
Blanquet cover-abundance scale is a widely used
method for ecological studies (Braun-Blanquet 1932)
that provides sufficiently accurate baseline data to
allow environmental impact assessment in terms of
species, estimation of relative abundance, estimation
of foliar coverage and density measurement (Wikum
and Shanholtzer 1978).
Due to land fragmentation and lacking information,
applying remote sensing and GIS to measure the envir-
onmental effects for our sampled households is not sui-
table. The field work was very challenging but appeared
to be the only option. We collected field-observed data
from 128 SLCP-enrolled plots (Figure C1 and C2 in the
supplementary material) owned by our 59 interviewed
households. Eachhouseholdwasmeasured by at least two
different located plots because of land fragmentation.We
randomly placed a 100 m2 quadrat with the steel tape
within the plot during the middle of the growing season
(August and September). In order to eliminate accidental
in selection, the sample quadrat from the sample plot was
checked by our local guide (local farmer specialized in
forest management). Species diversity, species number,
tree height and coverage were collected according to the
Braun-Blanquet table (Braun-Blanquet 1932). The
Braun-Blanquet cover-abundance scale was recorded by
the authors’ estimation in the quadrat. To make our
estimation more accurate and objective, we confirmed
the scale by counting the number of each tree species in
the quadrat. Finally, we adapted the scale with the
Chinese forest regulations (Table 2) (General
Administration of Quality Supervision 2006). The envir-
onmental outcome was categorized ‘forest’, ‘sparse for-
est’, ‘developing forest or grass’ or ‘re-farm’ (Figure C3 in
the supplementary material). According to the Chinese
forest regulations, the first two categories are considered
forest, and the other two categories are not. Therefore,
a coverage ratio of 10% is used as the threshold to distin-
guish environmental success and failure at the household
level (Table 2). We acknowledge that we are not seeking
to precisely quantify the environmental effects. Instead,
we want to make an estimation of the relative abundance
of forest for further outcome comparisons. Given the
current availability of data and facility at the household
level, the cover-abundance scale in a sample quadrat is an
appropriate measure for examining the household-level
environmental effectiveness.
As our study case is the individual household, the
field observation data from 128 SLCP-enrolled plots
need to be aggregated into 59 households. When one
household’s plots have the same result (45 of 59), they
can be easily unified. When one household’s plots had
different results, a participatory process with the village
head was carried out to make a decision based on the
overall performance during the previous local inspec-
tion. If re-farm is observed in any of the plot, the out-
come of the household is labeled as re-farm (9 of 59).
4.3. Data analysis by qualitative comparative
analysis
To compare the 59 households, we employed qualitative
comparative analysis (QCA) to determine the different
pathways to environmental success and failure among
varied condition arrangements. QCA, which is based on
Boolean logic, allows comparison between cases and at
Table 2. Conversion of Braun-Blanquet cover abundance scale to SLCP scale.
Braun-Blanquet scale Coverage ratio SLCP scale Coverage ratio
3–5 >25 Forest 20%-100%
2 10–25 Sparse forest 10%-20%
1 <10, numerous individuals Developing forest 5%-10%
+ <10, few individuals Grass 0–5
R <10, no individuals Re-farm 0, crop or nursery planting
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the same time offers a detailed understanding of the
complexity of each case, particularly in small or med-
ium-sized samples (Ragin 2008). QCA is particularly
powerful in analyzing multiple conjunctural and asym-
metrical causation (Rihoux and Ragin 2009). Multiple
conjunctural causation means that 1) not one factor but
a combination of factors will lead to the outcome; 2)
different combinations of factors can produce the same
outcome; and 3) one condition can have different
impacts on the outcome, depending on its combination
with other factors and the context. The justification for
considering QCA as an appropriate method for our
study can be found inA2 in the supplementarymaterial.
Hypotheses within QCA are implication hypotheses
of the notions of necessity and sufficiency (Ragin 2008).
A condition is necessary if, whenever the outcome is
present, the condition is also present. A condition can
be interpreted as sufficient, if always whenever the con-
dition is present, the outcome is also present. The QCA
analyses presented in this paper were conducted with
fsQCA 2.0 software (Ragin 2008). The software used the
truth table to sort the condition data into the different
logically possible combinations. When applying the logi-
cal minimization procedure to the truth table rows, three
solution terms are produced: the complex solution, the
parsimonious solution and the intermediate solution.
With no simplifying assumption, a complex solution
avoids using any counterfactual cases (remainder).
Parsimonious solutions, on the other hand, permit the
use of any remainder that will yield the simplest recipes.
An intermediate solution is something in between; it uses
only the remainders that survive counterfactual analysis
based on theoretical and substantive knowledge. The
researcher is free to choose the solution for substantive
interpretation depending on the balance between com-
plexity and parsimony (Ragin 2008). Finally, to explain
inconsistencies, contradiction analysis is used to explore
why some of the cases covered by the sufficient condition
exhibit the outcome and others do not.
The comparison of QCA and classical regression ana-
lysis (e.g. binary logistics) is by far a mixed result (each
has merits and drawbacks). As this study does not intend
to compare the methods, readers can find a detailed dis-
cussion in the works of Seawright (2005), Grofman and
Schneider (2009) and Vis (2012). We acknowledged that
this method is only briefly introduced in this section of
this paper. Our recent publication explains how QCA
could be applied in institutional analysis for PES and
illustrates five basic steps for such application (Meyer
et al. 2018). In Ragin (2008, 2014) and Schneider and
Wagemann (2010, 2012) provide handbooks, user guides,
explanations and standards of good practice regarding
this method. Nevertheless, to facilitate the understanding
of the results and discussion, we summarized the basic
terminology in Table B2 in the supplementary material.
4.4. fsQCA and calibration
Crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis (csQCA), spe-
cifically, an early developed version with dichotomy, was
first introduced by Charles Ragin in 1987 (Ragin 2008).
As csQCA was criticized by using binary-value data,
fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) allows the researcher to establish
differences in degree through a fuzzy membership score
(Schneider and Rohlfing 2013). Themembership score is
usually generated by calibration, and this crucial process
should be transparent, open and replicable (Ragin 2006).
The fuzzy membership score of our four conditions was
a four-value scheme with ‘0’, ‘0.33’, ‘0.67”, and ‘1.0’ to
indicate ‘fully out,’ ‘more out than in,’ ‘more in than out,’
and ‘fully in’, respectively. Since the household involve-
ment is more complicated, the fuzzy membership scores
of household involvement employed a six-value scheme,
with values of ‘0’, ‘0.2’, ‘0.4’, ‘0.6’, ‘0.8’ and ‘1.0’. Similarly,
the fuzzy membership outcome scores were categorized
with a four-value scheme to indicate ‘forest’, ‘sparse
forest’, ‘developing forest or grass’ and ‘re-farm’.
Theoretical knowledge and empirical insight were
used to generate the fuzzy membership scores of each
condition by using a measure. The selection of the mea-
sure followed the structural calibration procedure sug-
gested by Basurto and Speer (2012). Each condition was
explained by a measure, and each measure corresponds
to a survey question (Table 3). The full dataset can be
found in table B1, and details of the calibration process
are summarized in table B3 in the supplementary
material.
Table 3. Measure of condition.
Condition Measure Survey question
Household Involvement Involvement in general planning Were you involved in the program general plan in the village?
Involvement in tree selection Were you involved in the tree species selection for your own enrolled land?
Involvement in site selection Were you involved in the site selection for your own enrolled land?
Satisfaction Were you satisfied with the tree and spot selected for your SLCP enrolled land?
Property rights Tree ownership Do you think you own the tree under the payment?
Tree disposition Do you think you own the tree after the payment?
Land ownership Do you think you own the enrolled land?
Off-farm labor allocation Income structure How much is your land-related income?
How much is your total income?
Effective monitoring Checking standard Do you understand the checking standard?
Monitoring Have you been regularly monitored by a local official?
Inspection Did the provincial or national official inspect your SLCP enrolled land?
Financial incentive Recognition of attractiveness Do you feel the payment is attractive compared to the input that is required?
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5. Results
5.1. Monitoring of environmental effects
In Jingyuan, ecological planting (species that provide
ecological services, compared to fruits and nuts) has
been fully implemented due to longer payment, as the
local government promoted. Local forest experts told us
that ecological trees grow better on SLCP-enrolled land
in Jingyuan, which has poor soil fertility. Inappropriate
choices of tree species were made in the first few years,
given the study region’s low water availability and harsh
winter (König et al. 2014), and replanting was con-
ducted every year to fill the gaps left by dead trees.
Thus, local governments, on behalf of the program,
asked the households or hired local laborers to partici-
pate in replanting. Years later, due to many rounds of
replanting, a mixed plantation of many indigenous
species was established by the households. However,
many households complained that the payment was
greatly reduced due to the replanting.
A majority of trees on the ground are less than 3
meters tall, with low coverage (Table 4) and low density
(Table 5). Most of our observation plots are at the early
stage of forest development. The average self-reported
tree survival rate is 65.4%, while the field-checked tree
survival rate5 is 40.46% (Table 5). Both figures are much
lower than the official 85% standard, implying that
there may be a serious problem with tree management.
Sixteen of 59 households had delivery of a qualified
‘ecological forest’, and they will be entitled to annual
compensation by categorizing their forest into
a national public forest. Forty-three households had
not achieved the expecting environmental outcome,
and 9 households had reconverted their SLCP-
enrolled land back to agricultural use.
5.2. Pathway to success
We assumed that the presence of household involve-
ment, property rights, off-farm labor allocation, effec-
tive monitoring and sufficient financial incentive is
relevant for environmental success.
5.2.1. Necessary conditions
For this study, we used a consistency score of 0.90 as
a threshold for accepting a condition as being necessary,
as suggested by Schneider and Wagemann (2010). The
analysis showed that all consistency scores are below the
threshold with an exception that the condition of
effective monitoring (0.897683) is very close to 0.9,
indicating that effective monitoring is likely the neces-
sary condition for success.
5.2.2. Sufficient conditions
By performing a sufficiency analysis, we sought to
determine which individual conditions or combina-
tion of conditions would be sufficient for achieving
the outcome. All 59 cases were used to build the
crisp-set truth table, with 24 rows (figure C4 in the
supplementary material). The outcome value of each
row was determined. We found a clear gap between
the outcome consistencies of 0.82 and 0.79 (marked
as red in figure C4); therefore, we used the natural
break of 0.8 as the threshold. QCA is a case-oriented
method and is very sensitive to case. To avoid over-
interpretation, we set the frequency at 2. Thus, five
rows were considered successful and 19 rows unsuc-
cessful (figure C4). We identified two solution terms
for sufficient conditions for success (Table 6). The
verification of the QCA solutions for inconsistencies
and noncoverage can be found in A3 in the supple-
mentary material.
Accordingly, the results of our sufficiency analysis
are graphically displayed through an XY plot (Figure 3)
that can be used to visualize how consistent a given
combination of conditions is with the statement of
being a sufficient condition. The axes show the fuzzy-
set membership scores of the cases in the set of condi-
tion X and the outcome Y. For sufficiency, each case’s
fuzzy-set membership score in X must be equal to or
less than its fuzzy-set membership in Y. In other words,
almost all cases falling above the main diagonal would
indicate a sufficient relation. In this figure, most cases
are above or on the bisecting line.
5.3 Pathway to failure
Similar to our analysis of environmental success, we
assumed that the absence of household involvement,
property rights, effective monitoring or financial
incentive is relevant for environmental failure.
However, the effect of off-farm labor allocation is
not clear in the literature. Therefore, we retained
both on-farm labor allocation and off-farm labor
allocation in the assumption. The condition code
was marked with a tilde (~), indicating the status of
absent.
Table 4. Coverage of 128 SLCP-enrolled 100 m2 quadrat.
SLCP scale Coverage ratio Number of plots Percentage
Forest 20%-100% 23 18%
Sparse-forest 10%-20% 16 12.5%
Developing-forest 5%-10% 27 21.1%
Grassland 0–5 49 38.3%
Re-farm 0 13 10.2%
Table 5. Descriptive statistics of tree number and survival
rate of 128 SLCP-enrolled 100 m2 quadrat.
Number of trees Survival rate
Mean 13.75 40.46%
Standard Deviation 10.27 0.26
Minimum 0 0
Maximum 78 1
Count 128 128
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5.3.1. Necessary conditions
The analysis of necessary conditions of environmen-
tal failure indicated that none of the five conditions
was necessary for the outcome.
5.3.2. Sufficient conditions
We use the intermediate solution as a result because it
balances parsimony and complexity via the injection of
additional theoretical knowledge into the analysis.
Again, we set 0.8 as the threshold according to the
natural break (marked as red in figure C5 in the supple-
mentary material) and set the frequency at 2. Thus, we
identified three solution terms for sufficient conditions
for failure (Table 7). The verification of the QCA solu-
tions for inconsistencies and noncoverage can be found
in A4 in the supplementary material.
6. Discussion
6.1 Conditions for environmental effectiveness
According to the necessary condition analysis, consis-
tency of effective monitoring is very close to the
threshold, indicating that monitoring is practically the
only necessary condition for an environmental success
at the household level. The results of our sufficient
condition analysis indicate that the combination of
certain conditions rather than a single condition alone
is crucial for environmental effectiveness. The results
reveal one main path and one complementary path,
which include both socioeconomic and institutional
conditions. The two different paths can independently
lead to environmental effectiveness (multiple conjunc-
tural causation).
Each path contains the combination of household
involvement and effective monitoring, illuminating
them as a fundamental combination. This combination
can create platforms for negotiation and capacity-
building between stakeholders. Both social systems
and ecosystems are nonstatic, and the governmental
PES needs to cope with abrupt change. Specifically,
a reforestation program such as the SLCP requires
closely cooperating stakeholders who deal with general
planning, location and tree species selection, and pro-
blem solving. The initiation of SLCP includes choosing
saplings, planting at the right time, digging a good-sized
Table 6. Sufficient conditions for success: complex solution.
Term Solution Raw coverage Unique coverage Consistency Covered household number
1 invo*moni*fina 0.708494 0.411583 0.851113 3, 4, 8, 13, 15, 19, 23, 24,29, 33, 35, 39, 43, 44, 52, 55, 56, 57
2 invo*moni*prop*off 0.335135 0.038224 0.843538 4, 8, 16, 17, 39, 52
Model: out = f(part, prop, off, moni, fina)
Solution coverage: 0.746718, Solution consistency: 0.823329
Frequency cutoff: 2.000000, Consistency cutoff: 0.824345
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Figure 3. XY plot of solution for sufficient condition invo*moni*fina + invo*moni*prop*off.
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hole and keeping the soil moist. Failure of any of these
factors can lead to extensive tree death, poor growth, or
a decline after planting. The fundamental combination
urges the households to manage their saplings at an
early stage, establishing a strong resistance to later
environmental challenges such as open livestock graz-
ing, drought, cold and rodent damage. For example,
2007 saw the coldest winter in Jingyuan in the last
decade, and massive damage to trees occurred.
Therefore, long-lasting household involvement and
effective monitoring are needed for both initiation and
follow-up replanting. Our results confirm the hypoth-
esis that PES schemes that are serious about involve-
ment and monitoring will also tend to perform better
with respect to their environmental outcomes (Ezzine-
de-Blas et al. 2016). Nevertheless, environmental suc-
cess can only be expected from the occurrence of
a fundamental combination with either 1) a financial
incentive or 2) both property rights and off-farm labor
allocation.
6.1.1. Path 1: the combination of household
involvement, effective monitoring and financial
incentives
Due to the high coverage (14 of 16 successful house-
holds), path 1 is the main path to environmental
success. It shows that the fundamental combination
has to be consistent with financial incentives. As
primary incentive, payment is important for the
properly initiated households to maintain their
efforts. In contrast, payment to those who failed to
pass the checking standard can be largely deducted
and use to contribute to replanting costs. This path
can focus the households’ incentive away from one-
time behavior and towards long-lasting efforts by
creating a positive feedback loop.
Notably, clear property rights and off-farm labor
allocation are missing in the combination, which has
challenged many studies (Uchida et al. 2009; Tu et al.
2011) by showing that clear property rights and off-
farm labor allocation are irrelevant for the main path to
environmental success. In Jingyuan County, local
employment opportunities are limited and unstable.
Most off-farm employment is physical work in the
construction and service sector. This kind of employ-
ment often has no contract and is excluded from the
social security system. The households covered by this
path showed varied recognition of property rights. Only
3 of 14 successful households could explicitly recognize
a property right. Therefore, we argue that the instability
of off-farm work in poor areas and the vagueness of
property rights in rural villages may undermine the two
important conditions for environmental effectiveness.
6.1.2. Path 2: the combination of household
involvement, effective monitoring, clear property
rights and off-farm labor allocation
The second path shows that environmental effectiveness
can also be expected in the presence of a fundamental
combination together with clear property rights and off-
farm labor allocation. Complementary to the main path,
this path describes how to reach environmental success
for a special group of off-farm households. Although
a majority of the income came from off-farm employ-
ment and their dependency on the land was increas-
ingly weak, the three successful households covered by
path 2 (household numbers 4, 8, and 52) hold strong
concerns about the risk of unemployment. Therefore,
they wanted to strengthen their ownership of the trees
and the land as a safeguard.
The financial incentive is not a component of the
path for off-farm households, although three success-
ful households had two ‘0.67’ and one ‘1’ in the value
scheme of the financial incentive. Due to the incon-
sistent cases (household numbers 16, 17, and 39), the
logic minimization procedure treated financial incen-
tive as an irrelevant condition. While the payment
was important at the early initiation stage, three suc-
cessful households told us that this importance was
increasingly weak as time passed. As off-farm
employment has recently dominated total income,
the payment of SLCP was only viewed as ‘icing on
the cake’. Therefore, we argue that it is not necessary
to add a financial incentive to the combination.
6.2 Conditions for the failure of environmental
effectiveness
Similar to the conditions for environmental effectiveness,
failure can occur from a combination of certain condi-
tions rather than single conditions alone. Additionally,
asymmetrical causation was also observed. Conversely,
the presence of certain conditions linking with environ-
mental effectiveness does not imply that their absence
links with failure.
In the absence of certain conditions, the SLCP may
become either business as usual or a form of welfare
entitlement. In particular, household noninvolvement
Table 7. Sufficient condition intermediate solution. Assumptions: ~fina (absent) ~moni (absent) ~prop (absent) ~part (absent).
Term Solution Raw coverage Unique coverage Consistency Covered household number
1 ~off*~invo 0.511783 0.172508 0.870504 6,12,20,21,26,27,28,32,37,38,41,45,47,48,49,51,53,54,58
2 ~prop*~invo 0.434441 0.048640 0.892613 5,6,7,14,26,27,28,37,40,41,49,51,59
3 fina*~moni*~prop 0.322054 0.073112 0.889816 5,6,9,28,36,37,41,46,50,59
Model: out = f(~part, ~ prop, ~ off, ~ moni, ~ fina)
Solution coverage: 0.680061, Solution consistency: 0.873836
Frequency cutoff: 2.000000, Consistency cutoff: 0.816568
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occurred in paths 1 and 2, showing that when program
implementation was informed rather than discussed
with households, their environmental effectiveness
may be harmed at the household level. As Bennett
(2008) found, incomplete involvement may place
some households in an unfair situation in terms of
resource distribution. Indeed, some households com-
plained that the saplings they received were bad quality
compared with those households who kept a close rela-
tionship with local forest officials. Corresponding to
section 6.1, household involvement plays a large role
in determining both success and failure of environmen-
tal effectiveness.
A negative effect of off-farm labor allocation was not
found in any of the three paths, which challenges the
argument that off-farm labor allocation may endanger
tree management due to time conflict or geographic
mismatch between city-based off-farm employment and
village-based forests (Bennett et al. 2011; Li et al. 2017). In
Jingyuan County, most off-farm laborers commute
between the construction sites and the villages by motor-
cycle. The short distance does not place the on-farm and
off-farm work in contradiction. Thus, off-farm labor
allocation may not play a role in the failure of environ-
mental effectiveness.
6.2.1. Path 1: the combination of household
noninvolvement and on-farm labor allocation
Households covered by this path have continued their
dependence on farming and lost the chance to diversify
their income. Many scholars assumed that it is more
likely that the on-farm labor allocating households and
relatively poor households will reconvert some of the
SLCP forest back to farming when the program ends
(Grosjean and Kontoleon 2009). The households cov-
ered by this path confirmed this assumption; five house-
holds had already reconverted some of the SLCP forest
back to sapling nursery or forage (alfalfa) planting. Our
results reflect the assumption of Barbier (2010) of
a ‘poverty-environment trap’ in developing countries,
where the relationship between poverty and natural
resource degradation is affected by the people’s access
to outside employment. Households covered by this
path may be resistant to both sapling initiation and
repeated replanting because they distrust the imple-
mentation process and they simply need the land for
agricultural use. Therefore, we argue that an environ-
mental failure can be expected in the presence of house-
hold noninvolvement and on-farm labor allocation,
where distrust, initiation failure, poor replanting and
farm dependency are all mutually reinforcing.
6.2.2. Path 2: the combination of poor property
rights and household noninvolvement
The combination of household noninvolvement and
poor property rights can also lead to failure. While
half of the covered households of the second path
overlapped with the first path due to the presence of
household noninvolvement, it is interesting to notice
the appearance of poor property rights. To date, forest
tenure reform allocated forestland to households but
caused more ambiguity about forest ownership (He
et al. 2014). Households covered by this path have
doubts about their property rights and hardly consider
the enrolled land their property, discouraging them
from managing the forest appropriately in the long
term. Similarly, in Vietnam (Kolinjivadi and
Sunderland 2012), Cambodia (Clements et al. 2010),
and Indonesia (Fauzi and Anna 2013), the implementa-
tion of governmental PES has been challenged by the
lack of well-defined property rights, raising a question
about the suitability of PES as a suitable tool in some
developing countries.
6.2.3. Path 3: the combination of financial
incentive, weak monitoring and poor property
rights
This path may be viewed by households as a form of
welfare entitlement or a profitable cheating strategy.
Particularly when the payment is attractive, monitoring
is not in place and property rights are not clear, house-
holds consider the SLCP compensation instead of con-
ditional payment. Our results are supported by the
study of Ezzine-de-Blas et al. (2016), who found that
governmental PES schemes that are perceived to be ill-
monitored will often eventually lead to widespread
noncompliance.
The trade-off effect of financial incentives is
worth mentioning, since it is a component of
a successful path and a failed path. It may be con-
sidered an inconsistency by the regression analysis,
but it is absolutely normal in the QCA analysis. The
multiple conjunctural causation of QCA allows one
condition to have different impacts on the outcome,
depending on its combination with other conditions.
Therefore, when combining with different condi-
tions, financial incentives can trigger not only suc-
cess but also failure.
6.3 Policy implications
Our study could be a reference to improve the govern-
mental PES programs. Governmental PES has great
potential to create significant economies of scale and
cost efficiencies when compared to other types of PES
(Engel et al. 2008). However, the tremendous invest-
ment from the state does not necessarily guarantee the
expected environmental outcome. Attention should be
given to understanding the combined effect of condi-
tions on PES program goals. Several studies have pre-
sented certain design features and synthesized some
common conditions for PES (Sattler and Matzdorf
2013). However, most existing studies consider the
various conditions individually and independently.
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Notably, Meyer et al. (2015) first showed that combina-
tions of certain design rules influenced the success of
a governmental payment scheme in Germany.
Similarly, our SLCP study shows that the combination
effect of certain conditions rather than single conditions
alone should be considered. In particular, for
a successful reforestation program, household involve-
ment, effective monitoring and financial incentives
should be present in a combination.While reforestation
requires continuous management with a trustable
reward system, this combination can foster a positive
feedback loop by building long-lasting cooperation
between households and government. The present of
both socioeconomic and institutional conditions shows
that interaction of socioeconomic and institutional con-
ditions may have a direct impact on the environmental
outcome. However, the interactions discussed in this
paper are by no means an exhaustive description of the
complex set of interrelationships between socioeco-
nomic, institutional and environmental dimensions.
We therefore call for more attention to combination
effects when designing a PES scheme.
Our study provided new empirical evidence that
is relevant for SLCP policymakers. First, our field
observation was in agreement with the claim that
environmental effectiveness decreased to thresholds
below those stipulated for payment. Second, the
effect of labor allocation is clear in our results. On
the one hand, off-farm labor allocation is the key
component of the complementary path to success.
On the other hand, households who continued their
dependence on farming may be trapped in poverty.
Third, the income structure change does not make
those off-farm households relax their property right
claims to their SLCP land and trees. Therefore, the
strength of property rights is needed in future poli-
cies, especially for those off-farm households who
successfully developed the trees. In late 2016, the
central government decided to terminate the pay-
ment (State Forest Administration 2016). From 2017
onward, the successfully established ‘ecological for-
est’ could be categorized as a national public forest,
which is entitled to annual compensation. The suc-
cessfully established ‘economic forest’ can be devel-
oped with the under-forest economy (agroforestry)
and even allowed to be cut down if permitted by
a local authority (State Forest Administration 2016).
However, the termination did not offer a solution to
those households who failed to meet the evaluation
standard. Therefore, timely policies should be made
to address these ‘excluded’ households by guiding
them from previously failed paths to successful
paths. In particular, the combination effect of house-
hold involvement and governmental monitoring
can help households break down institutional
constraints.
6.4 Methodological discussion
The Braun-Blanquet method was used to evaluate the
canopy coverage of SLCP-enrolled plots as an indicator
of environmental outcomes. Similar to other ecological
study methods for vegetation analysis, the result
depends on the time of the field visit. For instance,
deciduous trees may have different coverage in different
seasons. Moreover, the difference in tree species can
influence the result. For example, broadleaf trees (e.g.
black locust and Elm) in general have larger coverage
than do coniferous trees (e.g. dahurian larch and pine).
In our study region, both broadleaf trees and coniferous
trees were mixed planted, and trees were qualitatively
different due to different planting times. Therefore, we
consider that the Braun-Blanquet method is a better
tool to compare survival rates.
Our results confirm thatQCAhas the advantage in the
identification of necessary and sufficient conditions and
multiple conjunctural causation.However, disadvantages
of QCA, including reduced case numbers, limited causal
conditions (Rihoux and Lobe 2009), subjective condition
selection and imperfect calibration (Basurto and Speer
2012), have also been observed. Similar to other case-
oriented studies, fsQCA faces the same challenge that
only a limited number of cases and conditions can be
considered if one wants to draw valid inferences. High
numbers of conditions might be dysfunctional for QCA,
just as in garbage can statistical models, where too many
independent variables ‘destroy’ the results (Schneider and
Wagemann 2010). As is always true in QCA, the number
of cases is equal to 2k, where K is the number of condi-
tions included in the study. Our number of cases is 59,
and our number of conditions is 5, which are suitable for
the QCA application. Moreover, the selection of condi-
tions has a strong impact on the research result; therefore,
strong arguments are required to avoid subjectivity
(Sehring et al, 2013). In our SLCP study, the conditions
were selected and defined based on theoretical knowledge
and an extensive participatory process. However, several
important conditions (e.g. trust andnorm)were excluded
from our final five conditions. Authors must constantly
justify their choices and make them transparent (Table
B1). As a key part of fsQCA, calibration is essential to the
reliability and replicability of the result. Therefore, it
needs to be done carefully and documented clearly and
in detail. We kept the selection and calibration of condi-
tions transparent (Table B3) and open to criticism. We
thus believe that this openness has helped to balance the
subjectivity inevitably involved in any qualitative
research.
As a ‘middle road’ between quantitative and qua-
litative strategies (Rihoux 2003), QCA may go beyond
them by making systematic comparisons while still
taking into account the single case (Meyer et al.
2018). Despite being a well-established tool for policy
research, the application of QCA in the field of
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environmental governance is rare. As the potentials
and limits of QCA were reflected by our SLCP study
case, the added value of QCA as an alternative or
complementary method to conventional research
approaches might be discovered. The advantages of
QCA may be especially relevant in terms of research
on PES, which requires a better integration of rela-
tions between institutional, socioeconomic and envir-
onmental issues (Meyer et al. 2018).
7. Conclusions
In this study, we examined two major aspects. First, the
paths of socioeconomic and institutional conditions to
environmental effectiveness of the SLCP at the house-
hold level were revealed. Specifically, the linkage
between two interrelated datasets of socioeconomic
and institutional conditions and field-observed envir-
onmental outcomes were directly explored. Second, our
study is the pioneering work to use fsQCA in environ-
mental governance research for PES, and the added
value of QCA might be discovered. By correctly reflect-
ing its potentials and limits through empirical applica-
tion, we call for a more serious reflection on the added
value of QCA as an alternative or complementary
method to conventional research approaches.
Our field observation data from 128 SLCP-enrolled
plots are arguably one of the few datasets thus far avail-
able for SLCP field-observed evaluation.We show that 16
of 59 households had successfully implemented the SLCP
and that 9 households had reconverted their SLCP-
enrolled land back to agricultural use. The success and
failure in terms of environmental effectiveness can be
expected based on the combination of certain conditions
rather than single conditions alone. Our results revealed
one main path and one complementary path, either of
which can independently lead to environmental success.
As replantingwas annually conducted to replace the dead
trees in some areas, long-lasting incentives in situations
with effective monitoring appear to be critical for the
environmental outcome. The pathways to failure in
environmental effectiveness were more complicated.
The first and second paths were considered business as
usual, and the third path was viewed as a form of welfare
entitlement or a profitable cheating strategy. We found
that financial incentives have a trade-off effect, as they can
not only create a positive interaction but also trigger
failure in situations with different conditions.
Notes
1. At the household level, environmental effects were
measured by the tree survival rate (counting the trunks
3–5 years after the saplings are planted), tree species
and canopy coverage. At the regional and national
levels, environmental effects were measured by the
increase in forest area and forest cover.
2. Necessary and sufficient conditions refer to QCA ter-
minology; please see section 3.3 and Table B2.
3. The outcome and the negation of the outcome should
always be analyzed in two separate QCA analyses.
4. In the early 1980s, through forest tenure reform, most
collective forests in rural China came under the man-
agement of individual households.
5. We checked the survival rate according to the official
standard, which uses number of survived trees divided by
number of planted seeds or seeding (666.67 m2 = 220
seeds/seeding) after a 3 to 5-year period from time of
planting. The first planting was in 2000, but the re-
planting was annually repeated until 2013. The survival
rate was measured in 2015, which is three years after the
latest re-planting and close to the end of the program.
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Abstract: This study examines the network of actor for the implementation of a 
governmental PES program in China. We use Net-Map, a participatory network tool for social 
network analysis (SNA), combined with household survey to analyze how different 
stakeholders understand the program and how they influence each other. The results of our 
case studies in three townships showed that the local dynamics derived and shaped the 
program implementation. We found that the local agencies could potentially bringing 
together government and local farmers for up-front negotiations. Local institutional actors, 
including local government agencies, village councils, forest field stations and farmers may 
be forced to coordinate and ideally deliberate the terms and conditions of implementation 
and management options. Therefore, particular attention should be paid to the local 
governance models and interaction of local actors. 
Key words: Governance, governmental PES, SLCP, social network analysis, Net-Map, China 
 
Introduction 
The policymakers in China are increasingly interested in the market-based and incentive-
based approach to address the country’s conservation challenges and resource constraints. 
While Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) is increasingly popular as a way to manage 
Working Paper 
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ecosystems using economic incentives, its applications in China have been known under the 
domestic term of “eco-compensation” (Bennett 2009). Some eco-compensation schemes in 
China were recognized as PES-like or governmental PES schemes, as direct payment is often 
made by governments and the market mechanism is not yet fully in place (Wunder 2015). 
There are good arguments that this type of governmental PES fits well with the existing 
institutional and socioeconomic setting, especially when environmental conditions are in 
conflict with economic growth, rapid urbanization, expanding populations and social fairness 
(Liu and Diamond 2005). Other argued that eco-compensation in China lagged behind 
mature foreign PES projects in social negotiations, local acceptance, effectiveness and 
sustainability (Shang, Gong et al. 2018).  
As the flagship program of eco-compensation, the Sloping Land Conversion Program (SLCP), 
does not really fit the mainstream definition of the market-based approach, yet has been put 
under the label of one of the largest PES. This program aimed to reduce soil erosion by 
reforesting approximately 14.67 million hectares of cropland countrywide (State Forest 
Administration 2003). With stated principals of volunteerism and special emphasis on local 
engagement, central government provides payment to voluntary participants for land 
conversion, which is presumes to improve the provision of ecosystem services in the future. 
It includes both voluntary and hierarchical elements (top-down). However, the questionable 
property right and government’s political-campaigns-style strategy were often criticized by 
international scientific community (Bennett, Mehta et al. 2011, Yin and Zhao 2012).  
The central-designed policy had few modifications to adapt with the quite diversified 
ecological and economic conditions across the country (Chen, König et al. 2015). It left a 
significant variation for local practitioners to understand the policy and made room for 
different interpretation. Therefore, the implementation of SLCP has largely relied on local 
agencies and farmers (Xu, Tao et al. 2010), although the central government has the formal 
authority over the program design. However, nearly two decades of implementation, the 
National Forestry and Grassland Administration (formally recognized as State Forestry 
Administration) from central government had not developed effective incentives in 
mobilizing local cooperation in the SLCP. The eco-compensation programs over-depended on 
bureaucratic incentives, such as career promotion and administrative punishment, but 
seemed to ignore local agencies’ demand of financial compensation for their 
implementation efforts (Yu 2016).  
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Local agencies were considered important to ensure the social negotiations and voluntary 
acceptance. Many studies had observed the violation by local agencies (Trac, Harrell et al. 
2007, Bennett 2008), contradicting to central government’s stated principals of volunteerism. 
However, understanding the perception of local agencies and farmers toward the central-
designed governmental PES and their interaction with other actors are until now not clear 
yet. In order to fill this knowledge gap, this study aims to examine the recognition of 
different actor toward SLCP implementation. In particular, we focus on 
1) How is the actors´ network perceived? 
2) How is the PES implemented at the local level? 
Case study 
As a typical target region of the SLCP, Jingyuan County from the Guyuan Region in the 
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region was selected as study region. Located at the southern tip of 
the Loess Plateau, Jingyuan County is in a remote, environmentally fragile mountainous 
frontier region. It is defined as the national key ecological function zone and is one of the 
most undeveloped areas in China. Xingsheng Township, Huanghua Township and Xiangshui 
Township were purposely selected because they implemented two rounds of the SLCP with 
significant tree plantations and the extensive involvement of the local farmers since 2000.  
Method 
Social Network Analysis (SNA) is a suitable methodology to uncover involved actors, their 
motivations and power relations, and institutional settings. Thus, SNA can be used to bring 
transparency into PES governance and to foster social learning and coproduction of network 
knowledge. These aspects have been proven to support the closure of similar gaps in other 
areas of environmental governance (Hauck, Stein et al. 2015). Net-Map is an interview-based 
mapping tool that helps stakeholders understand, visualize, discuss, monitor, evaluate and 
improve situations in which many different actors influence outcomes. Net-Map is a hands-
on, low-tech, participatory tool, which can be used as a facilitation tool, or in the context of 
in-depth interviews. By creating Influence Network Maps sheets, individuals and groups can 
clarify their own views of a situation, foster discussion, and develop a strategic approach to 
networking activities.   
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In our case, we firstly asked about the actors in the implementation of SLCP. In the second 
step, we asked the pre-defined link(s) between the actors, including task assignment, 
knowledge flow, reporting and monitoring. In the third and fourth step, the influence and 
importance of the actors was measured. In the fifth step, the motivations of the actors were 
elicited. These five steps serve as a guideline for visualising a network map together with the 
interview partners (Table 1). This visualisation process is accompanied by interviewing, 
which the interviewees provide to explain the drawings. 
The information contained on the Net-Map sheets was later digitised in order to be analysed 
in the form of network graphs and their related SNA measures. The analysis of the Net-Map 
data was performed through the use of program UCINET 
(https://sites.google.com/site/ucinetsoftware/home).  
Step Goal Question 
1 Actor identification Do you know any actor involved in the implementation of 
SLCP 
2 Links  Task assignments (Who tells whom to do the SLCP) 
Advisory (Who discusses with whom about the targeting 
place and tree species) 
Report about outcome (Who reports to whom the result) 
Monitoring (Who inspect whom about the result) 
3 Influence tower How influential is this actor? 
Give a score between 0 and 5 
4 Importance tower How important is this actor? 
Give a score between 0 and 5 
5 Goal What is the goal for the actor in the program? 
Monetary benefit/environmental conservation/rural 
development/obligation require 
Table 1: Net-Map interview process 
In additional, survey of farmer perception was used as supplement to help the interpretation 
of the Net-Map data.  
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Date collection 
Data collection was made by our field trips in October 2014. Both qualitative (through Net-
Map interview) and quantitative (through household surveys) data were collected. 31 Net-
Map interviews were conducted, including policy makers, local executive officials and local 
farmers. Six policy makers are from higher administrative level, ranging from Ningxia 
provincial government, Guyuan prefecture government and to Jingyuan county government.  
Above the county level, three townships were further selected for local executive actors. 
Each township has one forest station and the chief of the station was interviewed. Each 
township has several villages and four villages from the three townships were selected. The 
village chiefs (the chairman of village committees) of the four villages were interviewed. It 
must be noted that, village is actually not an administrative level in China and therefore the 
village chief is not a government servant. Villages in China are self-governed by village 
committees, whose members are elected by villagers and held accountable to villagers and 
villager representative assemblies1. In the four villages, 18 household head were interviewed 
to represent the local households. The interview targeted the household head as the person 
seen as knowing the most about his/her household. The interviews were conducted with 
single person and were held mostly in the offices or in the homes of the interviewees. 
  
                                                          
1 Villages have been enfranchised under the Organic Law on Villagers Committees, passed by the National 
People’s Congress in late 1987, which allows villagers directly elect committees to serve three-year terms and 
administer the village’s affairs. 
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Net-Map 
interview 
Policy makers 
Provincial 
government 
Forest department 1 
Prefecture 
government 
Ningxia Forest bureau 1 
County government 
Guyuan Forest bureau 1 
Guyuan Development and 
Reform Bureau 
1 
Guyuan Financial bureau 1 
 Guyuan Grain bureau 1 
Local agencies 
Township government Forest station chief 3 
Village Village chief 4 
Farmers 
 
18 
 Total 31 
Table 2: Net-Map interview data 
221 household surveys were conducted in the same three townships. 71 households in 
Xingsheng, 79 households in Huanghua and 71 households in Xiangshui were onsite sampled, 
which were approximately 8% of the households in the township (Table 3). The subjective 
impacts from interview, such as strategic answer, influence of the interviewer and 
misinterpretation, were seriously considered and carefully addressed. The Net-Map 
interview was conducted face-to-face by the first author and the household surveys were 
carried by a team led by the first author. Since 2014, this team has worked in Jingyuan 
County. The team included three PhD students from a research group in Institute of 
Geographic Sciences and Natural Resources Research (IGSNRR), Chinese Academy of 
Sciences. All team members were trained and well-prepared knowledge, enabling the 
interview to be conducted with minimum communication difficulty. 
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Township Number of Household Net-Map Number of Survey 
Xingsheng 5 71 
Hunaghua 8 79 
Xiangshui 5 71 
All 18 221 
Table 3: Number of our sample township 
Result 
The results include two parts. The first part is the network derived from the Net-Map 
interview and the second part is based on the survey. 
The Network of actors 
Twenty-two most important actors have been identified by our 31 Net-Map sheets after 
concluding the interview process (Table 4). Multiple governmental agencies were involved in 
the implementation process and include departments from forestry and grain supply, to 
finance and development and reform commission (DRC). Agencies are tasked with releasing 
compensation in cash and grain, managing land contracts with farmers, mediating disputes, 
selecting and measuring land area for conversion, distributing saplings or grass species, 
issuing contracts, and monitoring results of conversion.  
Actor Abbreviation Role Orientation 
State Forest administration SFA Policy makers Forest governmental department 
Province forest department PF Policy makers Forest  governmental department 
Municipal forest bureau MF Policy makers Forest governmental department 
County forest bureau  CF Policy makers Forest governmental department 
Township forest station  TF Policy makers Forest governmental department 
Township chief  TC local agencies General administration 
Village committee VCO local agencies Non-government 
Village chief VC local agencies Non-government 
Farmers F Practitioners Non-government 
Forest re-planting team FRT Practitioners Non-government 
Forest ranger  FR Practitioners Non-government 
National development and 
reform commission 
NDRC Policy makers Other governmental department 
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Provincial development and 
reform commission 
PDRC Policy makers Other governmental department 
Municipal development and 
reform commission 
MDRC Policy makers Other governmental department 
County development and 
reform commission 
CDRC Policy makers Other governmental department 
Central government  CEG Policy makers General administration 
Provincial government  PG Policy maker General administration 
Municipal government  MG Policy maker General administration 
County government  COG Policy maker General administration 
Bank Bank Practitioners Non-government 
Financial bureau FB Policy maker Other governmental department 
Grain bureau GB Policy maker Other governmental department 
Table 4: Actors in the network 
The results show the network of actors for four different links, including task assignment, 
advisory, report and monitoring. In general, the perceptions of the network are varied 
between different hierarchies. Higher hierarchy level government can find more actors and 
their network are more complicated. As lower hierarchy as the actors are, they tend to know 
less. While the networks drawn by government are more complete, they are in line with 
their formal setting and their obligations. Different government departments (forest, finance, 
grain and DRC) are very careful to draw the network of others, as they do not want to have 
conflicts. The networks of the farmer look much simple. Since the information flow is top-
down, the bottom actor naturally know less. 
For visualization and detailed analysis, the information contained in the 22 Net-Map sheets 
was converted into 22 adjacency binary matrices to create the network graphs, in which 
information on the existence of a tie is coded with 1, and information on the non-existence 
of a tie is coded with 0 (Wasserman and Faust 1994). This was accomplished by summing up 
the adjacency matrices for each of the four links, resulting in four adjacency matrices, one 
for each links. For the analysis of this paper, we compared the network of policy makers, 
local agencies, and farmers respectively. The information about the importance, influence 
and motivation of the actor were listed in separate attribute tables. 
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For the visual interpretation, network graphs were generated using NetDraw. We used the 
actors’ node shape to better visualise their roles. Policy makers were drawn as round, local 
agencies were drawn as square and triangle is practitioners. To visualise the role of the actors, 
we coloured the actors with regard to their orientation. Forest governmental department are 
coloured in green, general administration in blue, other governmental department in red and 
non-government in white. The thickness of the arrow represents the number for being 
mentioned by the 22 net-map interviews. 
Figure 1, 2 and 3 are the network of task assignment for the three actor groups derived by 
UCINET. It is clear that policy makers have more complete network with 17 actors. The 
number of actors is reduced to 9 according to the perception of local agencies and most of 
them are below county hierarchy. Finally, the number is down to 6 at the household level and 
most actors are below township hierarchy. The complexity of the network and the richness 
of the information are depending on the hierarchy level. In general, the network of farmers 
is part of the network of local agencies, which is again part of the network of policy makers. 
Similar situations were observed in other links. In supplementary material, the network of 
advisory (Figure A4, A5 and A 6), monitoring (Figure A7, A8 and A9) and report (Figure A10, 
A11 and A12) can be found. 
 
Figure 1: The Net-Map of task assignments from policy makers 
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Figure 2: The Net-Map of task assignments from local agencies 
 
Figure 3: The Net-Map of task assignments from farmers 
The network of four links all highlighted the important role of local agencies and farmers. 
The interview results have shown that local actors, such as village chief, village council and 
forest station are responsible for collecting and reporting information about local economic 
and ecological conditions, communicating higher directives to individual farmers, allocating 
reforestation quotas, calculating payments, providing technical supports and monitoring 
project implementation. Particular attention should be paid to the local governance models 
and interaction of local actors. 
The importance of actors in the network 
We calculated the actors’ in-degree centrality and out-degree centrality for the network to 
determine the importance of actors. Degree centrality means the number of direct ties an 
actor has to other actors in a network (Wasserman and Faust 1994). In-degree centrality 
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means the number of direct incoming ties or the relations in which something is “received” 
by an actor (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Out-degree centrality is the reverse. Table 5 shows 
the in-degree and out-degree centralities in the network of four links, meaning that these 
actors maintain the highest number of relationships.  
County forest bureau, township forest station, township chief, village chief and farmers are 
the most important actors in centrality analysis. Farmers have high in-degree centrality of 
task assignment, advisory and monitoring and out-degree centrality of report. This showed 
that the engagement of farmer is not as decentralized as the program should be. 
 Task 
assignments 
Advisory Monitoring Report 
 Out In Out In Out In Out In 
State Forest 
administration 
2 1 0 1 3 0 0 1 
Province forest 
department 
3 3 1 1 0 0 1 1 
Municipal forest bureau 3 4 3 1 0 0 2 1 
County forest bureau  4 5 6 2 2 1 2 2 
Township forest station  3 2 5 2 2 3 3 3 
Township chief  4 4 3 2 2 0 3 2 
Village committee 1 1 1 2 0 0 1 1 
Village chief 1 4 2 3 1 1 3 5 
Farmers 0 4 1 5 0 7 5 0 
Forest re-planting team 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 2 
Forest ranger  0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
National development 
and reform commission 
2 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Provincial development 
and reform commission 
1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Municipal development 
and reform commission 
2 3 0 0 1 1 0 0 
County development and 1 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 
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reform commission 
Central government  4 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Provincial government  5 1 0 2 1 0 1 3 
Municipal government  3 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 
County government  4 4 0 1 1 0 2 2 
Bank 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Financial bureau 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Grain bureau 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 5 The result of centrality analysis 
Survey result 
We collected the data of SLCP implemented area of the three townships from the county 
forest bureau (Table 6). It has shown that three townships had implemented SLCP at 
different time and scales. For example, Xiangshui Township started SLCP relatively late and 
Xiangshui Township had more gradual steps.  
Township Village 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Xingsheng Hongqi    1178.3  1101.6  
Shangjing    214.8  1347.6  
Hunaghua Shengli 1521.3    95.8 705.4  
Miaowan  675.5 318.3 548  2270.8  
Xiangshui Huitai 1500 690 689.8   1026.9 568.2 
Table 6: 2000-2006 Jingyuan SLCP implemented area in our sample villages (unit: mu) 
Our household survey revealed the overall implementation results of the three townships. 
The average cropland per households substantially decreased and forest and grass largely 
increased in all three villages. We asked the households to estimate the tree survival rate2 of 
their SLCP enrolled land. The average in Xingsheng Township is up to 79.29%, which is close 
to the national standard of 85%. However, the average in Huanghua is only 54.05%.  
 
 
                                                          
2 At the household level, the environmental effects were officially measured by the tree survival rate which 
counts the trunks 3–5 years after the saplings are planted. 
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Township 
Cropland in 
2013 
Cropland in 
1999 
Forest and 
grass land in 
2013 
Forest and 
grass land in 
1999 
SLCP self-
estimated tree 
survival rate 
Xingsheng 6.58 10.62 4.45 0.24 79.29% 
Hunaghua 5.53 12.62 7.25 0.15 54.05% 
Xiangshui 4.34 12.85 8.68 0 72.22% 
Table 7: Land areas in 1999 and 2013 in our sampled townships (unit: mu/household) 
Our survey asked the households about their perceptions of local implementation. None of 
the three townships gave famers the real autonomy (Table 8).  
 
County 
Xingsheng Huanghua Xiangshui 
Are you forced to join 
the project? 
No 57.7% 58.0% 68.4% 
Yes 42.3% 42.0% 31.6% 
Who decide which plot 
should grow trees? 
Farmer 19.7% 27.8% 18.3% 
village chief 18.3% 29.1% 40.8% 
forestry station 7.0% 12.7% 14.1% 
higher-level 
government 
54.9% 30.4% 26.8% 
Can you receive the 
payment in time? 
yes 75.7% 44.9% 59.4% 
most of time yes 11.4% 38.5% 14.5% 
no 12.9% 16.7% 26.1% 
Table 8: Farmer perception about implementation 
Discussion 
We found farmers, village chiefs, forest station officials and local administration officials are 
very important for the implementation of SLCP. The local farmers are poorly informed and 
always lacking of influence. This study suggests that active household engagement is hard to 
achieve under a hybrid governance regime. Unlike policy designer thought, the decentralized 
power mostly goes to local government official rather than households.  
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Local governance model 
Local institutional actors deserved a closer examination as they reflect local capacities, 
resources, and uniquely crafted SLCP implementation regulations. In order to integrate the 
central-designed approach specifically to the local social and ecological context, local 
institutional resources, including the involvement of local government agencies, village 
council (farmer councils), village chief, forest field station and farmer may be forced to 
coordinate and ideally deliberate the terms and conditions of implementation and 
management options. Three types of models for local governance have been observed in our 
Net-Map sheets in three different townships. 
Xingsheng Township appeared to be the first type, where the executive actors (village chief 
and township chief) and forest actors (forestry bureaus or forest station) work separately 
with different tasks. The executive actors are in charge of coordination and communication 
and the forest actors are responsible for technical support and monitoring. However, the 
executive actors, not forest actors, take the primary responsibility in implementing the SLCP. 
They are expected to use all local resources to realize the goals of tree planting, forest 
management, and pass monitoring check. In contrast, the role of local forestry bureaus is 
reduced to a supporting party in the SLCP. In the network of Xingsheng Township, the 
interaction between village chef, forest station and farmers are one-way. As the two actors 
heavily rooted in bureaucratic incentives, they had hired a commercial re-planting team to 
fulfil the task. Local agencies were incentivized to focus on achieving the minimum goals of 
reforestation task with less concern on quality of the forest and the livehood of farmers. 
Other studies also observed that local government took the parsimonious measures for SLCP 
in order to speed up the implementation, regardless of the conflicts with farmers (Yu 2016).   
The SLCP is designed to have significant efforts for conflicst resolving, appropriate 
reforestation land targeting, incentive creating. However, it was displaced by local 
governments to simply tree planting task. Therefore, we call this model of governance “task 
first”.  
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Figure 4: visualization of network of Xingsheng Township 
Xiangshui Township tended to be the second type. On the contrary, the executive actors 
often closely work together with forest actors. There are cooperation between village chief 
and forestation. Some of their roles are overlapping and the interaction between village chef, 
forest station and farmers are often two-way. While the forest actors are in better position 
to make decision, the opinion of village chief and local farmers are taken into account. 
Locally embedded village council who provide trustworthy networks, information and 
assistance is considered as an active component within local governance structures. We call 
the model of governance “forest first“.  
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Figure 5: visualization of network of Xiangshui Township 
Huanghua Township is something in between. The interaction between village chef, forest 
station and farmers are also one-way. As the technical support was jointly conducted by 
village chief and forest station, the forest station hold some influences on the village chief 
and farmers. 
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Figure 6: visualization of network of Huanghua Township 
This collaboration between local actors at government, community and farmer and their 
motivations and interests for the implementation on the ground, play crucial roles. We 
developed a typology of local governance which assesses the Cooperation between 
executive and forest actors and farmer participation (Figure 7).  
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Figure 7: three types of models for governance at local level 
Evidences support our framing for the three models. Xingsheng Township was in a rush for 
implementing SLCP. As shown in Table 5, Xingsheng Township had a late start but suddenly 
enrolled large amount of land in 2003 and 2005. This could be a large pressure for the local 
agencies and farmers. In order to fulfil this task, the local agencies had put speed over 
quality.  On the contrary, Xiangshui Township started the program in 2000 and the 
enrolment took many years, allowing the local agencies to do it step by step and learn from 
past. Our household survey results are in line with the models as well. Xiangshui Township 
has the lowest rate for households being forced to join the SLCP. While the trust to the 
village chiefs was acknowledged by many households in Xiangshui Township, the village 
chiefs were considered as person who made final decision. Xiangshui Township had 
relatively high household self-estimated tree survival rate (Table 7), showing that this 
governance had a positive impact on environmental performance. Notably, Xingsheng 
Township had the highest self-estimated tree survival rate, which seemed contradict to our 
model. However, we do not think it is really a contradiction. The “task first” model does not 
necessarily mean bad environmental performance. Indeed, it can also achieve effectiveness 
when certain conditions are met. Another explanation is that this model gave too much 
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pressure to households, encouraging them to simply report success despite the failure. This 
was often observed in many other cases (Trac, Harrell et al. 2007). 
New actor: Re-planting team 
The showing up of ‘replantation team’ is an interesting phenomenon. Above county level, 
the higher level government didn’t mention about this actor. On the local level, in Huanghua 
and Xingsheng Township, forest station and village chief mentioned this actor. Inappropriate 
choices of tree species were made in the first few years, given the study region’s low water 
availability and harsh winter and re-planting was conducted every year to fill the gaps left by 
dead trees. Since many villagers left village to work in cities, they can’t take care of their 
SLCP land. So, the village chief organizes people who still in the village to do the task and as 
return the so called ‘replantation team’ will get income cutting from the payments of 
original land owner who can’t personally do the task. Years later, due to many rounds of re-
planting, a mixed plantation of many indigenous species was established by the farmers. 
However, many farmers complained that their payment was greatly reduced due to the re-
planting. While the re-planting may improve the environmental performance in the short-
term, it cannot ensure the incentives for farmers to manage the land appropriately. It can 
twist the core of SLCP from incentive based approach to a subsidy program. 
Governmental PES and the role of intermediary 
Large-scale governmental PES programs have frequently been criticized for low levels of cost-
effectiveness and environmental effectiveness. As low levels of cost-effectiveness is often the 
result of high transaction costs. Many studies argued that intermediaries within 
governmental PES governance structures can play an important role to facilitate transactions 
between governmental buyers and private sellers (Schomers, Sattler et al. 2015). Therefore, 
the involvement from intermediaries is considered to be helpful in reducing public and 
private transaction costs. Intermediaries can be from civil society (either individuals or non-
governmental organisations), social entrepreneurs, non-for-profit actors, non-governmental 
organizations (NGO), governmental organizations and semi-governmental organizations. 
Unlike western countries, China does not have a very long history of participating with 
environmental NGOs and other social organizations for environmental interests, as western 
environmental movements are not the main driving force for ecological policy in China 
(Guttman, Young et al. 2018). Intermediaries from civil society (western-style environmental 
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NGOs, community groups and private consultancies) are not in place for ecological 
improvement in China. Therefore, the implementation of SLCP commonly depends on 
governmental organizations and semi-governmental organizations. 
We found that the local cooperation between village council and forest station could 
potentially fill the role of intermediary in bringing together service beneficiaries and 
providers for up-front negotiation (local governance model of “forest first”, figure 5.). To 
maximize the advantage of PES idea, the government should take into account the 
importance of local engagement and facilitate information exchange among different 
stakeholders. We therefore argue that the local dynamics drive and shape the program 
implementation and particular attention should be paid to the interaction of local 
institutions. 
Challenges in local governance 
As the task and responsibility are not well defined, overlap and conflicts of local actors may 
cause substantial ineffectiveness of program implementation. Higher-hierarchy government 
(above county level) actors and lower-hierarchy actors have different views of actor’s 
responsibility. For example, higher-hierarchy governments think in the local level, forest 
station in town are expected to mainly implement the SLCP through giving farmers the SLCP 
task, offering plantation technical support and in the end inspecting the outcome. However, 
people from forest station in town don’t agree. They think village chief should do those work 
and their job is only guide farmer how to do SLCP (where to do and how). Furthermore, 
bureaucratic complexity and rent-seeking behavior could undermine the cooperation. 
Particularly, the tasks of SLCP are burdensome when local government agencies must pay 
the administrative costs from their own budgets. The rent-seeking behavior was reflected in 
the implementation, as local government agencies have found other ways to benefit from 
the system by increasing land conversion quotas, exceeding quotas and bargaining for more 
payments. As a result, local agencies view the SLCP payments as opportunities to finance 
their operation cost. Conflicts within the local cooperation were created when government 
agencies tried to minimize administrative costs by including parcels that are contiguous. If 
the negotiations between local actors can be improved and their role intermediary can be 
promoted, the environmental goals may be achieved in combination with greater self-
interest of the actors at the local implementing levels (Kolinjivadi and Sunderland 2012). 
Therefore, policy maker of governmental PES should increasingly recognize and appreciate 
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the potential of local actors. A more explicit commissioning to the village council, local 
expert, cooperative and community as intermediary could be considered as an option for 
future policy. 
Method advantages and limitations 
Net-Map is powerful to distinguish the actors and how they acting with each other in a 
network. It can facilitate the interaction between interviewers and interviewees. Particularly, 
the interviewee can early understand the concept of mapping and can fully follow the 
process from the beginning to the end. It can be used to collect scientific data in the field, as 
it is a hands-on, low-tech and participatory tool. The method can be an “ice-breaker” to let 
the interviewee talk freely about the social network, especially informal one. It addresses 
several challenge for conducting interview, like reaching transparency, common 
understanding, easy-going atmosphere and the learning process (Schröter, Sattler et al. 
2018).  
However, there are limitations as well. Firstly, like many qualitative methods, it inevitably 
has a problem with subjectivity. The definition of the question needs to be explicitly clear. 
For example, the farmers were confused about the question “Do you know any actor 
involved in SLCP”. Are the actors they know personally or they know by name? Should they 
answer the questions according to they actually felt or they expected? Secondly, the 
network is based on perception and it may be deviated from reality. In this case, interviewee, 
like farmer and local government official, only can present a network they perceived rather 
than the full network they actually had. For example, the farmers have not mentioned 
central government in their network, although they got payments from the central. Instead, 
they claimed they got the money from the bank. Due to the lacking of knowledge, there 
were lots of missing puzzles in the farmers’ network. The farmers have difficulty to identify 
the actors above their hierarchy level. Thirdly, Over-simplification might be a problem as 
well. For example, our farmers told us the influence and importance tower are difficult. 
Particularly, the influence tower is not very reliable when the interviewee is evaluating the 
actor far away from their ordinary life. For instance, it is hard for the farmers to choose the 
influence tower of importance for the different governmental departments. Based on our 
experiences, Net-Map along cannot explain why the network appeared like this. As the 
interpretation of Net-Map rooted in qualitative information, the author needs to have an in-
depth knowledge to make interpretation. Many supportive materials are needed for this 
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purpose. In our study, we had combined with descriptive statistic result. Other studies often 
had used qualitative materials, such as information from workshop (Schröter, Hauck et al. 
2018).  
To conducting a Net-Map interview is not easy, as it has high requirement for the 
interviewer. The interviewer needs to have the overview of the situation, be familiar with 
local knowledge and equipped with good communication skill to guide the interviewee. 
Finally, it is challenging in a closed and conservative cultural context and a top-down 
hierarchy institutional structure, such as in China and SLCP. The farmers in China are not 
used to openly discuss governmental policy and criticize the government. The duration of 
our interview with farmers is most of the time shorter than 30 minutes. On the contrary, the 
Net-Map interviews conducted by our colleagues Barbara in Costa Rica last in average one 
hour. Therefore, researchers have to consider the specific settings in the case study they 
want to investigate, especially regarding to power relations and distribution of knowledge. In 
contexts with strong hierarchies the method becomes more difficult to apply. 
We also found UCINET cannot analysis the centrality and betweenness centrality for all links 
together. It always consider different link separately. The similar problem found in 
visualization as well. The network was displayed in different single link rather than in a 
combination for all (such as figure 4, 5 and 6).  We cannot use UCINET to draw the figure of 
the three townships with all links.  
Conclusion 
In this study, we showed the importance of local actor in the network of a governmental PES 
and the effects of governance models on implementation. By using Net-Map, the actors´ 
perceived network and the implementation of PES implemented at the local level were 
exanimated. The local farmers are poorly informed and always lacking of influence. Unlike 
policy makers thought, the decentralized power mostly goes to local agencies than 
householders. We found that the local agencies could potentially bringing together 
government and local farmers for up-front negotiations. However, local agencies could also 
violate the stated principals of volunteerism and replace the true farmer engagement in 
different governance model. Therefore, particular attention should be paid to the local 
governance models and interaction of local actors. 
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Supplementary material  
 
Figure A1: The Net-Map of advisory from policy makers 
 
Figure A2: The Net-Map of advisory from local agencies 
 
Figure A3: The Net-Map of advisory from farmers 
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Figure A4: The Net-Map of monitoring from policy makers 
 
Figure A5: The Net-Map of monitoring from local agencies 
 
Figure A6: The Net-Map of monitory from farmers 
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Figure A7: The Net-Map of report from policy makers 
 
Figure A8: The Net-Map of report from local agencies 
 
Figure A9: The Net-Map of report from farmers 
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A B S T R A C T
Designing environmental governance structures and in particular ecosystem services governance structures,
means modifying, replacing, or creating institutional arrangements. Several scholars have tried to identify sets of
functioning and particularly preferred institutional design principles for environmental governance.
Comparative institutional analysis (CIA) plays a major role in this process and refers to comparing real-world
institutions, organizations, decision-making structures, and coordination mechanisms. CIA attempts to de-
termine preferred institutional arrangements among several possibilities. Within the paper, it is emphasized that
the set-theoretic Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) approach and technique may support CIA. Therefore,
different institutional structures that regulate resource use may be understood and presented as sets of in-
stitutions and may be put into a relation. Correspondingly, the paper illustrates a qualitative comparative in-
stitutional analysis (QCIA) application procedure. It explains how QCA works, determines how it could be ap-
plied to CIA, and defines certain basic steps for QCIA application. The application of crisp-set and fuzzy-set QCA
are presented step by step based on two examples – German agri-environmental payment schemes (AEM) and the
Chinese Sloping Land Conversion Program (SLCP). Finally, challenges and benefits of QCA application to CIA of
environmental governance structures are discussed. In sum, the paper shows that QCA may generally support the
CIA of complex units, which are conducted by many institutional economists and institutionalists. QCA can help
to facilitate the reduction of structural institutional complexity. Furthermore, QCA provides formalization for
qualitative comparative aspects, and the generated results are highly policy relevant. However, there are certain
challenges and limitations of QCIA that also cannot be neglected.
1. Introduction
Governance describes ruling and collective action (Benz et al.,
2004). The concept can be referred to “steering”, involving elements of
authority as well as processes and structures for shaping peoples’
priorities and coordinating peoples’ actions (Vatn, 2012). Governance
depicts a dynamic interaction of actors and institutions (Borrás and
Edler, 2012). Institutions are formal and informal rules defining policy
processes, markets, and interactions in the civil society sphere,
including constitutional and collective choice rules, the rights to re-
sources, the rules of interaction, and the norms of civil society (Benz
et al., 2004). Thus, institutions are central to the analysis of environ-
mental governance (Bromley, 1991; Hagedorn, 2000; Schlager and
Ostrom, 1992; Vatn, 2005)2. Environmental governance depends on
various institutional structures that determine and regulate resource
use at different levels and scales of socio-political organization (Berkes,
2002). Environmental governance and especially ecosystem services
governance3 may furthermore imply formal and informal institutional
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoser.2018.07.008
Received 17 October 2017; Received in revised form 7 July 2018; Accepted 18 July 2018
⁎ Corresponding author.
1 C. Meyer and C. Chen contributed equally to this work.
E-mail address: claas.meyer@zalf.de (C. Meyer).
2Within institutional economics there different schools and assumptions about individuals, behaviours, and the development of institutions differ. Our analyses are
generally based on the economic institutionalist perspectives introduced by Vatn (2005, 2009) and Bromley (1989, 1990), who understand institutional change as
instances of the social and political context rather than as results of utility maximizing, rational individuals.
3 Since early 90s there has been a shift in governance that is characterized by an emphasis on the important role that natural ecosystems play in economics as well
as human wellbeing (Loft et al., 2015). Within this article ecosystem services governance is perceived as a mode of governance that largely draws on the relations and
feedbacks between humans and the natural environment based on the ecosystem services concept (cf. Mann et al., 2015).
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development and change dependent on the social-economic-ecological
context. The decision on distribution and redistribution of use rights to
internalize certain externalities via agreements or government regula-
tion may for example depend on the existing property rights situation as
well as public perceptions of the environmental problem (Vatn, 2005).
Designing environmental and ecosystem services governance
structures means modifying or replacing institutional arrangements if
they are sources of a problem or creating incentives to cope with bio-
geophysical drivers if the problems are based upon those (see Young,
2002). Thus, generally, institutional arrangements are designed to meet
a goal, “the solution of more or less well-defined problems” (Young, 2002:
p. 17)4. Accordingly, institutional performance analysis identifies the
extent of an institution’s contribution to achieving/not achieving a
specific goal (Mitchell, 2008). An evaluation of institutional perfor-
mance requires the definition of criteria against which the institution
can be evaluated (Corbera et al., 2009). Several scholars have tried to
compare sets of institutional design principles for collective natural
resource management and to determine what works best (cf. Corbera
et al., 2009: p. 745; referring to the principles developed by Agrawal
(2002) and Ostrom (1990)). Monsees (2008) historically traces the
development of such comparative institutional analyses (CIA) from first
applications thereof by Demsetz (1969) to the approaches of
Williamson (1991) and Frey (1984) and to complex concepts by Aoki
(1996), and Buzbee (2000). CIA is defined very diverse and the dif-
ferent authors exercise various institutional analyses under this term.
Thereby, CIA is taught and used not only by scholars in law and eco-
nomics but across the social sciences (Cole, 2013). The central element
is always a comparison of institutions, organizations, decision-making
structures, and coordination mechanisms and judging them relative to
one another. Thus, CIA attempts to determine preferred institutional
arrangements among several possibilities (Monsees, 2008). Due to the
complexity of socio-economic systems, there is mostly no overall best
design solution with one governance approach as the main alternative.
Rather, there are always trade-offs among different alternatives which
may be adequate (e.g. Williamson, 1991, Aoki, 1996).
Consequently, for designing environmental and ecosystem services
governance structures it is important to compare different institutional
arrangements and to decide on potential alternatives. The comparison
must be based on an ample knowledge on similar or different oppor-
tunities and the arrangement’s relationships as well as their trade-offs.
The question arises how to compare the relevant institutional ar-
rangements. We think that Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA),
introduced by Ragin (1987), can be an adequate way to carry out CIAs,
as the QCA idea meets central problems and demands of institutional
economist and institutionalist approaches in terms of case-orientation,
including qualitative data and small or intermediate numbers of cases
as well as the focus on complexity and diversity (Ostrom, 1990, Aoki,
1996). Ragin (1987: p. 13) explains that when qualitatively oriented
comparativists compare, “they study how different conditions or causes fit
together in one setting and contrast that with how they fit together in another
setting (…). That is, they tend to analyse each observational entity as an
interpretable combination of parts – as a whole.” He emphasizes the idea
of using set-theory5 for the interpretation and analysis of social science
data in Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and presents the
method in his book “The Comparative Method” (Ragin, 1987). QCA is
building upon causal interpretation, visualization, and analysis of
causal complexity as well as principles of logical minimization. Interest
in QCA has grown in recent years because of fundamental debates on
empirical social science methodology in comparative social science
(Schneider and Wagemann, 2012)6. QCA is often presented as a third
way between quantitative statistical techniques and case-study meth-
odology (Ragin, 1987) and combines an established subfield in
mathematics and social sciences principles and practices. The final
analyses consist of conditions that are subsets of the outcome and are
thus sufficient and/or necessary (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012).
Thus, QCA is not only a data analysis technique but also a research
approach including the processes before and after the analysis of the
data, such as the collection of data, definition of case studies, and
specification of concepts (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009).
In sum, we understand that QCA may be valuable to support CIA
regarding the determination of potentially adequate institutional ar-
rangements because institutional arrangements often may be presented
as sets of institutions and be put into a set relations. Furthermore, QCA
was originally developed to formalize qualitative comparative methods
(cf. Ragin 1987) and is suitable to intermediate number of cases (5–100)
(Ragin, 2000: p. 25, see also Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). Recently,
there have been first applications of QCA in institutional environmental
governance analysis (e.g., Meyer et al., 2015; Hamidov et al., 2015; Pahl-
Wostl and Knieper, 2014; Bodin and Österblom, 2013; Basurto, 2013;
Chen et al., 2018). However, existing literature focusses either on QCA
case study applications to institutional environmental governance
structures, or else, on a QCA application in general, in terms of method
papers, textbooks, and handbooks (e.g. Schneider and Wagemann, 2012;
Berg-Schlosser and Cronquist, 2012). A QCA application to CIA of en-
vironmental governance structures has not been specifically worked up
and methodologically systematized so far. Accordingly, within this
method-illustrating paper we aim to systemize the qualitative compara-
tive institutional analysis (QCIA) application procedure and discuss the
suitability of the approach and technique, based on the application of
QCA to two CIAs on governmental payments for ecosystem services
(PES), Thus, we choose two governmental PES implemented in very
different social-cultural, socio-economic, and political contexts. By de-
riving the systematization of the method’s application from cases in
different contexts we aim at ensuring a good transferability of the de-
veloped application systematics. Furthermore, the two different ex-
amples reveal the two main QCA variants which should be both covered
by the systematics. The additional value of the paper over existing text
books as well as general method and research papers is a straight forward
guideline on how to use QCA for CIA of environmental and ecosystem
services governance structures, especially on PES. Furthermore, poten-
tials as well as limitations of an application to CIA are firmly explained.
In sum, the objectives of this method-illustrating paper are:
• Systematization of a QCIA application to environmental governance
structures: Step-by-step guidelines• Presentation of the step-by-step application to two different PES
governance structures• Discussion of QCA’s suitability for CIA of environmental and eco-
system services governance structures
Therefore, in Section 2, we explain how QCA works, determine how
it could be applied to CIA and define certain basic steps for application.
In Section 3, we illustrate two different applications of QCIA step by
step: The application of crisp-set QCA to the institutional analysis of
German agri-environmental payment schemes (AEM), basically gov-
ernmental agreements with farmers to adopt predefined practices or to
4 In the course of designing environmental governance structures we kept in
mind that only some institutions can be designed and the institutional context
always matters. Thereby, institutions do “not only define the social environ-
ment within which the individual is choosing. They also constitute the in-
dividuals themselves and their interest.” (Vatn, 2005: p. 61) Aspects of an in-
formal institutional context may also be included in comparative qualitative
institutional analysis if relevant.
5 Set-theory is the mathematical theory of well-determined collections (sets)
of objects (members or elements of the set) (Bagaria, 2017).
6 Schneider and Wagemann (2012) understand QCA as the most formalized
and complete set-theoretic method. They provide a graphical overview on
different set-theoretic approaches in social sciences and their relation to other
empirical comparative approaches (Schneider und Wagemann, 2012: p. 10).
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provide predefined ecological conditions for payments compensating
them for additional costs and loss of income (Mettepenningen et al.,
2009; Uthes and Matzdorf, 2013), and the application of fuzzy-set QCA
to the institutional and social analysis of the Chinese Sloping Land
Conversion Program (SLCP), a forest restoration program where parti-
cipating households received payments in the form of grain or cash for
converting cropland on steep slopes to forest or grassland (The State
Council, 2002). In Section 4, we discuss the presented cases and the
applicability of QCA to the CIA of environmental and ecosystem ser-
vices governance structures in general and show strengths and weak-
nesses. Finally, in section five, we conclude.
2. Qualitative comparative institutional analysis
In a first step we will show how QCA works and in a second step we
relate QCA to CIA. QCA is understood as a middle way that combines
certain features of qualitative research (e.g. case orientation) with
features of quantitative research (e.g. the interest in generalization)
(Sehring et al., 2013). QCA aims to find matches of cases’ properties
and a common outcome in a formal way (Berg-Schlosser and Cronquist,
2012), or, in other words, to determine subset relations between certain
variables and an outcome (Ragin, 1987, 2008). Thereby, QCA is not
following a statistical logic but employs set theory, the logic of pre-
positions, Boolean algebra, and fuzzy algebra (Schneider and
Wagemann, 2012). The method focusses the understanding of the re-
lations between different causes and how they are interconnected in a
certain context (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009). Basic QCA ideas are the
application to intermediate numbers of cases (5–100) that are too small
for statistical analysis and systematic cross-comparison while they are
still case sensitive. A central principle is multiple conjunctural causa-
tion, which means that not only single variables but combinations of
variables can (and most often will) lead to an outcome, that different
combinations of variables can produce the same outcome, and, that one
condition can have different impacts on the outcome, depending on the
combination with other factors (Sehring et al., 2013). Another main
concept is the idea of sufficiency and necessity. It reveals that condition
can be interpreted as necessary if in the case that the outcome is pre-
sent, the condition is always also present. On the other hand, a condi-
tion can be interpreted as sufficient in the case that if the condition is
present, the outcome is always also present. The necessary condition is
a super-set of the outcome, while the sufficient condition is sub-set of
the outcome (Schneider, 2009; Schneider and Wagemann, 2007).
Generally, necessary conditions are a bold statement and rarely found
empirically (Schneider and Wagemann, 2007).
For QCA application we draw back on two text book examples
showing the two different main variants of a QCA application: Crisp-set
QCA (csQCA) (see Box 1) and fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) (see Box 2). The
two main QCA variants differ in types of sets on which they operate:
CsQCA operates on sets where cases can either be members or non-
members with membership scores 0 or 1. In fsQCA, cases are allowed to
have gradations of their set membership. The application of the one or
the other variant depends primarily on the existing detailedness of in-
formation regarding variables and outcome. QCA operations include
negations/complements of the case sets NOT (∼), the logical AND (∗)
to bring together two or more single sets into conjunction, and the lo-
gical OR (+) to describe a union of different case sets, encompassing
elements belonging to either one case set or the other or both
(Schneider, 2009). The information for the cases is presented in truth
tables in which each row displays one of the 2k logically possible
combinations of variables (k) and the observed outcome value of the
cases that depict one of the 2k variables (Schneider, 2009; Schneider
and Wagemann, 2007). Cases having the same conditions and outcome
are presented in the same row of the truth table and are analytically
identical. The truth table shows under which combination of conditions
a certain outcome occurs or does not occur.
Box 1
The Kindergarten example - formal analysis of sufficiency in csQCA (adapted from Berg-Schlosser and Cronquist, 2012: pp. 138)
In a hypothetical case, the parents of a four-year-old boy are surprised at the desired guests for their son’s birthday party. Thus, the
example’s outcome is a party invitation or non-invitation. The parents assume that reasons for invitation could be the membership in the
son’s Kindergarten-group (K-group), the age of the children (older kids preferred) and the gender. They look at data of five invited a three
non-invited children:
An example for a proposition from the table: Betty is a girl who is older than four and is not in the son’s Kindergarten-group (∼K-
group∗Age∗Gender). Now, which individual conditions are sufficient for the outcome “Invited” are checked – meaning that wherever the
condition occurs, the outcome should also occur. Neither all kids from the K-group nor all older kids (Age 1) are invited. Thus, the K-group
and Age alone are not sufficient conditions. However, all girls (Gender 1) are invited to the party. Thus, gender is sufficient for the outcome.
However, this does not fully answer the parents’ question as in addition to the girls, the boy Adam is also invited. Therefore, combinations
of conditions are applied. The AND conjunction for K-group and Age fulfils the criterion of sufficiency, meaning that all kids older than 4
(Age 1) who are in the same Kindergarten-group (K-group 1) are also invited. The parents now can explain the invitation behaviour of their
son and the sufficient conditions for invitation. It is sufficient to be a girl or an older kid from the son’s Kindergarten-group (Gender+K-
group*Age→ Invitation).
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Within the csQCA example (see Box 1) we show how QCA draws on
set memberships to generalize the information of different cases in
terms of three conditions K-group, age, and gender. We also demon-
strate that csQCA requires dichotomization of data, which is sometimes
not easy to achieve as certain social science concepts require detailed
and nuanced information (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). Therefore,
csQCA has been increasingly criticized. However, the newer and re-
cently more often applied fsQCA variant offers a qualitative distinction
between cases and adds “differences in degree” to “differences in kind”
which are provided by crisp-sets (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: p.
14).
As mentioned above, in contrast to crisp-sets, fuzzy-sets allow for
partial membership in a set. The elements could be, for example,
fully in (1), mostly in (0.8), crossover – neither in nor out (0.5),
mostly out (0.2), etc. (Ragin, 2000: p. 156). Such partial membership
values require different forms of presentation. Ragin (2000) suggests
an XY plot of which the axes show the fuzzy-set membership scores of
the cases in the set of condition X and the outcome Y. For sufficiency,
each case’s fuzzy-set membership score in X must be equal to or
smaller than its fuzzy-set membership in Y. In an XY plot, this dy-
namic is visualized by drawing a diagonal. X is a subset of Y if all
cases fall above the main diagonal. As the basic sufficiency require-
ments are the same for crisp and fuzzy-sets, the sufficiency analysis
looks generally identical. To be sufficient, the membership of each
case/row in the condition must be equal or smaller than its mem-
bership in Y. In fsQCA a possible necessary condition is signaled
when instances of the outcome Y constitute a subset of instances of a
condition X. We show an example of an fsQCA application using a
hypothetical example adapted from Schneider and Wagemann (2012:
pp. 67) in Box 2.
Table 2
Truth table for AEM application (adapted from Meyer et al., 2015: p. 157).
Row Conditionsa Number Outcome Successb
ESTARGET AREATARGET FLEXIAPP IMPLNAT ADVICE
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
2 1 0 1 0 0 2 1
3 1 1 0 1 1 3 1
4 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
5 1 1 1 1 1 12 1
6 1 0 0 0 0 2 0
7 0 0 0 0 1 2 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 3 0
9 0 0 1 0 0 8 0
10 1 0 1 0 1 5 0
11 1 0 0 0 1 2 0
12 0 0 1 0 1 2 0
13 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
14 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
15 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
16 0 1 0 1 1 3 0
a ESTARGET: Ecosystem service targeting, AREATARGET: Area targeting, FLEXIAPP: Flexibility in application, IMPLNAT: Nature protection agency involved in
implementation, ADVICE: Access to advice.
b Set at consistency 0.74 cutoff due to natural break in data.
Table 1
Assumed and coded rules for successful AEM (adapted from Meyer et al., 2015: p. 150).
No. Design rule Presence Definiton Labels Code
1 Ecosystem service targeting yes
no
AEM focusses on one primary environmental objective
Different environmental objectives
ESTARGET
∼ESTARGET
1
0
2 Area targeting yes
no
AEM has to be applied to certain area, or it protects a certain habitat
Flexible application
AREATARGET
∼AREATARGET
1
0
3 Flexibility in application yes
no
Farmer has individual flexibility in technical, temporal, or area wise AEM
application
Flexibility is lacking
FLEXIAPP
∼ FLEXIAPP
1
0
4 Nature protection agency involved in
implementation
yes
no
The nature protection agency obligatorily participates in AEM implementation
If not
IMPLNAT
∼ IMPLNAT
1
0
5 Access to advice yes
no
The administration takes care of the advice, or a reliable advice service exists for
AEM
If not
ADVICE
∼ADVICE
1
0
aThe capital labels explain the presence of a variable (1), lowercase labels explain its absence (0).
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Box 2
The Stable Democracy example – formal analysis of sufficiency in fsQCA (adapted from Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: pp. 67)
In a hypothetical case, researchers are interested in the conditions for a stable democracy in selected Latin American countries. The
researchers assume that three aspects could play a role in stable democracies (DEM): Violent upheavals in the past (condition: UPH), an
ethnically homogeneous population (condition: POP), and a pluralistic party system (condition: PAR). The researchers included 10 Latin
American countries in the example. They have already dichotomized (1/0) the data and conducted a csQCA, achieving the result of an
absence of a violent upheaval or an ethnically heterogeneous population in combination with a pluralistic party system
(∼UPH+∼POP*PAR→DEM). The fuzzy-set membership scores are presented the following matrix:
The fsQCA sufficiency analysis was only performed for the conditions that turned out to be sufficient in the csQCA: ∼UPH and
∼POP∗PAR. The fuzzy value of ∼POP∗PAR is always less than or equal to the fuzzy value of the outcome. The fuzzy value of ∼UPH,
however, does not pass the test based on fuzzy sets. Various cases/rows show a higher membership score in ∼UPH than in DEM. The XY
plots visualize these findings: ∼POP∗PAR → DEM.
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For an application of QCA to CIA, the comparison of institutional
arrangements must be presentable in terms of set relations. Thus, dif-
ferent possibilities of institutions, organizations, decision-making
structures, or coordination mechanisms must be described as related
sets. The requirement of framing institutional arrangements in terms of
set relations corresponds to the general prerequisites of CIA to present
consistent sets of characteristics for the definition and description of all
compared institutional arrangements (Monsees, 2008). Correspond-
ingly, a general compatibility of the QCA and CIA can be affirmed.
Furthermore, the original goal of QCA development is a formalization
of qualitative comparative methods without departing from the general
logic of case-oriented research. Ragin emphasizes that “…qualitative
researchers tend to look at cases as wholes and they compare the whole cases
with each other. Cases are viewed as configurations – combinations of
characteristics” (Ragin, 1987: p. 3), and he understands that in such case
study approaches, it is often difficult to examine more than a few cases
when confronted with a large number of cases in which the investigator
has to make many paired comparisons and in which “…the analysis may
disintegrate into descriptive statements lacking any generality” (Ragin,
1987: p. xiii). This initial idea exactly meets central issues and demands
of institutional economist because institutional approaches are often
case-oriented, include qualitative data, are based on datasets with small
or intermediate numbers of cases, and highlight the complexity, di-
versity, and uniqueness of certain institutional arrangements (see e.g.
Ostrom, 1990; Aoki, 1996).
Many institutional economist and institutionalist approaches use
complex structures as units of analysis (including for example various
rules, actors, and relationships) and aim at finding fitting governance
structures for different transactions (Monsees, 2008). Such demands
may be met (at least partially) by QCA’s focus on multiple conjunctural
causation. Combinations of relevant structural elements may for ex-
ample be analyzed in terms of their conjunctural fit. Different combi-
nations of certain structural elements may be relevant for the same
outcome but also same structural elements can be analyzed for different
impacts within different complex situations. However, applying QCIA
and presenting institutional arrangements as set relations means redu-
cing the structural institutional complexity as well as targeting only one
function of the governance structure by using only one output variable.
Institutional complexity reduction can be implemented through styli-
zation (Ostrom, 1990; Williamson, 1991). Regarding Monsees (2008),
this process could be, for example, a choice of the most frequent, dif-
fering types of institutional arrangements from a total of cases and, in a
second step, the elaboration of the prototypical characteristics of the
main types. Determining the one output variable may be based on
comparison and assessment criteria in terms of type and quality, e.g.,
certain qualitative efficiency criteria. Monsees (2008: p. 16) reviews a
variety of criteria sets for comparative institutional analysis and sum-
marizes different clusters, as adaptability, efficiency, externalities,
fairness, production costs, accountability, and transaction costs.
Based on CIA requirements and QCA opportunities, we emphasize
five steps for QCIA application, the determination of sufficient and
necessary conditions, and the definition of preferred institutional ar-
rangements. In step 1, it has to be clarified whether the institutional
arrangements to be compared may be presented as set relations with
regard to an output. Therefore, it has to be checked whether the in-
stitutional complexity could be reduced and, correspondingly, condi-
tions have to be selected. In step 2, one output variable has to be spe-
cified by fixed, measurable criteria. In step 3, the transformation of
qualitative or quantitative data into crisp or fuzzy-sets should be ap-
plied. A calibration technique is needed to make the process transparent
and replicable. Step 1–3 may be dynamically related to the data col-
lection processes. In step 4, the analysis for necessary and sufficient
conditions has to be conducted. Finally, in step 5, a case-based ex-
amination of the inconsistencies (not successful cases included in the
solution terms) and non-coverage (successful cases not included in the
solution terms) should be done for solution term verification and gen-
eralization. The application of the five different steps will be ex-
emplified and explained in detail within the next Section 3. For illus-
tration we draw back on QCIA application to two PES governance
structures.
3. Application of QCIA to PES governance structures
The illustrative QCIAs have been applied to governmental PES in
Germany (Agri-environmental measures, AEM) and China (Sloping
Land Conversion Program, SLCP). The PES concept is diversely defined,
and the term has been used to refer to various national conservation
approaches that create positive economic incentives for the provision of
ES worldwide (cf. Muradian et al., 2010; Vatn, 2010). Corbera et al.
(2009: p. 745) understand PES as “… new institutions designed to enhance
Table 3
Definition of conditions in SLCP application (adapted from Chen et al., 2018: pp. 31).
Condition Presence Definition
Household involvement (INVO) 1 Household is fully involved in decision making.
0.8 Household is mostly involved in decision making and feels satisfied about the result.
0.6 Household is mostly involved in decision making but feels unsatisfied about the result.
0.4 Household is partly involved in decision making and feels satisfied about the result.
0.2 Household is partly involved in decision making but feels unsatisfied about the result.
0 Household is not involved in any decision making.
Property rights (PROP) 1 Household has strong recognition of the property rights.
0.67 Household recognizes the property rights.
0.33 Household hardly recognizes the property rights.
0 Household recognizes no property rights.
Off-farm labor allocation (OFF) 1 Great majority of income comes from off-farm employment.
0.67 A large part of income comes from off-farm employment.
0.33 A small part of income comes from off-farm employment
0 Household is not engaging with off-farm employment.
Effective monitoring (MONI) 1 The monitoring works effectively.
0.67 The monitoring works.
0.33 The effect of monitoring is poor.
0 The monitoring does not work.
Financial incentive (FINA) 1 Payment is very attractive given the responsibility
0.67 Payment is attractive given the responsibility
0.33 Payment is very little attractive given the responsibility
0 Payment is not attractive given the responsibility
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or change natural resource manager's behavior in relation to ecosystem
management through the provision of economic incentives”. Such broad PES
idea incorporates hybrid governance structures, including hierarchies
as well as market concepts (Matzdorf et al., 2013; Vatn, 2010), and
state rules play major roles in such PES governance structures (cf.
Matzdorf et al., 2013). Thus, the definition includes the large govern-
mental payment schemes (as German AEMs and the Chinese SLCP).
While these schemes rely on incentive-based mechanisms and voluntary
participation (State Forest Administration 2007 for SLCP) they also
include traditional hierarchical elements, such as a top-down structure,
inflexible contract design and campaign-style mobilization (Kolinjivadi
and Sunderland, 2012).
AEM are basically governmental predefined agricultural manage-
ment practices which are environmentally favorable and can be taken
up voluntarily, often with certain different options for application. The
government, as a representative of the public, pays the farmers for
application in terms of additional costs and loss of income (cf.
Mettepenningen et al., 2009). German AEM are either co-developed and
co-financed by the EU and German federal states within the framework
of the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)7 or developed and
financed solely by the federal German states (cf. Kirschke et al., 2007).
EU expenditures on AEM have been significant, amounting to nearly 20
billion EUR for the period from 2007 to 2013 (European Commission,
2014). Correspondingly, in China the SLCP is essential to reduce soil
erosion and increase forest cover by directly engaging over 32 million
households for program implementation (State Forest Administration,
2003). The participating households received payments in the form of
grain or cash for a maximum of 16 years for converting cropland on
steep slopes to forest or grassland (The State Council, 2002; State Forest
Administration, 2003).
The institutional arrangements of such governmental PES can vary,
for example in terms of the area targeted, the payment mode, and the
involvement of nature protection agencies. Thereby, certain institutions
or combinations of institutions may be important for the success of the
schemes (Meyer et al., 2015). Furthermore, as the final land-users and
key stakeholders, have significant importance to the program im-
plementation, the schemes need to interact with local institutional and
socioeconomic conditions. Therefore, despite the leading role of gov-
ernment in policy design, the success of the program may be also de-
termined by the fit of the governance arrangements with the local socio-
economic contexts (Vatn, 2010, Muradian and Rival, 2012). Reasons for
performance of different PES has been broadly analyzed in terms of
strengths, weaknesses, and limitations as well as issues of im-
plementation (cf. Wunder et al., 2018; Reed et al., 2018; Salzman et al.,
2018; Hausknost et al., 2017; Chan et al., 2017; Wunder, 2015;
Muradian et al., 2010; Vatn, 2010; Kosoy and Corbera, 2010; Fisher
et al., 2009; Engel et al., 2008; Wunder et al., 2008). Lately, QCA has
been used to determine preferred institutional PES arrangements and
important socio-economic conditions for PES implementation, e.g. in
our illustrative studies (Meyer et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2018) Thereby,
both authors basically follow the 5 steps for QCIA application that have
been described in Section 2. Meyer et al. (2015) examine the govern-
mental top-down design rules that make AEM successful in terms of
environmental effectiveness, and Chen et al. (2018) determine the
governmental institutions as well as other the existing socioeconomic
conditions that are important for SLCP implementation at the house-
hold level. As results, both analyses attempt to determine one or more
preferred institutional PES arrangements among several possibilities by
drawing on QCA.
3.1. Step 1: Selection of the conditions
In the first step of QCIA application it has to be clarified whether the
institutional arrangements may be presented as set relations. Therefore,
conditions that can present the arrangements have to be selected and
conceptualized. The selection and conceptualization may be based on
theory and empirical knowledge. Both studies derive assumptions on
sets of key conditions relevant for program success based on PES, AEM,
and SLCP literature as well as policy documents as the German CAP
evaluations8 (cf. Sattler et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2015). In contrast to
the literature based assumptions on the national level by Meyer et al.
(2015), Chen et al. (2018) household level study is very much based on
the local context, and they additionally interviewed local experts in the
study area which solidified and confirmed the literature based pre-se-
lected and defined assumptions. Meyer et al. (2015) basically assumed
that certain AEM rules (QCA conditions) or combinations thereof may
be potentially important for environmental effectiveness (literature on
the relevance of certain conditions e.g.: Schader et al., 2014; Garrod,
2009; Ruto and Garrod, 2009; Matzdorf and Lorenz, 2010;
Mettepenningen et al., 2013; Khanna and Ando, 2009; Prager and
Freese, 2009). Institutional complexity reduction for condition specifi-
cation occurred through focusing on general PES aspects and linking
them to specific information on AEM. In conclusion, the authors finally
determine five single conditions that are potentially relevant for en-
vironmental effectiveness: (i) focus on either one environmental goal or
bundling goals, (ii) application to a certain area or habitat, (iii) tech-
nical, temporal, or area-wise application flexibility, (iv) implementa-
tion support of nature protection agencies, (v) access to AEM advice.
Meyer et al. (2015) include 49 different AEMs from five German federal
states in the analysis. In contrast, Chen et al. (2018) do not only focus
on designed institutions but also consider other socio-economic aspects.
Table 4
Sufficient conditions for success of AEM (adapted from Meyer et al. 2015: p. 151).
Term Cases
1 ESTARGET*AREATARGET*IMPLNAT*ADVICE 15
2 ESTARGET*AREATARGET*FLEXIAPP*ADVICE 13
3 ESTARGET*∼AREATARGET*FLEXIAPP*∼ADVICE 3
Success= f(ESTARGET, AREATARGET, FLEXIAPP, IMPLNAT, ADVICE) Consistency cutoff: 0.750000.
Solution coverage: 0.727273, solution consistency: 0.842105.
7 The CAP is a common policy for all the countries of the European Union. It
is managed and funded at European level from the resources of the EU’s budget.
The CAP is financed through the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund
(EAGF): direct support and market measures, European Agricultural Fund for
Rural Development (EAFRD): rural development. National paying agencies, set
up by each European Union country, manage the payments to beneficiaries
(https://ec.europa.eu/info/food-farming-fisheries/key-policies/common-agri-
cultural-policy/cap-glance_en#legal-aspects).
8 The CAP is a common policy for all the countries of the European Union (see
footnote 7). The CAP is regularly externally evaluated within the EU member
states. As part of the CAP 2014–2020 the monitoring and evaluation framework
helps to assess the performance of the CAP and its main instruments (https://
ec.europa.eu/agriculture/evaluation/cap-monitoring-evaluation_en).
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Thus, they assume that certain institutional but also socio-economic
conditions may influence rural households to reach the environmental
goals of a governmental PES program: (i) household involvement, (ii)
property rights, (iii) off-farm labor allocation, (iv) effective monitoring,
and (v) sufficient financial incentive.
3.2. Step 2: Specification of the outcome
After a presentation of comparable institutional arrangements as
sets and the definition of the conditions, in a second step, the output
variable has to be specified. There are many different ways to specify
the output variable. Meyer et al. (2015) and Chen et al. (2018) both are
focusing the environmental impact of the PES, however, output defi-
nition and measurement followed very different ways. Meyer et al.
(2015) specified the output variable “…success in terms of environmental
effectiveness aspects...” by expert interviews. This took place according
to fixed evaluation criteria based on the literature. The success of each
AEM was determined based on a broader set of effectiveness aspects
following an evaluation framework for public policies developed by
Mickwitz (2003). Four determinants have been used to define success:
“the relevance of the measure to cope with key environmental pro-
blems”, “the concrete impacts of the measure”, “the effectiveness in
terms of impacts corresponding to the goals of the measure”, and “the
variability of the measure to cope with changing external conditions”.
The success evaluation was conducted by the evaluators of the Common
Agricultural Policy in the German federal states. In contrast, Chen et al.
(2018) evaluated the household implementation outcome by field ob-
servation. The authors measured the environmental outcomes from 128
plots of 59 SLCP-enrolled households by randomly placing a 100m2
quadrant. Within the quadrant they collected data on species diversity,
species number, tree height and coverage based on the Braun-Blanquet
cover-abundance scale (Braun-Blanquet, 1932).
3.3. Step 3: Transformation of data into crisp- or fuzzy-sets
In the third step the data has to be turned into crisp or fuzzy sets
depending on the research question as well as the type and extend of
the available data. Meyer et al. (2015) applied a csQCA for the AEM
cases. Thus, the presence and absence of every single condition is de-
termined dichotomously (1 or 0) for each of the 49 AEMs (see Table 1).
The determination was undertaken by the staff of the agricultural and
conservation administrations responsible for AEM programming. Meyer
et al. (2015) choose csQCA based on their dichotomous information on
the AEM rules as well as on the dichotomized data on success. Di-
chotomization has been carried out by considering AEM as successful
only if it got the highest rating in terms of overall success. The success
has been coded as (1= successful and 0=unsuccessful) as the AEM
rules (present= 1 or absent= 0) (see Table 2).
In contrast Chen et al. (2018) employ fsQCA to determine the dif-
ferent pathways to success and failure among varied condition ar-
rangements. The membership score is usually generated by calibration,
and this crucial process should be transparent, open, and replicable
(Ragin, 2006). The fuzzy membership score of four conditions was a
four-value scheme with “0”, “0.33”, “0.67”, and “1.0” indicating “fully
out,” “more out than in,” “more in than out,” and “fully in”, respec-
tively. Since household involvement is more complicated, the fuzzy
membership scores of household involvement followed a six-value
scheme, with “0”, “0.2”, “0.4”, “0.6”, “0.8” and “1.0” (see Table 3).
Similarly, the fuzzy membership scores of outcomes were categorized
with a four-value scheme to indicate “forest”, “spare forest”, “devel-
oping forest or grass” and “re-farm”. Theoretical knowledge as well as
empirical insights were used to generate the fuzzy membership scores
of each condition using different measures. The selection of the mea-
sure followed the structural calibration procedure suggested by Basurto
and Speer (Basurto and Speer, 2012). Each condition was explained by
a measure, and each measure corresponds to a survey question.
3.4. Step 4: Analysis for necessary and sufficient conditions
In a next step, the analysis for necessary and sufficient conditions
based on the truth table follows, generally by calculation software. In
both studies fsQCA software is used.9 Meyer et al. (2015) find only one
necessary condition, which then is considered to have limited sig-
nificance due to its coverage value, whereas, Chen et al. (2018) found
no necessary conditions. However, the sufficiency analyses show va-
luable results in both studies.
Meyer et al. (2015) identified three solution terms for sufficient
conditions (see Table 4): The first two terms cover (Term 1) measures
that target one environmental goal and a certain application area/ha-
bitat, are implemented with the involvement of the nature protection
agencies and are supported with a reliable advice system; and (Term 2)
measures that target one environmental goal and a certain area/habitat,
provide flexible application possibilities, and are supported with a re-
liable advice system. The first term covers 15 cases (12 successful and 3
unsuccessful). The second term covers 13 cases (10 successful and 3
unsuccessful), and the terms overlap for 9 successful cases. Both terms
generally support the authors’ assumptions. A third term (Term 3)
covers measures that target one environmental goal with an opportu-
nity for flexible application but no advice system; three successful cases
are included without overlap with other terms. Because the term em-
phasizes the exclusion of an advice system, it challenges the authors’
assumptions in terms of the positive impacts of advice.
Chen et al. (2018) found two solution terms in terms of sufficient
conditions for a successful outcome (see Table 5). The first term (Term
1) measures that a high level of household involvement, effective
monitoring and attractive financial incentives can be sufficient for
program implementation. The first term covers 18 cases (14 successful
Table 5
Sufficient conditions for success of SLCP (adapted from Cheng et al., 2018: p. 17).1
Term Solution Covered household number
1 INVO*MONI*FINA 18
2 INVO*MONI*PROP*OFF 6
Success= f(PART, PROP, OFF, MONI, FINA).
Frequency cutoff: 2.000000, consistency cutoff: 0.824345.
Solution coverage: 0.746718, solution consistency: 0.823329.
1 The present of household involvement, property rights, off-farm labor allocation, effective monitoring,
and financial incentive were labelled as “INVO”, “PROP”, “OFF”, “EFFE” and “FINA,” respectively.
9 There is different software for QCA application, e.g. fsQCA by Charles
Ragin, Kriss Drass, and Sean Davey (http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/
fsQCA/software.shtml), TOSMANA developed by Lasse Cronquist (https://
www.tosmana.net/) as well as QCA packages for the data analysis programs
Strata and R.
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households and 4 unsuccessful households). The second term (Term 2)
shows that high levels of household involvement, effective monitoring,
clear property rights, and off-farm labor allocation are also sufficient for
program implementation. The second term covered 3 successful
households and 3 unsuccessful households. Although all successful
households in the second path overlapped with the first path, the
second path is worth noting due to the presence of property rights and
off-farm labor allocation.
3.5. Step 5: Examination of the inconsistencies and non-coverage
The verification of the QCA solutions for generalization requires an
examination of the inconsistencies and non-coverage. Both, Meyer et al.
(2015) as well as Chen et al. (2018) carried out such examination on a
case base. Basically, differences and similarities in the contradictory
cases are examined to detect vague or imprecise definitions as well as
changes in meaning (cf. Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). Further-
more, expert knowledge has been considered. Regarding the cases that
cause inconsistencies of Terms 1 and 2, Meyer et al. (2015) took for
example certain statements of the CAP evaluators into account, in-
dicating that some cases are almost successful, but conceptual or ac-
ceptance issues did not allow for a perfect rating. The authors interpret
those cases as being “on the edge”. If these cases had been rated as
completely successful, the consistency value would have increased.
Those generally positive statements on the cases have been understood
as general support of the sufficient conditions. In terms of the non-
covered cases they detect that four of these six non-covered successful
cases include one measure: payments to employ organic farming tech-
niques. Thus, the authors argue that therefore a corresponding refine-
ment of the assumptions may be indicated. Chen et al. (2018) face for
example inconsistencies in terms of six unsuccessful households cov-
ered by their two terms. From the six households one head of household
is the current village chief, and another is his brother. Further two
heads of household are previous village chiefs, a fifth head of household
is the Akhoond10 in the village mosque, and the sixth is a village elder.
Due to the political and social role of these six households, they were
special regarding program implementation, which can explain the in-
consistencies.
3.6. Overall results
Both QCIA studies on PES could determine highly plausible solution
terms, showing opportunities for successful governance structures in
terms of environmental outcome. Both studies allow for generalization
on the particular PES program design (AEM or SLCP) but also for PES
design in general. They emphasize that the combination of certain
conditions rather than a single condition alone is crucial for the PES
success. Meyer et al. (2015) could furthermore illuminate aspects of
PES integration into overall environmental policy, PES relation to
property rights in natural resources, and output-based payments for
well-defined ES. Chen et al. (2018) showed that governmental PES must
be capable of adapting to different local conditions in a combinatory
fashion. Even though csQCA can comprehensively present institutional
arrangements in terms of dichotomous set relations, complexity has to
be reduced to a certain degree. When compared to csQCA, fsQCA
strengthens the QCIA by allowing the researcher to establish differences
in degrees, theoretical knowledge, and in-depth empirical insights that
were sometimes needed to understand the single cases and local con-
tent. However, the results are not as clear-cut and straightforward as in
csQCA.
4. Suitability of QCA for environmental governance CIA
The exemplary application of QCA to PES in Germany and China
shows a general suitability of the method for CIAs of environmental and
ecosystem services governance structures. In both of the exemplary
studies, institutional arrangements as well as socio-economic conditions
for successful PES could been determined. The findings display the
results of reducing complexity of governance arrangements to make
them comparable, test assumptions, develop new ideas, and derive
policy advice. However, there are many critical issues and challenges
that have to be taken into account when applying QCIA.
4.1. Complexity reduction and pitfalls in application
In particular, QCA provides a tool that can help to translate in-
stitutional complexity (e.g. many rules, many actors) into comparable
arrangements. Thereby, on the one hand QCA application forces to,
and, on the other hand it helps to concretize and reduce the many
different aspects of governance structures to the most relevant ones.
Such concretization and reduction is a part and a main concern of CIA
to enable a comparison of different institutional arrangements
(Monsees, 2008). Our example studies show that only a limited number
of conditions in terms of institutions or socio-economic factors can be
considered to make valid inferences – 5 in both cases (Chen et al., 2018;
Meyer et al., 2015).
The process of such complexity reduction requires a forth and back
in terms of theory, data collection, knowledge gaining, and con-
cretization of the conditions. During QCA application the factors are
generally discussed and changed within an intensive dialog with the
cases (Rihoux and De Meur, 2009). Continuous comparison and re-
integration of theory and case studies information as well as defining
and redefining thresholds requires an in-depth case knowledge and
iterative processes (Blatter et al., 2007; Rihoux and De Meur, 2009).
Such in-depth case study knowledge and processes are part of many
CIAs and therefore a QCA application suggests itself (e.g. Pahl-Wostl
and Knieper, 2014; Brockhaus et al., 2017). The complexity reduction is
supported by QCA’s ability to clearly structure and summarize data and
visually display clusters, patterns, and differences among governance
structures within the truth table throughout the application process.
However, complexity reduction in terms of case, condition, and
indictor selection has a strong impact on the research results and
therefore, they must be based on a careful consideration to avoid sub-
jectivity (Sehring et al., 2013). Referring to this, also Pahl-Wostl and
Knieper (2014) underline that QCA is no trivial and results may be
strongly influenced by the rules for e.g. fuzzy-set membership values or
by the interpretation of consistency measures. They agree to Schneider
and Wagemann (2012) who state that the popularity of QCA seems not
to have kept pace with efforts to adopt standards of good practice in
method application and documentation and encourage sharing of ex-
periences in a wider community of practice.
Especially output variable determination, concretization, and mea-
surement for environmental and ecosystem services governance ap-
proaches may be challenging. Comparison and assessment criteria in
terms of type and quality (see Monsees, 2008) with data available and/
or accessible are often difficult to design. Both case studies (Chen et al.,
2018; Meyer et al., 2015) used very different approaches (an expert
survey based on an evaluation framework and field visits with an
ecologic mapping method) which worked out within the respective
studies but both approaches also involve challenges and limitations.
Future efforts on integrated evaluation methods on the success of en-
vironmental and ecosystem services governance approaches are highly
recommended.
Serious critics also appear regarding csQCA and the required binary
coding as it reduces complexity too much and many social and political
phenomena cannot be adequately depicted as they are not binary pre-
sentable (Sehring et al., 2013; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). Fuzzy-
10 Also called Imam: An Islamic leadership position who may lead Islamic
worship services, serve as community leader, and provide religious guidance.
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sets may express the institutional arrangements in a more encompassing
way. For example, in the SLCP case, participation and property could
hardly be measured by an explicit number. Thus, generally we agree to
Schneider and Wagemann (2012) and see that working with crisp-sets
does create some issues. However, for a CIA of ecosystem services
governance arrangements we argue that the applicability of crisp-sets
may very much depend on the particular institutional and socio-eco-
nomic governance context. Some aspects can be well reduced to binary
expressions as for example the presence or absence of certain formal
rules in the AEM example (Meyer et al. 2015). Accordingly, the ques-
tion if csQCA could be used for CIA depends on the research question
and available data.
Even if complexity in terms of condition numbers has been reduced
QCA studies are always challenged by limited empirical diversity. For
example, in both presented studies, the 5 conditions mean 32 possible
combinations of conditions (Chen et al., 2018; Meyer et al., 2015).
Ideally, all possible combinations can be observed and analyzed.
However, this is hardly ever the case, and thus, for some combinations
of factors the truth table will not show any cases. In the SLCP case, the
truth table shows only 24 combinations. Thus, usually a number of the
combinations are logically possible but do not occur in the real world
(called logical remainders). There are different strategies to cope with
this issue, basically to make certain assumptions on the logical re-
mainders or not (see Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: pp. 152), but
they all are not completely convincing. However, the problem has been
assumed less relevant in terms of statements on the observed cases and
more relevant for generalization (Sehring et al., 2013). This means for
QCIA that the researcher has to keep in mind for which purpose the
QCIA is carried out and which assumptions on logical remainders could
be made. For making assumptions on logical remainders deep knowl-
edge on the institutional governance arrangements and contexts is
needed.
In sum, the disadvantages of QCA in terms of reduced case numbers,
limited causal conditions, subjective condition selection and imperfect
calibration (Basurto and Speer, 2012) should not be neglected. How-
ever, if applied carefully QCA provides a good tool for CIA in terms of
cross-case comparison and complexity reduction.
4.2. Assumption testing and idea development
Generally, QCA may offer advantages over conventional qualitative
and quantitative techniques in specific contexts. Many institutionalist
or institutional economics issues are related to complex social-eco-
nomic-ecological contexts which could hardly be targeted by statistical
methods as regression analysis, as for example causal configurations
(see Pahl-Wostl and Knieper, 2014). However, a qualitative case study
approach does not allow for generalization (Sehring et al., 2013). QCA
goes beyond statistical regression analyses and makes systematic com-
parisons while taking still into account the single case. It enables to
understand if combinations of relevant institutional factors will lead to
an outcome, different combinations of institutional factors can produce
the same outcome, and if a condition can have different impacts on the
outcome depending on its combination with other institutional factors
and the context. Correspondingly, different institutionalist or institu-
tional economist assumptions may be well targeted.
Thereby, in addition to institutions, also societal perspectives as
values, interests, knowledge-claims, and combination thereof may be
included into the analysis as determining conditions for success or
failure of governance approaches (shown by Chen et al., 2018). Chen
et al. (2018) combined institutions of the program as household in-
volvement and monitoring with socio-economic context factors as off-
farm labor. Thereby, the notion of multiple causation (more conditions
can lead to the same outcome), is not generally opposed to the idea of
identifying preferred institutional arrangements. It meets the percep-
tion that depending on the context, different institutional arrangements
can be relevant, or else, different institutional arrangements can be
trade-offs regarding the same outcome. The results from both presented
studies on AEMs and SLCP prove the importance of different arrange-
ments as well as combinations of certain conditions to the success of
governmental PES. QCA also allows researchers to better understand
such complex causal relationships among a larger number of cases
because both qualitative and quantitative data can be used.
Besides testing theories and assumptions, QCA can be used to falsify
existing theories and develop new hypotheses. For example, if a large
number of contradictory cases in a truth table shows that empirical
cases have not been adequately assessed or that an important factor has
been forgotten (Rihoux, 2007). High non-coverage also shows a missing
element to formulate the solution. In the AEM example, the solution
term with the highest coverage value explains 16 of 22 AEM. Thus, six
AEM that are rated successful are not explained by any of the solutions,
meaning that they do not comply with any successful condition. Four of
these six relevant cases include organic farming. Thus, it could be as-
sumed that organic farming could provide a sufficient condition for
success (e.g., Meyer et al. 2015). Correspondingly, QCA may help to
develop new assumptions and hypothesis on relevant institutional ar-
rangements. This may be especially relevant in the course of research
on ecosystem services governance advancement and a better integra-
tion of relations and feedbacks between humans and the natural en-
vironment based on the ecosystem services concept.
In sum, QCA offers different valuable opportunities for CIA in terms
of hypothesis and assumption testing and development. Due to certain
challenges and limitations explained in section 4.1, a combination of
QCA with other qualitative and statistical approaches to confront the
result or combine them (Sehring et al., 2013; Rihoux, 2007) may be
valuable in terms of CIA (Pahl-Wostl and Knieper, 2014; Pahl-Wostl
et al., 2012).
4.3. Inferences on policy design
Overall, we acknowledge a relevance of QCIA as a decent way to
determine preferred environmental and ecosystem services governance
structures and provide input for the policy arena. QCIA offers oppor-
tunities to analyze existing governance approaches and support im-
plementation, monitoring, and evaluation as well as opportunities to
provide innovative ideas for governance development. This applies not
only in terms of an administrators’ point of view and an optimization of
the administrative decision-making but also for market, civil society,
and cooperative governance aspects. As our results show, QCIA may
deliver guiding principles for designing certain environmental and
ecosystem services governance approaches, it may provide insights into
the social-economic-ecological factors that could be relevant for im-
plementation, it could help on a further development of existing ap-
proaches, and it could give input for governance innovation. However,
QCIA encounters different challenges and limitations, especially in
terms of complexity reduction, which have to be always taken into
account before drawing back on certain results for decision making.
Therefore, a combination of QCIA with other methods can be a helpful.
In any case, QCIA may illustrate trends and help to detect problematic
policy issues.
5. Conclusions
The objective of the paper was to show that the QCA approach and
technique may be an excellent way to support CIA in terms of a for-
malized determination of preferred institutional arrangements for en-
vironmental, or rather ecosystem services governance. Therefore, this
work explains how QCA works, determines how it could be applied to
CIA, and defines basic steps for QCIA application. The application of
crisp-set and fuzzy-set QCA to CIA are illustrated step by step based on
two case studies in Germany and China, and challenges and opportu-
nities of the applicability of QCA to CIA are discussed. The paper firmly
explicates that QCA may generally support CIA very well. In particular,
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the technique helps to structure the complexity of the included units
which is part of many institutional economic and institutionalist ap-
proaches. The method provides an opportunity to formalize the quali-
tative comparative aspects that are often part of CIAs and also allows
for the integration of qualitative and quantitative data. Furthermore,
contrary to other methods, especially quantitative approaches, the QCA
method shows combinations of conditions that are relevant for a certain
output and does not focus on the impacts of single conditions. Finally,
the decently verified and interpreted results provide relevant policy
implications that can be communicated to the relevant decision-making
bodies and decision makers. However, generating reliable and utiliz-
able QCIA results could be very time-consuming in terms of data
gathering, processing, and interpretation and requires the corre-
sponding resources.
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Background
Net-Map is a participatory, innovative tool for social network 
analysis (SNA), which combines elements of qualitative and 
quantitative research. During an in-depth interview, the inter-
viewees (individuals and groups) create and draw maps of the 
networks they participate in. While drawing the network, they 
engage in a process that helps them to understand and clarify 
their own view of the given situation, discuss the situation 
and finally develop a strategic approach to improve their own 
networking activities. The advantages and disadvantages of 
Net-Map compared to classical SNA are more implicitly dis-
cussed in the literature (Campbell et al., 2014: 431; Hauck 
et al., 2015; Schiffer and Hauck, 2010). In classical SNA, the 
analysis focuses primarily on data raised in a quantitative 
manner, which makes it difficult to understand the underlying 
reasons for complex and dynamic structures, and there are 
typically time gaps between data collection and results (Reed 
et al., 2009). In contrast, the Net-Map approach additionally 
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supports qualitative information based on individual actors’ 
viewpoints and perceptions, which helps to combine purely 
structure-oriented quantitative network analysis with more 
qualitative aspects such as narratives and participatory 
approaches (Hauck and Schiffer, 2012). In addition, in quan-
titative SNA, each actor reports his or her own ties to other 
actors, whereas in the Net-Map tool, the actors also report 
their perceptions of ties between third parties. Therefore, at 
least one representative of every actor group must be inter-
viewed when using the Net-Map tool in individual interviews 
to prevent bias when aggregating single networks for further 
analysis of the overall network. In principle, it is also possible 
to use Net-Map in group interviews with all relevant actors 
and construct the overall network together. This, however, 
bears some additional challenges as the actors have to coin-
cide about the network they draw. This is time-consuming, 
more difficult to control biases and challenging, in particular 
in conflictive networks.
Based on experiences with applying this research tool in 
four different countries and continents, we document the 
strengths and weaknesses of the proposed method against the 
international background and propose ideas for improve-
ments and further research.
Case selection and method
The tool was used to analyse the governance models in four 
different research projects. A governance model is a special 
arrangement of institutional structures and actor constella-
tions of which three ideal types are distinguished: hierar-
chies, markets and community management based on 
cooperation (Vatn, 2010: 1246). Although they focused on 
different topics, all of the types we present in this article ana-
lyse collaborative governance approaches in environmental 
management. Collaborative governance approaches seek tai-
lored solutions for complex problems and are characterized 
by the incorporation of all concerned actors and their specific 
needs, by using all kind of resources (e.g. local knowledge), 
by using social capital and by being flexible and adaptive 
(Mert and Pattberg, 2015).
In Costa Rica, a community-based payment scheme for 
ecosystem services was investigated in which fishermen are 
paid for restoring mangroves and are also active in educational 
work. In Germany, collaborative governance approaches were 
analysed in which actors from public, private and civil society 
worked together for water management and biodiversity pro-
tection. In Tanzania, the functionality of farmer groups imple-
menting so-called upgrading strategies, such as tide ridges 
within a village that aim to improve food security, were 
assessed. In China, a state-financed payment for ecosystem 
services scheme was studied in which peasants are paid for 
reforesting part of their land (see Table 1).
Most interviews were conducted with actors at the local 
level. For each study, the following comparable information 
was gathered: determining the important actors in the gov-
ernance approach, their connections with each other, their 
motivations to participate and their influence on and benefits 
from the schemes.
The Net-Map tool which is an empirical research tool 
developed by Eva Schiffer and the International Food and 
Policy Institute (IFRPI) was used for data collection. Net-
Map is used
to (1) visualize implicit knowledge and understand the interplay 
of complex formal and informal networks, power relations, and 
actors’ goals; (2) uncover sources of conflicts as well as 
potentials for cooperation; (3) facilitate knowledge exchange 
and learning processes; and (4) develop visions and strategies to 
achieve common goals. (Schiffer and Hauck, 2010)
To specify the context for which the network is mapped, 
an overarching Net-Map question is first formulated: ‘Who 
has influenced/can influence XY where and when?’
The interviews include four steps:
1. Recording the participating or influencing actors. 
During this step, interviewees identify the actors 
within the network, write the names on actor cards 
and distribute them on a large sheet of paper. To 
gather additional information, they are asked what 
makes each actor important.
Table 1. Comparison of different collaborative governance approaches in Costa Rica, Germany, Tanzania and China.
Costa Rica Germany Tanzania China
Project type Community Blue 
Carbon Project
Backwater Advisory board 
‘Staubeirat’, Citizen Foundation 
‘Kulturlandschaft Spreewald’
Upgrading strategy 
Tide Ridges
Sloping Land Programme
Governance type Community and 
Market, a bit of State
State and Community Community + Science State Hierarchy, 
Community takes over
Top-down/bottom-up Bottom-up Top-down (Backwater 
Advisory board); bottom- up 
(Citizen Foundation)
Bottom-up Top-down
Important Intermediaries Non-governmental 
organization
Water and Soil Association; 
Foundation
Researchers, group 
leaders
Villages Chiefs (not 
foreseen)
Source: Own elaboration.
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2. During the second step, different links between the 
actors are identified. The interviewer asks for one 
specific link between actor A and all other actors, fol-
lowed by the same link between actor B and all the 
other actors, and so forth, and then draws arrows con-
necting the actors. When one link is finished, the next 
link is mapped with a different colour. In the reviewed 
studies, we asked for different relationships between 
the actors such as personal contacts, trust, flow of 
money or materials, written contracts and exchange 
of knowledge; the arrows are all displayed in differ-
ent colours.
3. During the third step, the motivation of each actor is 
established, a legend is drawn and symbols are placed 
beside each actor’s card. In some cases, the inter-
viewee was presented a list of five pre-defined moti-
vations based on the case study experience which 
were identified through qualitative interviews before-
hand; these include economic, ecological, social, 
image-related and knowledge-related motivations. 
Additional information is gathered by asking for the 
reasons behind specific motivations.
4. Finally, the interviewee is asked to indicate how 
strongly each actor is influencing the result in the 
overarching Net-Map question. He or she arranges 
towers (which are built of some stackable material 
such as small bricks and chocolate) for each actor 
according to the estimated importance. The greater 
the influence of the actor, the higher the tower. 
Towers of different actors can be of the same height, 
and the heights of towers may or may not be restricted. 
The interviewer notes the height of the towers onto 
the map and gathers additional information by asking 
for reasons for the actors’ influence.
This visualization process is accompanied by narratives 
which the interview partners provide to explain the drawings.
In our studies, the Net-Map tool was used to analyse five 
main aspects: (1) Who are the important actors in a network? 
(2) What are the relationships between those actors (such as 
flows of knowledge, information, money and other resources, 
contracts, reporting, trust or conflicts)? (3) What are indi-
vidual actors’ motivations or goals (e.g. ecological, eco-
nomic, social, image, knowledge, love, joy)? (4) What is 
each actor’s, influence or importance?
To adapt the tool (Schiffer and Hauck, 2010) to our 
research needs for the case of Costa Rica, Germany and 
Tanzania, the forth step was repeated, asking not only for 
actors’ influence and importance but also for actors’ per-
sonal benefits, income food availability, learning and trust.
In each case study, individual interviews were conducted 
by the lead researchers of the respective project. Local staff 
only served as translators in the case of Tanzania, but they 
were trained in the interview method and the terminology 
was defined in their presence. An overview of the different 
interview conditions is presented in Table 2.
Research results
After data collection in each study was finalized, we con-
ducted a short survey with open questions among six research-
ers that had been involved with the studies. They were asked 
for their opinions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of 
the Net-Map tool in relation to (1) interactions with inter-
viewees, (2) collection of scientific data, (3) structural aspects 
of the tool (e.g. guidelines, interview steps and duration) and 
(4) what they would change to improve the method.
Challenges regarding the interaction between the inter-
viewee and interviewer can be attributed to either methodo-
logical challenges or differences in the respective research 
design or country context of the studies.
Methodological challenges
In Costa Rica, it was sometimes difficult to keep the inter-
viewees focused and not make them deter from the topic, 
whereas in Germany, the experience was mixed. Some inter-
viewees perceived interviews as time-consuming and annoy-
ing, but others felt that interviews were more interactive and 
interesting than conventional interview techniques.
Challenges to data collection were, in Germany, related to 
actors who performed different roles in the network. This 
made it difficult to unmistakably assign roles to one particu-
lar actor as their roles were associated with several actors, 
and thus it was more difficult to assess their relationships. In 
addition, the individual interpretation of terms used during 
the interviews deviated, which made it difficult to secure 
common understanding. In Tanzania, the main challenge was 
to process the acquired data because of a large number of 
interviews. Although this took more time and the data-acqui-
sition schedule was very dense, the data richness allowed not 
only for an elaborated case study comparison design of dif-
ferent networks across different villages and regions but also 
for a broader statistical analysis beyond network measures 
(e.g. a chi-square test for motivations and influence towers). 
In China, only a small number of actors was part of the gov-
ernance approach and interviewed, so the data quality was 
highly dependent on the interviewer’s ability to obtain the 
most information possible and to subsequently interpret the 
Net-Maps. In Costa Rica, data collection was not a chal-
lenge, because people are more relaxed and easily communi-
cate their perceptions.
Challenges associated with specific case study 
conditions
In Tanzania, there were challenges related to the illiterate-
ness of interviewees, which was solved using icons for 
actors. In the beginning, the participants felt as though they 
were at a school and first had to become comfortable with the 
situation to provide their answers. It was sometimes difficult 
for them to make statements regarding other persons. As 
such, it was necessary to take care to not make them feel 
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ashamed when they did not know an answer, and to give 
them sufficient time to think and therefore maintain their 
confidence. The length of the interview was usually long, up 
to 3 hours, which caused weariness and challenged their abil-
ity to concentrate on the topic. Similarly, in China, it was 
difficult for the interviewees to make statements regarding 
the involvement, links or influence of other actors. 
Interviewees could comment on their own level (e.g. other 
farmers in the village), but not on government employees on 
the regional or state level. This finding revealed the opacity 
of the network. Local actors had a limited perspective on the 
network up to hierarchical structures. Although they were 
experts and an active part of the network, they only knew 
about the local structures.
Regarding structural aspects, the main challenge was the 
length of the interview. In Germany, Tanzania and Costa 
Rica, the interviews were often considered to be too long, 
which made it difficult for people to stay focused on the topic 
at hand, such as staying focused and concentrated or thinking 
about other urgent tasks they must do. In China, the inter-
views were considered to be too short. People especially at 
the local level had less knowledge and could not comment on 
higher levels, so the interpretation of maps and the resulting 
situation was difficult for the interviewer because network 
narratives did not offer much additional information.
Advantages of the Net-Map method that were mentioned 
in all four case studies were that the method is easy to under-
stand, very intuitive and contains an element of fun. In addi-
tion, the step-by-step procedure is simple and subsequently 
adds complexity to the network while explanatory informa-
tion is collected during the qualitative part of the interview. 
Because the stakeholders construct their network on their 
own during the interview, they address the actors very con-
sciously. This creative act results in being very helpful for 
reflecting their relationships. The prompt visibility of the 
collected information makes interpretation possible imme-
diately, as well as makes discussion of the results easier. 
Most importantly, both the interviewer and interviewee 
learn during the process, and knowledge exchange occurs in 
both direction. This makes the tool suitable for interviewing 
not only single persons but also groups of people. As the 
data become structured, comparison between interviews 
becomes easy. In addition, the combination of collecting 
qualitative and quantitative data is an added value of the 
method, as it presents a complete picture and allows mixed-
method analysis.
Table 2. Comparison of different interview situations in Costa Rica, Germany, Tanzania and China.
Costa Rica Germany Tanzania China
Number of interviews 11 18 177 34
Number of 
interviewers/interview
2 1 1 1
Interview language Spanish, English German English (with Swahili 
translation)
Chinese
Use of interpreter No No Yes No
Places where 
interviews were 
conducted
Open space in front of 
interviewees home, inside 
interviewees home, class/
workshop room in field 
station, office meeting room
Home or office place of 
the interviewees (open 
and closed spaces)
Open space or closed 
space, home of the 
interviewees, community 
house and offices
Offices of government 
officials, farmers home or 
open space close by
Length of the 
interview
1–2.5 hours 1–2.5 hours 1.5–3 hours 10 minutes–1 hours
Individual interviews 
or focus groups
Individual Individual Individual Individual
Number of 
interviewees per 
interview
1–4 1 1 1
Interview partners Local community/fishermen, 
NGO members, business
Local and regional 
administration, 
associations, farmers, 
Civic Local community/
fishermen/farmers
Local community/
farmers, extension staff, 
NGOs, government 
officials, villages chiefs
Government officials, 
village chiefs, local 
community/farmers/ 
households
Educational 
background of 
interview partners
From very basic to university 
level
From very basic to 
university level
From very basic to 
university level
From very basic to 
university level
Regional coverage/
scale
National and Local Regional Local National, regional and local
Source: Own data.
NGO: non-governmental organization.
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Discussion and conclusion
Although our findings do not allow for a systematic case 
study comparison due to the slightly different research design 
of each study, we found that Net-Map is a very flexible tool 
that is suitable for three out of the four different socio-cul-
tural contexts. Only in China the tool showed limited suita-
bility because of its hierarchical context. This coincides with 
the findings of Reed (2008) that ‘methods should be selected 
and tailored to the decision-making context, considering the 
objectives, type of participants and appropriate level of 
engagement’ (p. 2424).
The tool addresses several problems that may occur dur-
ing conventional interviews, such as reaching transparency 
and common understanding through visualizing the situa-
tion, overcoming shyness or the will to talk and creating a 
comfortable atmosphere that keeps the participants involved, 
which in the end improves not only social learning but also 
the quality of the interview data (Campbell et al., 2014; 
Schiffer and Waale, 2008).
Although the use of the tool is time-consuming, it has the 
great advantage of enhancing learning effects. These learn-
ing effects occur immediately when the interviewee is 
reflecting on his or her perception of the network. Immediate 
data analysis and discussion is possible, in contrast to classi-
cal SNA and other participatory methods for governance 
analysis such as experiments or multi-criteria analysis. 
Similar to participatory modelling, the resulting map is a 
product which can serve as a boundary object, which acts as 
a device ‘for the development of a shared language to address 
different objectives and integrate different forms of knowl-
edge’ (Hauck et al., 2015: 408). The maps can be discussed 
in a focus group with all interviewees to reach a common 
understanding of the overall network perception, which 
would be a second step of social learning.
On one hand, the maps help to make tacit or implicit 
knowledge, or the ‘know how’ (Roberts, 2000: 431), visible. 
The interviewees report their perception of the network, and 
only the overlay of all interview data depicts the entire net-
work picture. As actor groups can be split into interviews or 
focus groups, the method gives the less powerful a chance to 
explain their perception of the network but makes the situa-
tion difficult if different actors discuss their perception at the 
same time. On the other hand, when there are diverse actors 
with different educational and knowledge levels, the imme-
diate mapping of the lack of knowledge or shyness to utter 
perceptions becomes obvious during the interview. In this 
case, the learning effect occurs in the end when the resulting 
map is discussed with the interviewees.
The visualization of the results for participants was used 
as a motivation to take action because it enhances the under-
standing of the network and roles of individuals/groups that 
must be improved in order to achieve a better performance. 
For example, after the interviews, the participants realized 
the weaknesses of their network and tried to do ‘something 
about it’ for improving the situation; for example, if the 
group leader is not fulfilling his or her role in the group, 
members would have a meeting to try to fix it.
However, for conducting Net-Map interviews, researchers 
must consider the specific settings in the case study they want 
to investigate, especially regarding power relations and the 
distribution of knowledge. The method seems to function 
well in open societies where uttering critiques, thinking out 
loud, speculating about and for others, and abstract thinking 
is common. Literacy helps, but the method can also be applied 
to involve illiterate people because of the visualization  moti-
vations and actors’ names can be represented by icons. In 
general, the method seems to be intuitive enough to work for 
everyone, independent of the educational or social back-
ground of the interviewee. Knowledge differences of the dis-
tinct actor groups are perceived to be mainly due to lack of 
information, not to educational standards. Altogether, it seems 
important to use the method in a flexible way and to adjust it 
to the given situation so that interviewees can familiarize 
themselves with the method and continue at their own pace. 
However, in contexts with strong hierarchies, the method 
seems less suitable because hierarchies are the more accepted 
social structure compared to networks. Local actors are not 
familiar with answering open questions and do not have 
enough information due to poor participation in the design of 
the governance models. Only people with hierarchical power 
are capable of sharing such information. In addition, in this 
context, it was difficult to make people comment on other 
involved actors, as well as on the links and influence within 
social spheres other than their own. Actors are not really 
interested in clearly addressing power structures and depend-
ent actors do not feel free to evaluate other actors in their 
network.
Moreover, in all case studies, the level of education dif-
fered and influenced the application of the tool. Despite con-
ducting pilot interviews to test the wording of the questions, 
it was sometimes difficult to use the same terms for every 
actor group, such as in the German case study. This may be a 
limitation of the method, as it is hardly possible to use the 
same language if the actor heterogeneity is very high. In con-
trast, the strengths of the tool are the visualization possibili-
ties, which allowed including, for example, illiterate 
participants in Tanzania.
The different education levels are linked to the wider pro-
file of the different actors, which had influence on the behav-
iour of the interviews in all case studies. Whereas grassroots 
stakeholders generally had more time but were less keen on 
discussions, academic or business stakeholders had time 
constrains but were more open to discussions.
Finally, the interview questions must always be framed in 
the local political context. In some cases, such as in China or 
Germany, the questions broached more sensitive topics than 
in Costa Rica or Tanzania, which influenced interviewees’ 
behaviours. The experience also showed that if the inter-
views are short on time and information, a lot of local 
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knowledge is required from the interviewer to be able to 
interpret the maps. Therefore, we recommend good prepara-
tion and prior training of the interviewer, as well as proper 
pre-testing of the research questions and wording in the orig-
inal context. Using an interpreter for local languages such as 
in Tanzania did not make a difference in the utility of the 
method because the interpreters were trained in the interview 
method beforehand. We did not find the method to be very 
suitable for highly hierarchical settings. For this reason, we 
encourage more research regarding power relationships and 
knowledge hierarchies in different social and institutional 
settings when applying the Net-Map tool (Figure 1).
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5 Synthesis and Discussion 
5.1 Overall results 
The first paper provides the conceptual basis for all subsequent studies presented in 
this dissertation, as it is an overview of the effectiveness and institutional challenges 
of China’s SLCP. The second paper explores how socioeconomic and institutional 
conditions encourage rural households to reach the primary environmental goals of 
SLCP. The third paper shows how local dynamics derived and shaped the SLCP’s 
implementation. The fourth paper illustrates and discusses the method used in paper 
2, comparing it with another case study in Germany. Finally, the fifth paper present 
the strengths and weaknesses of the method used in paper 3 based on the 
experiences of four different countries. The results of the five individual papers and 
corresponding research questions for the dissertation are briefly summarized in 
Table 1. 
 Research question Result 
A 1 
What are the institutional 
challenges for the 
effectiveness of SLCP? 
Hierarchical (top-down) approach 
Household participation 
Administrative coordination 
Poor monitoring 
Compromise of a multi-goal approach 
Flexible payments 
Property right 
What are the institutional 
and socioeconomic 
conditions of the 
implementation of SLCP 
at household level? 
Household involvement 
Financial incentives 
Off-farm labor allocation 
Property rights 
Effective monitoring 
A 2 
What are necessary and 
sufficient institutional 
and socioeconomic 
conditions for a 
successful SLCP 
implementation at the 
Path 1: the combination of household involvement, 
effective monitoring and financial incentives 
Path 2: the combination of household involvement, 
effective monitoring, clear property rights and off-
farm labor allocation. 
Synthesis and Discussion110
 
household level? 
What are necessary and 
sufficient institutional 
and socioeconomic 
conditions for a failed 
SLCP implementation at 
the household level? 
Path 1: the combination of household non-
involvement and on-farm labor allocation 
Path 2: the combination of poor property rights and 
household non-involvement 
Path 3: the combination of financial incentive, weak 
monitoring and poor property rights 
A 3 
Which roles do the local 
agencies and household 
play in shifting a 
compensation program to 
a governmental PES? 
Local agencies, including village council (farmer 
councils), village chief and forest station may be 
forced to coordinate and ideally deliberate the terms 
and conditions of implementation and management 
options. If the negotiations between local actors can 
be improved and their role as intermediaries can be 
promoted, the environmental goals may be achieved 
in combination with greater self-interest. 
B 1 
How to apply QCA 
approach to support 
Comparative Institutional 
Analysis to determine 
preferred institutional 
arrangements among 
several possibilities? 
Step 1: Selection of the conditions 
Step 2: Specification of the outcome 
Step 3: Transformation of data into crisp- or fuzzy-sets 
Step 4: Analysis for necessary and sufficient conditions 
Step 5: Examination of the inconsistencies and non-
coverage 
B 2 
What are the strengths 
and weaknesses of using 
the Net-Map tool for 
participatory social 
network analysis in 
ecosystem service 
governance? 
Strengths: 
1) improving the quality of the interview data 
2) Enhancing learning effects 
3) Making tacit or implicit knowledge 
4) Visualization for taking action 
5) Intuitive to work for everyone 
Weaknesses: 
1) Time-consuming 
2) Might have problem with strong hierarchies 
3) Local knowledge is required from interviewer  
Table 1: Short summary of the result of publications 
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5.2 How to improve the design of governmental PES 
This dissertation has shown that governmental PES, like SLCP, could create significant 
economies of scale and environmental effectiveness under certain institutional 
conditions. However, the actual implementation of SLCP has deviated substantially 
from the market approach promoted by the central government, as well as from 
suggestions by domestic and international researchers. While the design of the 
program is often framed as a PES mechanism, its implementation could be actually 
viewed as a compensation for legal restriction. A significant gap between vision and 
implementation has been observed in terms of governance and effectiveness (Table 
2). As the PES in China is strongly grounded in a specific institution, the improvement 
of government PES should be featured along with the causes of the gap, rather than 
simply embracing PES elements from theory. In order to do so, Paper 1 proposes that 
the program’s effectiveness is a result of interacting driving forces, whereas 
institutional factors play a key role in shaping the outcome. Paper 2 suggests that the 
effectiveness of the SLCP can be improved if key relationships are jointly understood 
and addressed. Paper 3 argues that local dynamics drive and shape the program 
implementation, and that particular attention should be paid to the interaction of 
local actors. 
 
Table 2: Comparison of SLCP in design and implementation with PES theory 
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The SLCP was viewed domestically as the flagship program for the transition from 
subsidy (bottom-right in Figure 6) to incentive-based governmental approach 
(bottom-left). However, this dissertation has indicated that the SLCP is the overlap of 
governmental-financed payments and compensation payments for legal restrictions 
(middle point of two bottom corners), according to the governance model developed 
by Matzdorf (Matzdorf et al. 2013). However, Eco-compensation can be considered 
more to right side of the model (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6: SLCP in the PES governance model (adapted from Matzdorf et al., 2013) 
 
5.2.1 Implications for governmental PES in China 
The gap between design and implementation is often viewed as an ‘implementation 
barrier’. SLCP is embedded in incomplete institutional settings and particular 
attention should be paid to the institutional setting. To answer questions A 1.1 and A 
1.2, the relevant institutional design conditions for reaching PES environmental goals 
are reviewed in paper 1 and elaborated on by papers 2 and 3. The implementation 
User-financed  
and nongovernment-financed 
payments  
 
Government-financed 
payments 
Compliant payments 
Compensation payments for 
legal restriction 
State involved as legal actor 
St
at
e 
in
vo
lv
ed
 a
s b
uy
er
 
No Yes 
No
 
Ye
s 
Governmental PES 
SLCP 
Eco-compensation 
5Synthesis and Discussion 113
 
has been shaped by institutional and socioeconomic conditions, interacting broadly 
by a top-down policy. 
The status of property rights in China is a very unique one. Paper 1 finds that 
property rights are generally thought to influence household behavior regarding 
resource use and environmental management. However, Paper 2 shows that there 
are increasing concerns surrounding uncertainty over the lack of property rights in 
rural China. Both the separation and limited duration have posed great challenges to 
“well-defined property rights”. However, as the property rights issue in China is 
embedded in the political system and ideology, it is less likely to see any dramatic 
changes in the near future. Therefore, PES in China has to adapt to this precondition 
and use other mechanisms to fix the vacuum in property rights. For example, 
Chinese governments have used a combination of regulatory and voluntary 
manoeuvres to encourage transactions. However, caution should be paid here, as 
this kind of “solving” incomplete property rights may come at the cost of 
undermining the willingness of households. While this approach may be effective in 
the short-term, the strength of property rights is still needed, especially for the far-
off farm oriented households who have successfully grown the trees. 
China is developing an alternative model of the role of non-governmental actors in 
environmental governance (Guttman et al. 2018). This dissertation found that the 
local government affiliated or related agencies could potentially fill the role of 
intermediaries in bringing together government and local households for up-front 
negotiations. In order to integrate the centrally designed approach specifically in to 
local social and ecological contexts, local institutional resources, including the 
involvement of local government agencies, village councils (farmer councils), village 
chiefs, forest field stations and farmers may be forced to coordinate and ideally 
deliberate the terms and conditions of implementation and management options. 
They are jointly responsible for collecting and reporting information about local 
economic and ecological conditions, communicating higher directives to individual 
households, allocating reforestation quotas, calculating payments, providing 
technical supports and monitoring project implementation. This collaboration 
between local actors and their motivations and interests for the implementation on 
the ground play crucial roles. The role of local agencies as the “in-system” 
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intermediaries for governmental PES should be recognized and appreciated by the 
government (Paper 3). However, as tasks and responsibilities are not well defined, 
overlaps and conflicts between local actors may cause substantial ineffectiveness in 
program implementation. Furthermore, bureaucratic complexity and rent-seeking 
behavior could undermine any cooperation. Rent-seeking behavior has been 
reflected in implementation, as local government agencies have found other ways to 
benefit from the system by increasing land conversion quotas, exceeding quotas and 
bargaining for more payment. As a result, local agencies view SLCP payments as 
opportunities for financing their operation’s costs. Conflicts between local agencies 
and households were created when local agencies tried to minimize administrative 
costs by including parcels that were contiguous. 
Attention should be paid to understanding the combined effect and the trade-off 
effect. Paper 2 addresses questions A 2.1 and A 2.2, indicating that the combination 
of certain conditions rather than a single condition alone is crucial for the success or 
failure of household implementation of SLCP. Paper 4 takes this one step further, 
comparing the combination of certain design rules for governmental PES in Germany 
and China. A number of studies have presented certain design features and 
synthesized some common conditions for PES (Sattler and Matzdorf 2013). However, 
most existing studies have considered the various conditions individually and 
independently. Notably, Meyer et al. (Meyer et al. 2015) first showed that 
combinations of certain design rules influenced the success of a governmental 
payment scheme in Germany. Similarly, our SLCP study (Paper 2) shows that the 
combined effect of certain conditions rather than single conditions should be 
considered. In particular, for a successful reforestation program, household 
involvement, effective monitoring and financial incentives should all be present. 
While reforestation requires continuous management with a reliable reward system, 
this combination can foster a positive feedback loop by building long-lasting 
cooperation between households and government. We therefore want to call 
attention to combination when designing a PES scheme. 
5.2.2 Outlook of PES in China 
The development of SLCP works in parallel with the domestic concept of eco-
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compensation, which has laid the groundwork for PES in China. Eco-compensation 
has become a key initiative of the Chinese government and a hot topic in society. 
Besides this, it is indicative of a greater emphasis being placed on not only 
developing innovative market-based instruments, but also on resolving property 
rights and equity. As most eco-compensation projects in China have used public 
funds via top-down approaches, they have often been criticized for insufficient local 
engagement, poor administration, and corruption. While SLCP is fully funded by the 
central government, local governments in China have been important contributors to 
many centrally-initiated eco-compensation programmes (Figure 7), rapidly adapting 
central designs to suit their own needs. Recently, both central and local government 
have explicitly stated their aim of diversifying funding sources, suggesting that 
significant opportunities exist for private sectors being brought in as key partners and 
stakeholders. This is a good reason to believe that private actors may play more 
important roles in the near future. Some other structural changes, such as climate 
change, provide additional opportunities for re-structuring China’s PES in a new 
direction. Therefore, future research should focus on how to fit a more marketed-
based PES. 
 
 
Another trend of governmental PES in China is shown in the link between eco-
compensation and poverty alleviation. Poverty alleviation is the second goal of SLCP, 
Central 
government, 
89.80% 
Local 
government, 
9.80% 
Other, 0.30% 
Figure 7: Non-government investment in Eco-compensation (Leshan et al. 2016) 
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after forest restoration. However, the dual goals of ecological conservation and 
alleviation of poverty have placed local government in a dilemma, weakening its 
ability to ensure program compliance. Punishing poor performance tends to worsen 
living conditions in poor households. In 2014, the central Chinese government 
initiated a campaign of “Targeted Poverty Alleviation”. As poverty relief has been put 
at the top of the political agenda, eco-compensation became part of this critical 
national strategy. As a result, SLCP and eco-compensation have acquired more 
meaning when alleviating poverty than for their ecological objectives. This 
replacement may make the program look more like a subsidy program than a PES 
program, which might be a serious setback for transforming the traditional approach. 
Recently, eco-compensation has had a new focus for cross-sector and cross-boundary 
cooperation. China’s ecological conservation domain has been divided into different 
sectors, such as farmland, grassland, forestry and water conservation. Governmental 
departments in these sectors are separately responsible in their own sectors, and 
cross-sector cooperation was very challenging. Furthermore, how to balance the 
benefits between different regions was another difficult task. For example, west 
parts of China, which had played a key role in ES provision, often had conflicts with 
the east parts when not paying enough for ES. How to cope with the existing 
institutional settings and break down the barriers between different sectors and 
regions is, until now, not clear. 
In late 2016, the central government decided not to extend the contract for land that 
came first (1999-2005) (State Forest Administration 2016), despite calls for 
extensions by provincial governments and the scientific community. According to the 
State Forest Administration, from 2017 onward, the successfully-established 
“ecological forest” could be categorized as a national public forest, which is entitled 
to annual compensation. The successfully-established “economic forest” was to be 
developed with the under-forest economy (agroforestry), and even allowed to be cut 
down if permitted by a local authority (State Forest Administration 2016). The final 
decision made by SLCP did not offer a solution to those who failed to achieve this 
outcome. Therefore, timely policies should be made for these “ignored” households 
by guiding them from previously failed paths on to successful paths. In particular, the 
combined effect of household involvement and governmental monitoring can help 
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households break down socioeconomic and institutional constraints. 
5.2.3 Reflection on global PES debates 
On a global level, debate surrounding the private Coasean PES schemes vs. public 
Pigouvian schemes (market-based approach vs. hierarchy-based approach) is a prime 
consideration in PES research (Muradian and Rival 2012, Vatn 2015, Wunder 2015, 
Raes et al. 2016). Market-based PES for environmental governance has been 
promoted as being among the best-suited instruments for delivering equitable ES 
(Wunder 2013). As the well-known advocate of market-based PES, Wunder (Wunder 
2013) admitted that “PES do require a payment culture and good organization from 
service users, a trustful negotiation climate, and well-defined land- or resource-
tenure regimes for providers”. With such preconditions, PES might be promising in 
some cases. However, its potential could be limited in others. Against this backdrop, 
literature increasingly emphasizes that PES are not ‘real’ markets, but rather hybrids 
that lie between markets and hierarchies (Muradian et al. 2010).  
The Chinese experience has shown that governmental PES has great potential for 
creating significant economies of scale and cost efficiencies when compared to other 
types of PES (Engel, Pagiola et al. 2008). In China, vast administrative resources, 
together with tremendous investment, have enabled large-scale payment programs 
to be implemented, with broad geographic cover and strong participation. The SLCP 
can be an important milestone in governmental PES in China and other countries 
with similar institutional settings. If the problem of property rights and 
intermediaries is an established feature of the political and social context, many 
developing countries might benefit from the Chinese experience. 
Notably, incomplete institutional settings didn't prevent SLCP’s wide acceptance and 
fast development at the beginning phases of the program. In these phases, farmers' 
interests (saving time from on-farm work to off-farm work) overlap with SLCP’s goal 
of land retirement. Farmers are willing to retire some low-productivity lands in 
exchange for government payments in order to free themselves from time-
consuming farm work. Therefore, farmers, village councils and local officials share 
some common interests (He and Sikor 2015). As local government affiliated or 
related agencies could potentially fill the role of intermediaries, the Chinese 
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governmental PES tend to have a great advantages in mobilizing rural households for 
enrollment. SLCP had attracted many participants in the beginning phases and was 
praised as an efficient approach to solving urgent environmental problems in the 
short-term. However, it would be very difficult for government affiliated or related 
agencies to overcome bureaucratic complexity and rent-seeking behavior. After 
enrollment, some of the missing principles appear to be very important in keeping 
households from simply making one-off acts and to continuing them, with long-
lasting effort being made. The program’s predominantly top-down approach and lack 
of true voluntariness, conditionality, property rights, differentiation and mechanisms 
for ensuring sustainability are understood to be critical factors in explaining possible 
failures in the long-term. Therefore, there is no bypass for reaching long term success 
in terms of environmental effectiveness, in the absence of key PES elements (real 
incentives). 
The lessons learnt from China can be viewed through the lens of transaction cost 
theory (Williamson 1979, 1996). In China, the majority of rural households are very 
small-scale and their land property rights are not clearly defined. As the costs of 
bringing parties together can be enormous, therefore, the argument exists that 
administrative authorities with institutional resources are necessary for engaging in 
transactions. This could substantially reduce transaction costs, bringing together 
millions of ES sellers and negotiating and implementing contracts (Kolinjivadi and 
Sunderland 2012). However, government control of transactions is unlikely to reduce 
the total transaction cost for PES. The ambiguity found in property rights and the 
dual role of the government as intermediary and ‘buyer’ may cause bureaucratic 
inefficiency, rent-seeking behavior and cheating, signaling higher internal transaction 
costs (Kolinjivadi and Sunderland 2012). Compared to wholly voluntary PES, the total 
transaction of governmental PES could be even higher in the long-term, unless 
collective decision-making at local levels can be promoted. 
Eco-compensation and PES are good examples of Chinese policy makers learning 
from international experience and refining their current programs. As China is 
increasing important in global leadership of environmental affairs (Guttman et al. 
2018), it is essential for the world to understand of how western PES concept is 
translated into a China context. China’s ongoing eco-compensation and policy 
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innovations could enlarge the scope of PES and provide valuable lessons for 
international policymakers and practitioners. 
5.3 Methods for ecosystem service governance 
The institutional analysis of PES is challenging due to the complex settings, diversity 
of actors and dynamic nature of social-ecological systems. Therefore, the analysis of 
governance solutions calls for interdisciplinary and participatory approaches. A 
method review from our colleagues (Sattler et al. 2018) showed that less 
interdisciplinary methods are applied to justify the complex issues of ecosystem 
service governance, with few participatory methods being used to encourage 
stakeholder engagement. My experience has shown that mixed approaches 
combining qualitative and quantitative methods, such as QCA and SNA, have great 
potential for filling in the gaps. Despite being well-established tools in their own 
disciplines, the application of the two methods in the field of environmental 
governance is rare. 
5.3.1 QCA in determining institutional conditions 
As a formalized way of determining preferred environmental governance structures, 
QCA offers great opportunities for analyzing existing governance approaches and 
supporting implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. In order to address research 
object B1, this dissertation has shown that QCA provides an excellent tool for 
translating institutional complexity into reduced and comparable arrangements, and 
for formulating inferences on policy design. 
QCA could be very helpful in determining whether certain conditions, either 
individually, in combination or in absence, are sufficient for facilitating the successful 
implementation of PES (Paper 2). This dissertation also has taken a broader 
methodological view by explaining how two different QCA methods could be applied 
to international content (Paper 4). The application of crisp-set QCA (csQCA) and 
fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) to Comparative Institutional Analysis (CIA) are illustrated step 
by step, based on two case studies from Germany and China. Unlike other methods, 
particularly quantitative approaches, the QCA method shows combinations of 
conditions that are relevant for a certain outputs and does not focus on the impact 
of single conditions. The well-verified and interpreted results provide straightforward 
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and highly relevant policy implications that can easily be communicated to relevant 
decision-making bodies and decision makers. The advantages of QCA may be 
especially relevant in terms of research on PES, which requires a better integration of 
relations between institutional, socioeconomic and environmental issues. 
5.3.2 Net-Map for participatory network mapping 
Social network analysis (SNA) is a suitable methodology for uncovering involved 
actors, their motivations and power relationships, and institutional settings. 
Addressing to research object B2 this dissertation showed Net-Map, as a tool for 
SNA, could be strong in understanding institutional interplay and governance model 
(paper 3). Net-Map can help stakeholders understand, visualize, discuss, monitor, 
evaluate and improve situations in which many different actors influence outcomes. 
By creating the network maps, individuals and groups can clarify their own views of a 
situation, foster discussion, and develop a strategic approach to networking 
activities.  
Net-Map also can be used as a facilitation tool or for research interviews. It is hands-
on, low-tech and participatory. Like an “ice-breaker”, the easy-going and playful 
atmosphere enables the participants to talk freely about their social network, 
especially informal one. Some institutional aspects, which are traditionally difficult to 
explore, can be reveal. It addresses several problems that may occur during 
interviews, such as reaching transparency and common understanding through 
visualizing the situation, overcoming shyness (Paper 5). It can ultimately improve 
social learning and the quality of interview data (Schiffer and Waale, 2008; Campbell 
et al., 2014). 
5.4 Overall limitations 
5.4.1 The design of governmental PES 
This dissertation has contributed to narrowing the gap between international PES 
concepts and the Chinese practice of eco-compensation. While the SLCP is a major 
component in China’s ecological conservation policy, it cannot wholly represent the 
image of governmental PES in China. As most implications of this dissertation are 
based SLCP, some features of other eco-compensation programmes might be 
overseen. For example, this dissertation focused on only forest ecosystem services. 
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However, other ecological programs, such as watershed compensation schemes, may 
contribute differently. Future research should identify links between institutional 
settings with other programs as well as different instruments (such as auctions and 
credits). Furthermore, the theoretical re-framing of PES with incomplete institutional 
settings has not yet been compared with other countries.  
The sample size of my case study is relatively small, as Paper 2 includes 59 
households and Paper 3 includes 31 interviews with stakeholders. All the case studies 
are in Jingyuan County, from the Guyuan Region of the Ningxia Hui Autonomous 
Region. The results show that environmental effectiveness is different among 
households and townships, where institutional settings and local dynamics played 
important roles. However, these findings need to be further investigated, with a 
larger number of samples size and in a larger scale, if someone seeks to analyse more 
generalized implications for China and the world. The case studies carried out in this 
dissertation, however, have wide relevance for the understanding of eco-
compensation and PES in China, as other regions which had implemented the same 
program shared similar stories. 
Some other institutional elements, such as trust, norms and traditions, may have 
been underestimated in the dissertation. Trust is the cornerstone of cooperation and 
public goods provision. While trust was only partial addressed in Paper 3, norms and 
tradition were left out in this dissertation. Adding them to the institutional settings 
could provide more holistic insights. 
Finally, this dissertation has taken a static point of view to look at institutional 
settings. However, the forest sector in China is experiencing rapid institutional 
transformations and modernization, including tenure reform, logging bans and 
administrative structural changes. Further study could focus on the interplay 
between institutional changes and PES implementation. 
5.4.2 Methodological limitations 
I consider QCA and SNA alternative or complementary methods to conventional 
research approaches. This dissertation has no intention to argue that QCA and SNA 
are substitutions for the traditional qualitative and quantitative approaches (such as 
statistic and regression analysis). Therefore, this dissertation had not offered a 
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comparison between the “new” and “old” methods. Future efforts on integrated 
evaluation methods on the ecosystem services governance approaches are highly 
recommended. 
Some attention should be paid to the backdrop of QCA and SNA. QCA has been 
criticized for reduced case numbers, limited causal conditions (Rihoux and Lobe 
2009), subjective condition selection and imperfect calibration (Basurto and Speer 
2012). Similarly to other case-oriented studies, QCA faces the same challenge of only 
a limited number of cases and conditions being considered. Having many cases and 
conditions may affect the result. Moreover, the selection of cases and conditions has 
a strong impact on the results of the research. The selection must be based on 
careful consideration and strong arguments, in order to avoid subjectivity. As a key 
part of fsQCA, calibration is essential for the reliability and replicability of the result. 
Therefore, it needs to be done carefully, documented clearly and in great detail. 
During the review process of paper 2, the subjectivity of condition selection was 
criticized by the reviewers and my experience showed that it demands lots of efforts 
to convince the reviewers. 
For conducting Net-Map interviews, researchers have to consider the specific 
settings of the case study they want to investigate, especially regarding power 
relations and the distribution of knowledge. In contexts with strong hierarchies, the 
method becomes more difficult to apply. Local actors are not used to answering 
open questions, or do not have enough information due to poor participation in the 
design of the governance models. Only people with hierarchical power are capable of 
sharing information. Also, it was difficult to encourage people to guess about the 
other actors involved in this context, as well as links and influence from social 
spheres other than their own. Actors are not genuinely interested in clearly 
addressing power structures, and dependent actors do not feel free to evaluate 
others in their network. Therefore, the application of this method in highly 
hierarchical settings should be carefully considered. Further researches are 
encouraged with regarding power relationships and knowledge hierarchies in 
different social and institutional settings. 
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6 Conclusion 
This doctoral dissertation contributes to existing knowledge of institutional analysis 
of governmental PES by addressing two central objectives. The institutional design of 
a governmental PES program has been examined in China, and new methods for ES 
governance analysis have been discussed in an international context. 
This dissertation has shown that current western PES theory is not robust enough to 
capture the realities of what is happening for ES governance in China, where 
government is the predominant player, the property rights are separated and 
western distinctions among public sector, private sector, and civil society are not 
clearly applicable. 
The concept of PES is partially employed in China by providing eco-compensation. 
While the institutional settings might be considered incomplete according to western 
PES theory, it did not prevent the wide acceptance and rapid development of the 
major eco-compensation program at the beginning phase. The Chinese government 
used a combination of regulatory and voluntary manoeuvres to encourage 
transactions, and local government affiliated or related agencies filled the role of 
intermediaries. However, this model can not overcome bureaucratic complexity and 
rent-seeking behavior, and keep households from simply performing one-off acts, 
and encourage them to make a long-lasting effort. Therefore, the environmental 
performance in the long-term cannot be ensured in the absence of key PES elements. 
Eco-compensation may be an important reference for governmental PES, in which 
institutional requirements are as important as the designing of specific financial 
incentives. Some institutional challenges undermine the anticipated advantages of 
PES, and the path to environmental outcomes has been shaped by local institutional 
and socioeconomic conditions interacting with broad top-down policies. 
Governmental PES programs could benefit from adopting widely accepted principles 
which underly in typical PES, as reflected in policy design, implementation and 
monitoring. 
This dissertation also shows two innovative methods for supporting the research of 
ecosystem service governance. The QCA can be an excellent way of determining the 
preferred institutional arrangements for ES governance, while Net-Map tool can be a 
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flexible tool for understanding governance modes. QCA and Net-Map may be fruitful 
in PES research, which has been explored via either quantitative or qualitative 
approaches. 
Aiming to close the knowledge gap regarding the combination of voluntary market 
and hierarchy-based system, this dissertation hopes to offer a better understanding 
of governmental PES in dealing with incomplete institutional settings. 
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